'Putting Knowledge in Power': learning and innovation in the British Army of the First World War by Fox-Godden, Aimée Elizabeth
! 
 
 
 
‘Putting Knowledge in Power’: Learning and Innovation in 
the British army of the First World War 
 
by 
 
Aimée Elizabeth Fox-Godden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the 
degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of History 
School of History and Cultures 
College of Arts and Law 
University of Birmingham 
 
April 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
!ABSTRACT'
 
Learning is critical to battlefield success. Ceteris paribus, victory becomes more likely when 
militaries adapt faster and more effectively than their opponents. This thesis examines the 
effectiveness of the British army’s process for learning and adaptation across six different 
operational theatres during the First World War. Using a series of case studies, it considers how 
the army shared knowledge, responded to change, and integrated newcomers. It finds that the 
army’s attitudes towards learning were more thoroughgoing than hitherto thought. With its pre-
war ethos and increased fluidity in wartime, the army displayed organisational and cultural 
flexibility across all theatres, encouraging a culture of innovation through the promotion of 
informal learning and tactical diversity.  
 In a broader sense, the thesis does three things. First, it moves beyond the standard 
Western Front narrative of learning in the First World War, offering a more rounded 
examination of the army’s experience. Secondly, it highlights the complexity of military 
learning, considering that which occurs institutionally, between formations, and between 
theatres. Finally, it reflects on the importance of an organisation’s ethos when faced with 
uncertainty. This thesis, therefore, offers a point of departure for future studies of traditionally 
bureaucratic institutions and their ability to learn and innovate. 
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!NOTE'ON'STYLE'
 
Where possible, I have retained the original spelling and punctuation of primary source 
material. I have also refrained from using sic where possible, as such usage would obscure the 
significance of some of the extracts. Editorial interventions have been used to explain certain 
military abbreviations, i.e. G[eneral] O[fficer] C[ommanding]. Editorial omissions from original 
source material are denoted by use of an ellipsis (…). 
 
When referring to an individual’s rank and appointment, I have taken the decision to use the 
rank and appointment they held at the time of writing. This explains why certain individuals 
hold different ranks and positions throughout the course of this study. 
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! 1 
INTRODUCTION'
 
The man in the street might do well to consider whether the great departments of the 
Government, such as the War Office and the Army, should for ever be entrusted to men 
who have not even a nodding acquaintance with the business which their departments 
have to transact, the business of war. Success in that as in other business depends on 
putting knowledge in power.1 
Spenser Wilkinson 
 
There was a rigidity and restrictiveness about the methods employed which allowed no 
play for initiative, imagination and inventiveness… The men on the heights offered no 
encouragement or chances to genius down below.2 
David Lloyd George 
 
Learning is critical to battlefield success. Ceteris paribus, victory becomes more likely when 
militaries adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures faster than their opponents in response 
to changing operational environments. However, the two quotations above highlight the 
difficulty of promoting knowledge, change, and innovation in the British military. To put 
knowledge in power, as Wilkinson advocated, requires a culture that both tolerates and 
promotes the elevation of expertise; a leadership that recognises and acts on initiatives that 
enhance the army’s fighting capabilities; and a structure that allows for the dissemination and 
sharing of knowledge in a systematic way. For some, such as Lloyd George, the army was not 
hardwired to meet any of these requirements. In essence, it was a bureaucracy: rigid, 
hierarchical, bound by rules, and averse to change.  
 This thesis will examine the army’s process for learning and adaptation across six 
different operational theatres with the aim of answering the following question: how effective 
was the army at learning and adapting both on and beyond the Western Front during the First 
World War? Using a series of case studies to investigate how the army shared knowledge, how 
it responded to change, and how it integrated newcomers, the thesis will demonstrate that the 
army’s attitudes towards learning were more thoroughgoing than hitherto thought. There is a 
tendency to limit discussion of British military learning in the First World War to the Western 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 S. Wilkinson, Lessons of the War (London: Archibald Constable and Co., 1900), p. 47. 
2 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, II (2 vols., London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 2040. 
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Front and the end result of learning, namely combat effectiveness. This results in a 
misunderstanding of the army’s wider process for learning. If we fail to understand how the 
army learned, then we cannot truly understand how the army changed. This thesis goes beyond 
earlier studies, considering multiple theatres and examining different aspects of the army’s 
process for learning to determine whether the army was institutionally capable of learning from 
its myriad experiences and to what extent it put knowledge in power.  
 
For historians, the military’s ability to learn, change, and innovate has proved of great interest, 
generating considerable scholarship that sits under the umbrella of ‘military innovation studies’. 
This field of work has generated four different models: top-down innovation, bottom-up 
innovation, adaptation, and horizontal innovation. Before exploring these four strands of 
scholarship, some terms used in the literature require definition, namely transformation, 
innovation, and adaptation. Transformation, according to Paul Davis, means a ‘“profound 
change” in military affairs’.3 It does not necessarily imply rapid or across-the-board change, but 
the changes made should be ‘dramatic rather than mere improvements on the margin such as 
modestly better aircraft, tanks, or ships’. Transformation is viewed as a continuous process with 
‘no simple end point’.4 Similar to transformation is the idea of innovation. Indeed, Robert Foley, 
Helen McCartney, and Stuart Griffin have noted that transformation is simply military 
innovation by another name.5 Unlike transformation, innovation has a fixed end point. It can be 
defined as major change, such as a new way of fighting or the creation of a new combat arm, 
which is institutionalised in new doctrine, new structures, or new technologies.6 According to 
Stephen Rosen, changes that leave the ‘essential workings of that organization unaltered do not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 P. K. Davis, ‘Military Transformation? Which Transformation and What Lies Ahead?’ in S. J. Cimbala 
(ed.), The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 
2010), p. 11. 
4 Davis, ‘Military Transformation?’, p. 11. 
5 R. T. Foley, H. McCartney, and S. Griffin, ‘“Transformation in Contact”: Learning the Lessons of 
Modern War’, International Affairs 87 (2) (2011), p. 253. 
6 S. P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), pp. 7-8. 
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count as innovation’.7 Unlike innovation, adaptation is seen in terms of incremental change and 
usually relates to change in wartime. Adaptation, according to Theo Farrell, can be defined as a 
‘change to tactics, techniques, or existing technologies to improve operational performance’.8 
For Williamson Murray, the difference is not so much about the scale of change, but the type of 
environment with innovation occurring in peacetime, and adaptation in time of war.9 In this 
thesis, Farrell’s distinction between innovation and adaptation will be used.  
 Early military innovation studies aligned with a top-down approach – the first strand of 
scholarship. Focused on innovation in peacetime, particularly during the interwar period, this 
approach viewed the military as bureaucratic, rigidly hierarchical, and change resistant. In 
essence, these studies reinforced tenets of Max Weber’s view of complex organisations: that 
absence of innovation is the natural state for a bureaucracy. The military was seen as incapable 
of changing on its own. According to Rosen and Barry Posen, it was ‘designed not to change’, 
and required a ‘kick in the pants’ if it was to innovate.10 Instead, it needs to be goaded into 
change through top-down interventions. These interventions could occur in three ways. First, as 
advanced by Posen, Kimberley Zisk, and Deborah Avant, through a civil-military partnership 
with statesmen pushing, or working in conjunction with, military leaders or ‘mavericks’.11 This 
civil-military model underpinned the USA’s ‘transformation’ programme, which reflected an 
attitude that civilian management ‘could and should wrench hidebound military bureaucracies 
around to a new way of fighting’.12 Secondly, innovation could occur through the influence of 
senior military leaders, as argued by Rosen.13 For Rosen, externally imposed change is likely to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 8. 
8  T. G. Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan, 2006-2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33 (4) (2010), p. 569. 
9 W. Murray, Military Adaptation in War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 2-5. 
10 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 2; B. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and 
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 226. 
11 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; K. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and 
Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); D. Avant, 
Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
12 J. A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and 
Ninewa Provinces, 2005-2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 10-11, 15, 17. 
13 Rosen, Winning the Next War. 
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fail. Instead, the alignment of senior military leaders, mid-level officers, and promotion 
pathways is key.14 Finally, through a process of cultural change, whether ‘planned’ by senior 
military figures, through external shocks, or by emulation of other forces. Theo Farrell, Terry 
Terriff, and Elizabeth Kier have pioneered this particular cultural model of top-down 
innovation.15 All these studies are concerned with organisation-wide revolutions, disruptive 
technological change, and elite-driven politics.16 As we can see, the top-down approach argues 
that only civilians or senior military leaders can effect innovation. It does not focus on the role 
of practitioners. By focusing on peacetime, researchers also ignore the ‘adapt or die’ dilemma 
that accompanies the victory imperative of war. 
 This top-down focus led Eliot Cohen and Adam Grissom to call for research into 
‘bottom-up’ innovation – the second strand of scholarship. They argued that ‘military people, 
technology and particular tactical circumstances’ drove innovation.17 Emphasis was placed on 
military practitioners and their ability to drive innovation from the bottom up. Unlike the top-
down view of militaries as Weberian bureaucracies, this bottom-up approach instead aligned 
with the behaviourist school of management, pioneered by Chester Barnard. Scholars 
recognised that human behaviour, particularly lower down the hierarchy, was an important 
determinant of organisational behaviour.18  
 Scholars such as Farrell soon recast this bottom-up approach as ‘military adaptation’ – 
the third strand of scholarship. Adaptation studies have tended to focus on modern, Western 
militaries during counterinsurgency operations in order to distil lessons for future conflicts. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
15 T. G. Farrell and T. Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2002); E. Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). 
16 N. A. Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies (Published Online 3 January 2015. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2014.971947), p. 5 [Accessed 4 
January 2015]. 
17 E. A. Cohen, ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (3) 
(2004), pp. 395-407; A. Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29 (5) (2006), pp. 905-934. 
18 See, for example, M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, trans. M. Crozier (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 162; F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the 
Worker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968 [1938]). 
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Such research has drawn on the fundamental tenets of organisational learning theory to 
understand better how militaries respond to change in wartime. Key themes include the 
relationship between informal and formal methods of learning, the importance of organisational 
flexibility and culture, as well as the possibility of horizontal learning that ultimately eschews 
the vectored language of top-down and bottom-up.19 These key themes will be discussed in turn. 
 An effective relationship between informal and formal methods of learning is necessary 
for organisational learning to take place. Before unpacking this relationship, some terms require 
definition. Though it has generated a wealth of literature, there is little consensus on what is 
meant by ‘organisational learning’.20 For the purposes of this study, however, Marlene Fiol and 
Marjorie Lyles’ definition will be used, which states that organisational learning is ‘the process 
of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding’.21 Informal and formal 
learning are easier to define. Informal learning is that which occurs through practice and 
experience. It is tacit in nature, often unintended and opportunistic. 22  It is also highly 
personalised, taking place between individuals. Formal learning, on the other hand, is 
‘institutionally sponsored’, occurring in an organised and structured context.23 However, as 
Daniel Kim notes, even in the most bureaucratic institutions, there is much more that is 
unwritten, unsaid, and informal in nature.24 The relationship between informal and formal 
methods has been the focus of research by Keith Bickel, Robert Foley, Helen McCartney and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Studies on military adaptation include T. G. Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, pp. 567-594; S. Catignani, 
‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the 
British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (4) (2012), pp. 513-539; R. T. Foley, ‘A Case Study in 
Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916-1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (6) 
(2012), pp. 799-827; Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon’, pp. 1-25; K. A. Harkness and M. Hunzeker, ‘Military 
Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure’, Journal of Strategic Studies  (Published 
Online 3 January 2015. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2014.960078), p. 5 [Accessed 4 January 2015]. 
20 See D. H. Kim, ‘The Link between Organizational and Individual Learning’, Sloane Management 
Review (Fall, 1993), p. 37; M. M. Crossan, H. W. Lane, and R. E. White, ‘An Organizational Learning 
Framework: From Intuition to Institution’, Academy of Management Review 24 (3) (1999), p. 522. 
21 C. M. Fiol and M. A. Lyles, ‘Organizational Learning’, Academy of Management Review 10 (4) (1985), 
p. 803. 
22 M. Eraut, ‘Informal Learning in the Workplace’, Studies in Continuing Education 26 (2) (2004), p. 250, 
23 D. McGuire and C. Gubbins, ‘The Slow Death of Formal Learning: A Polemic’, Human Resource 
Development Review 9 (3) (2010), p. 250. 
24 Kim, ‘Organizational and Individual Learning’, p. 45. 
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Stuart Griffin, Paddy O’Toole and Steven Talbot, and Chad Serena.25 Though recognising the 
importance of informal methods as key sites for adaptation, they warn against the danger of 
failing to integrate them into the formal learning system.26 This can lead to ‘adaptation traps’ 
where valuable, often low level, knowledge is lost to the military. More recently, Sergio 
Catignani and Nina Kollars have further explored this problem in their respective research on 
the British army in Afghanistan and the US army in Vietnam.27 Catignani, for example, argues 
that ‘lessons identified and practices employed by tactical units… often a result of ad hoc 
change or of transient and informal mechanisms has made it very difficult for… adaptation to 
convert into innovation’.28 Kollars goes further and suggests that failure to capture or harness 
this informal learning ‘works against a service’s organizational memory’, increasing the 
likelihood of solutions being ‘lost, reinvented, or duplicated under the fog of war’.29 
 Though organisational learning is reliant on the interaction between formal and 
informal methods, it also requires an environment and culture that is flexible enough to support 
it. Flexibility is an important theme in adaptation scholarship. Rather than seeing the military as 
rigid and inflexible, some studies have posited that, in response to wartime situations, it 
becomes far more decentralised and fluid. It is not rigidity that undermines efforts to change, 
but rather the military’s struggle with ‘the knowledge generated by its practitioners’.30 Doubler 
provided one of the earliest studies on the importance of flexibility and this has found support 
from John Buckley, James Russell, Raphael Marcus, and Foley.31 Russell in particular makes a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 K. B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); Foley et al., ‘“Transformation in Contact”’; P. O’Toole and S. 
Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army’, Armed Forces 
and Society 37 (1) (2011), pp. 42-67; C. C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in 
the Iraq War (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).  
26  Foley et al., ‘“Transformation in Contact”’, pp. 269-270; O’Toole and Talbot, ‘Fighting for 
Knowledge’, pp. 61-62; Serena, Revolution in Military Adaptation, pp. 113-114. 
27 S. Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 37 (1) (2013), pp. 30-64; Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN”’; Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon’. 
28 Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN”’, p. 536. 
29 Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon’, p. 20. 
30 Ibid., p. 6. 
31 M. D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994); J. Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 9-11, 92-98; J. Buckley, ‘Tackling the Tiger: The Development of British 
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compelling argument in his study of the US army’s adaptation in Iraq, showing how ‘a 
collection of hierarchically structured organizations’ became the ‘kind of agile and adaptive 
structures thought to exist only in certain parts of the private sector’.32 Foley, on the other hand, 
has shown the importance of learning cultures to British and German adaptation during the First 
World War. The British, for example, made more effective use of top-down interventions, 
contrasted with the bottom-up and horizontal approach of the German army. He goes on to 
suggest that the British army was more likely to use ‘non-formal’ methods owing to its 
organisational culture.33 However, this thesis will suggest that in important ways Foley’s views 
need to be revised. 
 The importance of culture has also been considered through the lens of the ‘learning 
organisation’. Rooted in the work of management theorists, Peter Senge and Chris Argyris,34 the 
‘learning organisation’ concept has been appropriated by individuals such as Downie and John 
Nagl.35 In his study of US and British learning in Vietnam and Malaya respectively, Nagl 
argued that the US army’s attempts to learn were thwarted by its unshakeable organisational 
culture.36 Conversely, the British army had a culture that supported learning and ultimately 
succeeded in Malaya because it was a ‘learning organisation’. Though Nagl’s research is highly 
influential, it has drawn criticism for its use of the ‘learning organisation’ concept. There is little 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Armoured Doctrine for Normandy 1944’, Journal of Military History 74 (2010), p. 1182; Russell, 
Innovation, Transformation and War; R. Marcus, ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the 
Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies (Published Online 1 August 2014. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2014.923767), pp. 1-29 [Accessed 2 
August 2014]; R. Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies 
during the Great War’, International Affairs 90 (2) (2014), pp. 279-298. 
32 Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, p. 211. 
33 Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys’, pp. 291-295. 
34 See P. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (London: 
Century Business, 1992); C. Argyris, On Organizational Learning (Oxford: Blackwell Business, 1999). 
35 Downie, Learning from Conflict; J. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (London: University of Chicago Press, 2005 [2002]), pp. 115-116, 
217. 
36 For a counterpoint to this aspect of Nagl’s argument, see G. A. Daddis, ‘Eating Soup with a Spoon: The 
U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War’, Journal of Military History 77 (2013), pp. 
229-254. 
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consensus as to what constitutes such an organisation.37 Scholars such as Farrell, Catignani, and 
David French have argued that the British army has tended to engage in campaign-specific 
learning cycles.38 Given that one of the hallmarks of a ‘learning organisation’ is its sustained 
ability to learn and adapt, scholars such as French and Victoria Nolan have examined the army’s 
operations over a longer period of time to test the validity of such statements.39 
 By focusing on the culture and organisational make up of the military, studies have 
begun to move away from the explicitly vectored language of innovation. As Matthew Ford has 
argued, is it necessary and right to privilege the voice from below when seeking to understand 
the army’s learning process?40 Recent studies have pursued this line of enquiry either through 
research into horizontal innovation, or by acknowledging the interplay between vectored 
approaches. This represents the fourth and final strand of military innovation scholarship. Foley, 
in particular, has pioneered research in this area with his study on horizontal innovation in the 
German army of the First World War.41 He contends that the Germany army was able to 
innovate extremely rapidly owing to its predilection for horizontal learning between units, aided 
by the production of low level ‘lessons learned’ reports. Although Foley’s research breaks new 
ground, it does not fully examine how the process takes place. Given that Army Group 
Rupprecht made it ‘a requirement’ for all divisions to complete these reports, with German high 
command disseminating them, it is questionable as to how horizontal the method actually was.42 
Though supporting Foley’s work, Marcus and Kollars take a more complete approach to 
horizontal learning, viewing it as part of the interaction between top-down and bottom-up !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See C. Hughes and M. Tight, ‘The Myth of the Learning Society’, British Journal of Educational 
Studies 43 (3) (1995), p. 299; S. B. T. Mitchell, ‘An Inter-Disciplinary Study of Learning in the 32nd 
Division on the Western Front, 1916-1918’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013, 
pp. 21-22. 
38 Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, p. 591; D. French, British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-67 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 6; Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN”’, pp. 536-537. 
39 French, British Way in Counter-Insurgency; V. Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: 
The British Army and Small War Strategy since World War 2 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012). 
40 M. Ford, ‘Learning the Right Lessons: Military Transformation in Crisis and the Future of Britain’s 
Armed Forces’, in M. LoCicero, R. Mahoney, and S. Mitchell (eds.), A Military Transformed? 
Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion, 2014), p. 258. 
41 Foley, ‘Horizontal Military Innovation’. 
42 Ibid., p. 815. 
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innovation. Marcus, for example, highlights the ‘dynamic interplay’ between these approaches, 
while Kollars suggests that adaptation and innovation need not be vectored at all and that a 
military’s ‘tolerance of creativity’ is enough.43 This ‘tolerance’ highlights the importance of 
organisational culture and, as this thesis will argue, ethos as drivers of learning and adaptation. 
 While the importance of informal and formal processes and organisational flexibility 
have been considered in military innovation studies, they have not been the subject of such 
sustained analysis in studies on the British army of the First World War. Foley’s examination of 
British and German learning is an exception to this rule, while scholars such as Michel Goya 
and Christian Stachelbeck have considered such processes within the French and German 
armies respectively.44 Both Goya and Stachelbeck highlight the importance of each army’s pre-
war ethos as an important precursor to innovation.45 On the whole, though, studies relating to 
learning and adaptation in the British army have shied away from such analyses; rather, there is 
a tendency to focus on the emergence of new technologies, or increased combat effectiveness. 
This bias has dominated academic scholarship for the last thirty years with an almost exclusive 
focus on the Western Front. 
 Studies that consider learning in the army have broadly aligned with the concept of a 
‘learning curve’. This concept is used to describe the evolution of the army from a small, 
colonial gendarmerie in 1914 to a mass citizen army capable of waging sophisticated operations 
in industrial warfare in 1918. Historians associated with the learning curve have used the term 
to convey the belief that the army learned from its mistakes at the operational and tactical levels 
of war, attaining a high level of proficiency that manifested itself during the Hundred Days 
offensive of 1918. Studies that laid the groundwork for the learning curve include John 
Terraine’s Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier, White Heat, and Shelford Bidwell and 
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Dominick Graham’s Fire-Power.46 These three works challenged the ‘lions led by donkeys’ 
view of the war, demonstrating that the army ‘learned from its experience’ through its adoption 
of new tactics and weaponry. 47  Fire-Power was particularly influential in this respect. 
According to Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, it inaugurated a ‘new era of scholarship’, which 
‘concentrated on the Army as an institution’.48 Early examples of this new scholarship included 
works by Bill Rawling and Paddy Griffith. 49  Griffith’s work in particular provided a 
counterblast to suggestions by historians such as Timothy Lupfer and Bruce Gudmundsson that 
the Germany army was far more tactically progressive than the British.50 However, not all 
works at this time were as effusive in their praise. Tim Travers, for example, was more critical 
in his analyses.51 Though acknowledging that the British army ‘appeared to be more flexible 
tactically’, he argued that its officer corps found the ‘contours’ of the Western Front ‘too 
difficult… to perceive clearly, or to understand, or to which they could adapt’.52 In their 
biography of General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, though recognising 
the forward strides made by the army in the application of firepower and of ‘hard learned 
lessons and mounting experience’, were generally critical of British generalship.53 
 Building on these early studies, scholarship has expanded down a number of lines of 
enquiry, tending to focus on operational and tactical considerations, including studies on 
command and generalship; new technologies such as artillery, gas, and tanks; and the important !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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role of Imperial forces.54 Researchers have also begun to pay attention to the less glamorous 
aspects of war with studies on intelligence, communications, munitions development, and 
logistics.55 These valuable studies have added colour and depth to our understanding of the 
myriad changes taking place at different levels of command, in different branches, and behind 
the lines. Although the learning curve offers a neat analogy, it is telling that historians now tend 
to refer to it as a ‘learning process’ in an attempt to reflect the disjointed nature of learning in 
wartime. Both Dan Todman and Jonathan Boff have cautioned against the smooth progression 
that a curve entails.56 Todman has argued that it is more accurate to ‘posit a variety of different 
developmental processes’ that ‘changed at different times’.57 Boff expands on this view in his 
work on the British Third Army in 1918. For him, the process was far more complicated, 
arguing that learning was not ‘an abstract exercise aimed at solving a single equation, but an 
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intensely practical attempt to unpick a series of different specific tactical, operational and 
strategic knots’.58 
 This thesis accepts that a learning process took place in the British army. The army’s 
success in 1918 confirmed that it had established and maintained a learning superiority over its 
adversaries that, while not flawless, was certainly good enough. However, there are certain 
aspects of its learning process that have been insufficiently explored in the existing 
historiography. First, the very nature of this process and its constant evolution throughout the 
course of the war has been poorly served. This is typified by studies such as Griffith’s Battle 
Tactics on the Western Front and Peter Simkins’ From the Somme to Victory, both of which 
view the Somme campaign as the watershed moment for the army.59 According to Griffith, it 
was the Somme that ‘transformed it [the army] from a largely inexperienced mass army into a 
largely experienced one’.60 Unwittingly or not, this truncates the learning process, serving to 
discount the previous twenty-three months of warfare. With notable exceptions, this tendency is 
also reflected in the relative lack of scholarship on learning in the army from 1914-1915.61 
 Secondly, there has been little attempt to disaggregate the learning process and examine 
the methods the army used to learn. It is only recently that scholars such as Foley and Jim Beach 
have started to examine the nuts and bolts of the process.62 As noted above, Foley discusses the 
army’s tendency towards pragmatic, people-driven solutions, using the development of tanks 
and the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes as evidence of this.63 Beach’s research into the army’s 
doctrine writing process enhances our understanding of how doctrine was created, suggesting 
that the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] moved from an ad hoc approach to a far more 
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systematic one.64 However, these doctrinal pamphlets are not conclusive proof of steadily 
increasing competence. The process of doctrine writing was haphazard and did not really mature 
until mid-1918. To focus on these formal methods, notably the army’s Stationery Service [SS] 
pamphlets, tells only half the story. The survival and accessibility of these pamphlets has been 
used to demonstrate how the army learned, particularly at the tactical level.65 However, as 
Albert Palazzo argues, manual publication is easy, but ‘the path to doctrinal inculcation is 
difficult and fraught with institutional obstacles’.66 These obstacles often relate to the attitudes 
of individuals who may display resistance or inertia. Conversely, as we have seen with the 
literature on adaptation, members often partake in individual, informal learning that can be of 
great benefit to the organisation. With the exception of Foley, these informal methods have been 
conspicuous by their absence in scholarship of the First World War. Part of the problem is lack 
of evidence. Many of these informal interactions were not written down and are, therefore, lost 
to history. However, another reason relates to arguments advanced by Travers and Murray, 
which undermine the efficacy of the army’s formal methods.67 Both Travers and Murray 
highlight the anti-intellectualism of the army’s officer corps and argue that such a mindset 
impacted on its ability to learn during the war. Murray argues that ‘with the exception of the 
Germans, military organisations in the 1914-1918 conflict simply did not possess the means to 
gather and analyse combat experience in a coherent fashion’.68 He goes on to state that Field 
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s failure to ‘appoint a director of training… until 1918 underlines a 
failure to recognise the need for a coherent and consistent response to the tactical conditions 
encountered’.69 This not only undermines the army’s formal methods for learning, but also 
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reinforces Travers’ argument that the Germany army lost the war, rather than the British 
winning it.70 As such, ‘revisionist’ historians have sought to prove the efficacy of such formal 
methods to refute Travers’ assertion. 
 Thirdly, and finally, despite Sheffield and Bourne’s contention that new scholarship has 
‘concentrated on the Army as an institution’, the majority of it has focused on the experience of 
the BEF only. The experience of this one force has been extrapolated to represent that of the 
army as a whole. It is unsurprising that both Sir Hew Strachan and William Philpott have called 
for a less Anglocentric, less Western Front bias to First World War scholarship.71 For the British 
army, the Western Front was, undoubtedly, the most important and intensely fought campaign 
of the war. However, it is both dangerous and fallacious to assume that it is the only military 
experience of the period worth understanding. Until relatively recently, the subsidiary theatres 
suffered from relative historical indifference: their marginalised nature in wartime has been 
reflected in their position within the historiography. Early studies on these theatres were often 
narrative accounts that focused on campaign and battle studies, or personal experiences.72 
However, recent scholarship by historians such as Strachan, Matthew Hughes, James Kitchen, 
Andrew Syk, Yigal Sheffy, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen has sought to reassess these 
subsidiary theatres, moving away from sentimental, narrative accounts of battles to an objective 
analysis of each theatre.73 This research has succeeded in overturning some of the deep-rooted, 
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popular assumptions on the nature and conduct of war in these theatres. However, there is still a 
tendency to analyse theatres singly, without recourse to others. Though understandable, this can 
result in a skewed picture of progress and development. Matthew Hughes’ excellent account of 
General Sir Edmund Allenby’s command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force [EEF], for 
example, offered limited consideration of Allenby’s Western Front career, despite its significant 
influence on his training and personal command ethos.74 To understand how the army learned as 
an institution, the links between those theatres must be acknowledged and explored. 
 Where these links have been acknowledged, the focus is often limited to a single branch 
or formation, rather than a broader consideration. In his seminal work on British military 
medicine during the First World War, Mark Harrison allows for ‘comparisons to be made 
between different theatres’, highlighting the importance of commanders such as Lieutenant-
General Sir Stanley Maude (Commander-in-Chief [CinC], Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force) 
in propagating particular lessons.75 However, Harrison’s focus is on the outcome, rather than the 
process, of learning. In their wide-ranging study on artillery, Paul Strong and Sanders Marble 
show how ‘different armies faced varied circumstances and came up with unique solutions’. 
Indeed, looking at one theatre is not enough, as this reveals ‘only one learning curve associated 
with the particular circumstances in a given theatre, and thus inevitably fails to demonstrate the 
complex evolutionary processes at work’.76 Brian Hall’s recent work on communications 
beyond the Western Front offers another useful attempt to discuss the war in a global context.77 
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war diaries of signal companies in every theatre’, using this as an example of ‘clear cross-
fertilization’.78 Despite this, Hall, unlike Harrison, does not consider the impact of informal 
methods or individual commanders on this process of inter-theatre learning. 
Over a third of the army’s formations saw service in a theatre beyond the Western 
Front, yet very few divisional studies examine a formation that served in these other theatres. 
The notable exceptions to this rule are two doctoral studies on the 10th (Irish) Division and 
52nd (Lowland) Division by Stephen Sandford and Christopher Forrest respectively.79 Both 
studies chart the divisions’ experiences of different theatres and both examine how development 
on the Western Front contributed to changes in warfare more broadly. Forrest, for example, 
persuasively argues that ‘much of the experience it [52nd Division] had collected whilst serving 
in Egypt and Palestine was relevant to the needs and demands of campaigning on the Western 
Front’.80 Although both these studies are useful, they are limited to single formations and 
primarily focus on tactical developments. 
 
As this literature review suggests, studies on learning and innovation are isolated and 
fragmentary in nature. Innovation studies usually focus on modern militaries or prioritise 
operational case studies that have relevance to those fought by today’s armed forces. Although 
military organisations are now viewed less as Weberian bureaucracies and more as flexible 
institutions, this research is embryonic. Similarly, the move towards a less vectored approach to 
innovation has placed emphasis on the culture and ethos of a military and how that governs 
learning, but there remains room for development. For the army of the First World War in 
particular, discussion of learning has tended to limit itself to individual branches or formations, 
and remains fixed on the Western Front. 
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 This thesis responds to these gaps in three ways. First, it moves beyond the standard 
Western Front narrative of the First World War. It looks at multiple theatres, considering the 
army’s experience in Egypt, Gallipoli, Italy, Palestine, Salonika, and the Western Front. This 
will demonstrate how different environments and different enemies affected the army’s learning 
and adaptation capabilities. It also allows for a holistic examination of the army’s experience. 
Secondly, and more broadly, it responds to Farrell’s call for greater research into the ‘specific 
modalities’ of military learning, notably that which occurs institutionally, between formations, 
and between theatres.81 The army of the First World War shared knowledge through the 
movement of formations and personnel. It also brought in expertise from civilian professionals. 
By engaging with some of these modalities, this thesis will highlight the complex, multi-faceted 
nature of innovation and the various avenues that contributed to this process. Thirdly, it moves 
away from the ‘one campaign’ approach that has typified most studies on innovation. French 
has argued that it is ‘impossible to determine how and to what extent doctrine and practice 
developed over time’ by focusing on a single campaign.82 This thesis not only considers 
multiple expeditionary forces, but it also benchmarks the army’s experience of the First World 
War against its pre-war experiences. This places the army’s attitude towards learning and 
innovation into a broader context, whilst allowing for conclusions to be drawn as to the 
flexibility and, indeed, the continuing relevance of its ethos. 
 From this literature review, it has also been possible to pick out four hypotheses relating 
to the army’s process for learning during the war. First, the army’s ethos enhanced its ability to 
learn and innovate and, therefore, remained valid during the war. Secondly, the army primarily 
used formal methods to learn and share knowledge in wartime. Thirdly, it was not averse to 
change and actively encouraged innovation in time of war. Fourthly, it became organisationally 
less rigid in wartime, displaying greater flexibility, particularly when integrating newcomers. 
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The thesis will test these hypotheses to determine the effectiveness of the army’s attempts to 
learn and innovate. 
 
The approach taken is a thematic examination of the army’s process for learning across a 
number of different operational theatres. This examination focuses around three cross-cutting 
themes that govern the study’s structure, namely knowledge sharing, receptiveness to change, 
and integration of newcomers. These themes offer a way of examining and testing the army’s 
organisational behaviour and responsiveness in time of war. As it falls outside the scope of this 
thesis to consider all aspects of these themes and the army’s learning process, a case study 
approach has been employed. The choice of theatres and case studies needed to be broadly 
representative of the army in order to test the effectiveness of this process. When selecting 
operational theatres, sustained British involvement was a key factor. This, therefore, precluded 
detailed discussion of the East African and Mesopotamian campaigns, which were fought by 
Indian expeditionary forces. Also, as the study’s focus lies with active operational theatres, 
discussion of activities on the home front is necessarily limited.  
 As the literature review revealed, much of the research on army learning has focused on 
combat effectiveness, specific branch studies, and operational or tactical development. These 
developments have usually focused on a single, usually British, division. For that reason, the 
case studies chosen have addressed ‘teeth’ (front line) and ‘tail’ (behind the line) functions, as 
well as the organisational make up of the army, including its civilian and multi-national aspects. 
A whole range of case studies could have been used to illustrate these particular areas, but 
various factors, such as source limitations and previous scholarship, discounted them. For 
example, a full examination of the logistics network was ruled out owing to previous 
scholarship.83 Therefore, the decision was taken to primarily focus on the work of Inland Water 
Transport [IWT], water supply, and transport missions to the subsidiary theatres, which have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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been less well covered in the literature. This allowed for discussion of ‘tail’ functions as well as 
the involvement of civilian experts. The role of civilians also influenced the decision to consider 
‘front line’ innovations, including military mining and chemical warfare. To address the multi-
national dimension of the army, the Australian Imperial Force [AIF] was selected as a case 
study over other national contingents, such as the Canadian Expeditionary Force [CEF] and the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force [NZEF]. Its significant presence in a number of active 
operational theatres proved a primary reason for its selection, as well as the accessibility of 
source material. Where appropriate, however, reference has been made to other national 
contingents, including the CEF. The organisational makeup of the army was also examined 
through the integration of British combat formations into different expeditionary forces.84 It was 
impossible to explore the integration of all formations, so a number of case study divisions were 
chosen. It was important to select divisions that had served in at least two of the six operational 
theatres under examination; had spent more than six months in a new theatre; and had not been 
the subject of a recent study. This criteria provided thirteen divisions, nine of which were 
chosen to form the sample for this study. The sample included two regular divisions (7th and 
27th), five territorial divisions (42nd, 53rd, 54th, 60th, and 74th), and two Kitchener army 
divisions (11th and 23rd). Other formations have been used throughout the study where their 
inclusion added to, or illuminated, the chosen case studies.  
 The diverse range of case studies chosen offers a meaningful and broadly representative 
cross-section of the army. However, there are limitations to this case study approach. When 
examining a concept as broad and amorphous as learning, it is impossible to test its 
effectiveness within each branch or formation of the army. Although these case studies are 
broadly comparable with Harrison and Hall’s respective analyses, highlighting the army’s 
diversity of method and experience, they are by no means exhaustive. 
 This study draws on a wide range of sources. In addition to the secondary literature 
outlined above, it uses the official histories of each expeditionary force, formation and branch !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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histories written after the war, along with contemporary articles from service and professional 
journals. The majority of sources have been drawn from The National Archives [TNA] at Kew 
and have included, inter alia, records from the War Office, Cabinet, Treasury, Ministry of 
Munitions, and Geological Survey Board. Examining records from a number of different 
government departments highlights the complexity of arrangements required to support and 
supply the army with knowledge, matériel, and personnel throughout its various theatres. The 
war diaries held in WO 95 have provided the core of this study’s operational analysis. Diaries 
from General Headquarters [GHQ] down to battalion level have been consulted to furnish detail 
on the development and subsequent impact of training and integration methods. However, there 
are limitations to this material. War diaries and their respective reports are written after the 
event and, therefore, potentially subject to ex post facto justification. The level of detail varies 
considerably between formations. In certain units, there was a drive for uniformity, particularly 
in the AIF, which reminded its units that war diaries were to form ‘an “accurate record” on 
which the history of the war would be written’.85 In some formations, however, the desire to 
please higher command led to certain embellishments or omissions. One British Brigade Major 
[BM] recalled that ‘the narratives did not always paint a true picture… I have myself had to 
alter considerably a draft narrative, not because it was in any way inaccurate, but because my 
commander wanted certain incidents to appear in a more favourable light than perhaps they 
should have done’.86 Furthermore, owing to bomb damage during the Second World War and 
official pruning, some war diaries are incomplete, while some are non-existent. A number of the 
EEF’s formation and training school diaries, for example, were destroyed during the Blitz.87 In 
an attempt to mitigate this deficiency, the war diaries of higher headquarters, along with the 
private papers of general officers, were examined in search of training syllabi and schemes. 
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 Sources in addition to those at TNA have been consulted, particularly when examining 
the high politics of manpower, civilian expertise, and military education. These sources include 
Hansard debates, Parliamentary papers, and council minutes from learned societies, such as the 
Institutions of Mechanical and Electrical Engineers. Similarly, when considering the AIF’s 
relationship with the British army, official records and correspondence from the Australian War 
Memorial [AWM] and the National Archives of Australia [NAA] have supplemented sources 
from British archives. 
 While official and institutionally sanctioned documents are an important record, 
revealing much about a particular institution during a particular period, they only tell half the 
story. Rodney Lowe has argued that, where the Civil Service is concerned at least, no official 
could ‘reach the top unless “he is effective in the little private and informal conferences, 
committees, and interviews where the real decisions are taken”’.88 Where ‘questions of major 
policy are concerned… probably the most important work is done outside the formal committee 
structure by personal discussion and exchange of views’.89 This approach is not limited to the 
machinations of the Civil Service. For this reason, the personal testimony and correspondence 
of politicians, generals, officers, men, and civilian experts has been considered. The Imperial 
War Museum [IWM], Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives [LHCMA], National Army 
Museum [NAM], and the AWM have provided the bulk of testimonies. These papers have been 
used to fill gaps within the official record, but also to uncover attitudes towards certain 
individuals or formations, weaknesses within existing systems, or simply to gauge morale 
within the various forces. Often unfettered by bureaucratic protocols, these diaries and private 
papers provide useful details on the personality and perceived effectiveness of certain 
individuals. 
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Century British History 8 (2) (1997), pp. 247-248. For the strengths and weaknesses of TNA records, see 
A. McDonald, ‘Public Records and the Modern Historian’, Twentieth Century British History 1 (3) 
(1990), pp. 341-352; S. J. Ball, ‘Harold Macmillan and the Politics of Defence’, Twentieth Century 
British History 6 (1) (1995), pp. 78-100. 
89 Lowe, ‘Plumbing New Depths’, pp. 247-248. 
! 22 
 Unsurprisingly, there are weaknesses to this personal testimony. As Simon Ball has 
argued, personal recollection can ‘mislead or conceal as much as it reveals. Without any lies 
being told, information can be simply incorrect’.90 Its reliability can vary based on the author’s 
state of mind or the intended recipient. For contemporary letters home, the practice of self-
censorship cannot be ignored; while in the case of retrospective memoirs or those abridged in 
typescript form, consideration must be given to failing memories and, ultimately, the intention 
of the author or editor.91 
 
The thesis is split into six substantive chapters that align with the three cross-cutting themes of 
sharing knowledge, receptiveness to change, and integrating newcomers. The first chapter 
provides necessary context with a particular focus on the army’s pre-war ethos and the factors 
that shaped it. It examines whether the army’s tendency towards common sense and pragmatism 
was primarily a wartime phenomenon, or a legacy of its pre-war experiences. It finds that, 
despite the army’s rapid expansion and change in composition, this ethos endured throughout 
the First World War. It, therefore, supports the first hypothesis. 
 The second chapter aligns with the study’s first cross-cutting theme: sharing knowledge. 
With increased global commitments, the army needed to refine or develop a series of new 
methods to ensure that lessons and knowledge were shared between its different forces. Formal 
methods, such as publications and schools, saw information pushed out to the various forces. 
Though these methods were a step towards the standardisation of knowledge, the chapter finds 
that the army was reticent when it came to enforcing them. Instead, it delegated to the periphery, 
encouraging forces to use their initiative as to which lessons or tactics were appropriate. In this 
respect, the chapter challenges the second hypothesis, suggesting that, though important, formal 
methods were not as dominant as first thought. 
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 The next two chapters consider the second theme: the army’s responsiveness to change. 
Chapter 3 tackles questions around the military’s supposed aversion to change head on, arguing 
that the army encouraged a culture of innovation. It uses a series of case studies to test this 
argument, including military mining, gas, IWT, and the establishment of the Inspectorate of 
Training at GHQ. It emphasises the importance of individual change agents and facilitators at 
all levels of the army to the success of these initiatives. Though the army was not averse to 
change, there were still problems. The chapter shows that rivalry, scepticism, and resistance – 
all normal responses to uncertainty – had to be dealt with at both an institutional and individual 
level. Some of the methods used to mitigate these problems are discussed. Chapter 4 focuses in 
depth on the army’s use of civilian expertise. The relationship between civilian and combatant 
increasingly blurred during the First World War. Focusing on transport and engineering in 
particular, the chapter shows that the army actively sought out and promoted the skills of a 
variety of civilian experts. These individuals could challenge the status quo, enabling new 
methods to take root within the army, such as data collection and statistical forecasting. As with 
Chapter 3, pockets of resistance existed, requiring the army to rationalise proposed change 
through collaboration, cohesion, and communication. The third hypothesis, therefore, is 
supported although with certain caveats. 
 The final two chapters of the thesis align with the third theme: the integration of 
newcomers. Chapter 5 examines how combat formations, primarily territorial and Kitchener 
army divisions, were integrated into different expeditionary forces. It finds that there was 
considerable diversity of method as to how each force dealt with these formations, attesting to 
the cultural and organisational complexity of the army. Difficulties were encountered by these 
incoming formations, the reasons for which are explored. Building on the findings of Chapter 5, 
the sixth chapter uses the AIF as a case study to show how effectively newcomer organisations 
were integrated. It finds that the AIF benefitted from the refined integration methods used for 
territorial and Kitchener army formations. It also shows that the army tolerated efforts at ‘self-
integration’ and promoted innovation at the tactical level, underlining its hardwired preference 
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for autonomy and initiative. The fourth hypothesis – that the army was less rigid 
organisationally – is borne out, although the exigencies of war, and, where the AIF was 
concerned, pressure from external agencies, accelerated this fluidity. 
 Finally, the conclusion pulls the thesis’ findings together. It argues that, through a 
combination of its pre-war ethos and increased fluidity in wartime, the army displayed 
organisational and cultural flexibility across all theatres, promoting informal learning and 
encouraging individuals to innovate. The importance of the army’s ethos provided it with the 
flexibility to integrate a considerable number of newcomers – all of whom brought with them 
certain social and cultural preconceptions. While there were instances of resistance, the army 
nurtured a culture of innovation, rather than one of inertia. It actively shared knowledge across 
tactical, geographical, and institutional boundaries. It also promoted the ideas of soldier-
innovators and civilian experts to enhance its operational effectiveness. The thesis concludes by 
suggesting the broader implications of this work on our understanding of the British army and 
other traditionally bureaucratic institutions where learning and change are concerned.  
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CHAPTER'1'
THE'LEGACY'OF'THE'PAST'
 
Writing to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson in July 1916, General Sir William 
Robertson noted that the ‘situation is now better than it has ever been before and all that is 
needed is the use of common-sense, careful methods, and not to be too hidebound by the books 
we used to study before the war’.1 Robertson’s remarks provide an insight into the army’s ethos 
in July 1916. They highlight the importance of prioritising initiative and experience over 
prescription and books. However, the army of July 1916 was very different to the one that took 
the field in August 1914 and, indeed, to the one that ended the war in November 1918. On the 
outbreak of war, the British army was a small, professional gendarmerie, totalling 247,432 
officers and men.2 In July 1916, the army stood at 1,873,932 in all theatres.3 It was no longer a 
homogeneous force, but a mixture of territorial, Kitchener army, Indian army, and dominion 
units. By November 1918, the army’s strength across its various expeditionary forces totalled 
2,668,736 officers and men.4 It was a vast citizen force, largely conscript in nature. Given the 
rapid expansion and changing composition of the army, it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
this would have an impact on the survival and relevance of the army’s ethos. 
 This chapter seeks to answer two questions: first, to what extent was the need for 
‘common-sense’ and ‘careful methods’ a wartime innovation, or simply a continuation of the 
army’s pre-war ethos, and secondly, how, if at all, did the army’s ethos survive given the 
changes to the army’s organisation during the First World War? The aim of the chapter is to 
provide the necessary context for later analyses of the army’s ethos. The discussions and 
conclusions that follow are, therefore, necessarily broad. To realise this aim and to answer the 
questions posed, the chapter first defines what is meant by ethos and how it affects !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives [LHCMA], Papers of Field Marshal Sir W. R. Robertson, 8/4, 
Robertson to Rawlinson, 26 July 1916. 
2 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920 
(London: HMSO, 1922), p. 30. This figure does not include the reservists.  
3 Ibid., p. 64. 
4 Ibid., pp. 62-63.  
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organisational behaviour. Secondly, it examines a number of factors that shaped the army’s 
ethos, including national identity, geostrategic considerations, military initiatives including the 
establishment of the General Staff and the publication of Field Service Regulations [FSR], and 
the influence and homogeneity of the officer corps. Finally, it considers the impact of this ethos 
on the army’s ability to learn and, given the changing nature and composition of the army, 
assesses its continuing relevance during the First World War.  
 
The British army was an institution traditionally averse to doctrine. Arguably, up until the 
publication of Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine in 1989, the army 
had opted for a ‘doctrine of no doctrine’.5 General Sir John Chapple’s foreword to Design for 
Military Operations addressed this aversion to doctrine head on, stating that ‘there may be some 
who say that laying down doctrine like this is not the British way’. Nevertheless, Chapple 
wrote, the ‘modern battlefield is not a place where we could hope to succeed by muddling 
through’.6 The army’s long-standing aversion was based on the perception that doctrine would 
‘prepare the army to face the wrong army at the wrong time and in the wrong place’.7 Historians 
interested in the British army have debated what constituted doctrine and to what extent it 
actually existed within the army prior to 1914.8 Part of the issue is the problematic nature of the 
term ‘doctrine’. There is little consensus on what it actually means.9 Shelford Bidwell and 
Dominick Graham defined doctrine as ‘the definition of the aim of military operations; the 
study of weapons and other resources and the lessons of history, leading to the deduction of the 
correct strategic and tactical principles on which to base both training and the conduct of war’.10 
In a recent study, Harold Høiback defined it as ‘institutionalised beliefs about what works in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine (London: HMSO, 1989). 
6 Ibid., p. vii. 
7 H. Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 24 (6) (2011), p. 890. 
8 See Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, pp. 7-60; S. Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 
1880-1918 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 2-3; T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army: 
Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pp. 75-76. 
9 Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine?’, p. 880. 
10 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, p. 2. 
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war’, or, more elaborately, as ‘an authoritative theory of war that allows for cultural 
idiosyncrasies’.11 For the modern British military, doctrine is ‘a guide to commanders and 
subordinates on how to think, not what to think’ and something which can ‘never replace 
individual initiative’.12  
 Doctrine also provides the root for words such as doctrinaire and indoctrination. This, 
as Paul Latawski suggests, can ‘provoke a vision of intellectual rigidity’, and, for the army, can 
‘represent an unhelpful ossification of past military practice’.13 For military commentators in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a fear that doctrine could become 
dogma. Brigadier-General Thompson Capper, for example, suggested that ‘doctrines soon 
produce doctrinaires, and doctrinaires soon produce dogma’; while J. F. C. Fuller believed that 
dogma would ‘be seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgement, and who 
are only too grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification in a 
book’.14 For the army of the time, doctrine could be a straitjacket that compromised flexibility.15 
As we shall see, the British army, unlike the armies on the continent, could not predict where it 
might next be deployed. While it realised that certain principles of war and command needed to 
be articulated in print, the army did not subscribe to or promote a formal doctrine.16 Instead, it 
relied on something else for unity: a ‘common character’ or ethos. 
Unlike doctrine, ethos is far easier to define and, according to Anthony King, is ‘one of 
the most tangible aspects of human reality’.17 Ethos can be defined as ‘the characteristic spirit of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine?’, p. 897. 
12 UK Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 (5th Edition, November 2014), p. iii. 
13 P. Latawski, ‘The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine’, Sandhurst Occasional Paper No. 5 (2011), 
p. 3. 
14 LHCMA, Papers of General Sir J. S. M. Shea, 2/5, Draft of Brigadier-General Thompson Capper ‘The 
Doctrine of a “Doctrine” n.d. (c. 1912); J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: 
Hutchinson and Co., 1926), p. 254. 
15 H. Strachan, ‘Introduction’, in H. Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the 
Lessons of War in the 20th Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 4. 
16 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, pp. 2-3, 38; Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 38, 41, 66-67; Palazzo, 
Seeking Victory, pp. 8-9. 
17 A. King, ‘The Ethos of the Royal Marines: The Precise Application of Will’, Report Commissioned by 
the Royal Marines, 2004, p. 2. 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/58653/RMethos4.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 5 
March 2015]. 
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a people, community, culture or era’, or the ‘prevailing character of an institution or system’.18 
Put simply, it refers to what a human group does and how it does it.19 It can be both implicit and 
explicit in nature. It is implicitly assumed in every single interaction, as well as explicitly 
defined in military training, regulations, routines, and practice. Historians such as Albert 
Palazzo and David French have suggested that, rather than doctrine and the rigidity that it 
implies, the British army used its institutional ethos, or the ‘common character’ of its members, 
to interpret the nature of war, identify problems, pose solutions, and implement change.20 
Contrary to Tim Travers’ assertion that the army’s distaste for doctrine was due to anti-
intellectualism, Palazzo suggests that the army’s lack of doctrine was a deliberate policy 
decision.21 Ethos provided an alternative, equivalent structure for the decision-making process. 
Based on the cultural values of the nation, this ethos was institutionalised within the officer 
corps; its continuation assured by the use of mechanisms such as the regimental tradition to pass 
it on to the next generation.22  
Given its link to national and cultural values, it is tempting to equate ethos with 
tradition. To do this implies that ethos is inflexible and intolerant of change. This particular 
viewpoint resonates with ideas around military conservatism. As Theo Farrell has argued, an 
army’s ethos, or its cultural construct, may act as a brake on innovation.23 Existing procedures 
can become routine, even ritualised, and lose touch with their original purpose. Given the 
military’s veneration of tradition, this can be seen as problematic.24 However, this is only one 
viewpoint and one that is driven by the belief that ethos is static. Although influenced by past 
conflicts and national identity, ethos was not inflexible. Rather, it provided the army with the 
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18 Oxford English Dictionary. 
19 King, ‘Royal Marines’, p. 2; T. Terriff, ‘“Innovate or Die”: Organisational Culture and the Origins of 
Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29 (3) (2006), p. 478. 
20 D. French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 21-22, 50; Palazzo, Moltke to Bin Laden, passim.  
21 Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 38; Palazzo, Seeking Victory, pp. 8-19. 
22 Palazzo, Seeking Victory, p. 10. 
23 T. G. Farrell, ‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation’, International Affairs 84 (4) (2008), 
p. 783. 
24 P. H. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, Journal of Military History 72 (2008), pp. 31-32. 
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ability to adequately examine new ideas and situations. In short, it enabled the army to respond 
fully to the need for adaptation and innovation.25 
 Although there may be an overarching ethos that governs the military’s role and 
actions, this is not always homogeneous. It is more accurate to view the military as a culture of 
sub-cultures. This is evident in different service arms and, to focus on the army, within certain 
branches or regiments. This culture of sub-cultures also links in with ideas around identity and 
loyalty structures. Charles Kirke has emphasised the flexibility of such structures, arguing that 
individuals can belong to many different groups within the military organisation. For example, a 
soldier may find himself parading with his troop or platoon in the morning, attending a 
company briefing mid-morning, and supporting a battalion sports team in the afternoon.26 
 
On the outbreak of the First World War, the army’s ethos focused on a preference for 
amateurism, a distaste for prescription, and an emphasis on the character of the individual. The 
particular values of this ethos included loyalty, self-confidence, courage, obedience, moral 
virtue, and sacrifice.27 It was shaped and propagated by a number of different factors, including 
perceptions of national character, geography, military initiatives, and the social makeup of the 
officer corps. As we shall see, the influence of such factors would result in the endurance of this 
ethos during the First World War. 
 Writing in 1911, Major Ladislaus Pope-Hennessy remarked that ‘the character of a 
nation is woven closely into the texture of a national conception of war’. 28 Pope-Hennessy’s 
axiom can be taken further: the character of the nation is woven closely into the texture of the 
army itself. Armed forces reflect, like a time capsule, the values, beliefs, and social order of the 
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society from which they spring.29 Naturally, the British army’s ethos reflected some of the 
broader characteristics and self-perceptions of what it meant to be British. Questions around 
national character and the idea of ‘Britishness’ or ‘Englishness’ have generated considerable 
scholarship.30 For Robert Young, Englishness in particular was ‘defined less as a set of internal 
cultural characteristics attached to a particular place, than a transportable set of values which 
could be transplanted, translated and recreated anywhere on the globe’.31 It is unsurprising then 
that such values ended up shaping the culture and mentality of the army itself. 
 Since the eighteenth century, the British had defined their own national identity by 
contrasting themselves with their continental neighbours, particularly France and Germany. 
According to Linda Colley, the British national identity was an ‘invention forged above all by 
war’. The succession of wars against France brought Britons into confrontation with a hostile 
‘other’, encouraging them to define themselves collectively against it.32 To the British, France 
represented cosmopolitanism, artificiality, and intellectual deviousness. In contrast, the British 
saw themselves as bluff, forthright, and morally serious. 33  Such differences manifested 
themselves in the contrasting philosophies of the French Rationalist, René Descartes, and the 
Scottish Empiricist, David Hume. It was also realised through Britain’s dominant liberal 
political culture that emphasised the right of the individual to live their life with the minimum of 
state interference and to take responsibility for their own well-being.34!
These self-perceptions leached into the Victorian period. Unlike their continental 
neighbours, the British perceived that actions were not to be governed by abstract reason. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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31 R. J. C. Young, The Idea of English Ethnicity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 232. 
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33 Ibid., p. 252. 
34 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 21; W. Funnell, ‘Social Reform, Military Accounting and the 
Pursuit of Economy during the Liberal Apotheosis, 1906-1912’, Accounting History Review 21 (1) 
(2011), p. 72. 
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Instead, character was thought to be more important than intelligence, whilst improvisation had 
been of great benefit to the nation.35 Character was a central feature of Victorian political 
thought, particularly during the mid-nineteenth century. According to Stefan Collini, the idea of 
character was about ‘mental and moral qualities, which distinguished an individual or race 
viewed as a homogeneous whole’.36 Put simply, it was concerned with the idea of an isolated 
individual maintaining his will in the face of adversity.37 This adversity was usually cast as 
military or sporting in nature. From the 1830s onwards, the rise of organised games was well 
under way. Cricket, for example, was particularly glorified. For the Victorians, it was a 
‘national symbol’ because it was ‘an exclusively English creation unsullied by oriental or 
European influences’.38 One could argue that British character in the Victorian period was 
typified by the phrase: ‘it’s not cricket’. Loaded and emotive, this phrase was used to denote 
any despicable act that was ‘immoral, ungentlemanly, or improper’.39 Essentially, it was 
reserved for any act deemed to be ‘un-British’. 
 Tied to the rise of organised sports were concepts such as the ‘Corinthian Spirit’ and the 
‘Gentleman Amateur’, along with the ideologies of athleticism and Muscular Christianity. This 
latter ideology considered that participation in sport could contribute to the development of 
Christian morality, physical fitness, and manliness. However, manliness was not simply the 
outward display of physical strength; it also signified duty and moral courage. Such ideologies 
nurtured the ‘mind-set of the Empire’s ruling elites’.40 The physical and moral value of sport in 
the public consciousness was promoted by the public school system, idealised by Thomas 
Hughes, an advocate of Muscular Christianity, in his Tom Brown books. For Hughes, sport was 
designed ‘to try the muscles of men’s bodies, and the endurance of their hearts, to make them 
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37 Ibid., p. 47. 
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39 Ibid. 
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rejoice in their strength’.41 In the final cricket match in Tom Brown’s School Days, for example, 
the eponymous hero discussed the benefits of the game with his friend, George Arthur, and one 
of the masters: 
 
“…But it’s more than a game. It’s an institution,” said Tom. 
“Yes,” said Arthur, “the birthright of British boys old and young, as habeas 
corpus and trial by jury are of British men.” 
“The discipline and reliance on one another which it teaches is so valuable, I 
think,” went on the master, “it ought to be such an unselfish game. It merges the 
individual in the eleven; he doesn’t play that he may win, but that his side 
may”.42 
 
 The pre-eminence of organised games, particularly in the public schools, also gave rise 
to the belief that sport and war were in some sense the same.43 Sport was war without the 
adversity, while war was simply the ‘greater game’ as immortalised in Sir Henry Newbolt’s 
poem, Vitaï Lampada. As Collini argues, the values of teamwork and self-reliance, of 
concentration and courage, of obedience and initiative, were presented as unproblematically 
compatible.44 As we shall see in later chapters, this latter pairing of obedience and initiative was 
far from unproblematic for the British army. During the First World War, individuals like Lord 
Northcliffe used the British predilection for organised sports as propaganda to explain why the 
British were superior to their German adversary. According to Northcliffe: 
 
Our soldiers are individual. They embark on little individual enterprises. The 
German… is not so clever at these devices. He was never taught them before 
the war, and his whole training from childhood upwards has been to obey, and 
to obey in numbers. He has not played individual games. Football, which 
develops individuality, has only recently been introduced into Germany in 
comparatively recent times. His amusements have been gymnastic discipline to 
the word of command…45 
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 Unlike the perceived German ‘gymnastic discipline’ to command, the British were 
devoted to ‘amateurishness’.46 For some outsiders, this tendency towards amateurism and 
‘muddling through’ was an intriguing and a very British phenomenon. Writing in 1904, the 
American literary critic, Bliss Perry, noted that the glorification of amateur qualities ‘is all the 
more curious because of our pronounced national distaste for ineffectiveness. The undisguisedly 
amateurish traits of unskillfulness and desultoriness have not been popular here’. 47 According 
to Peter Mandler, the ‘Boer War bungling’ in autumn 1900 led to the ‘nation of shopkeepers’ 
being described as the ‘nation of amateurs’.48 He argued that it marked the point where the 
English way of business began to be described as ‘muddling through’ – a ‘more critical 
observation’ than it would become after the First World War.49  For the army, its poor 
performance during the Boer War resulted in reform and soul searching. For some, its failings 
signified the need to embrace a formal doctrine. However, this need was tempered by the British 
soldier’s character and, as we shall see, Britain’s geostrategic realities. Those opposed to a 
formal doctrine pointed to the dangers of dogma and the stifling of initiative. 
 That the army did not develop a formal doctrine following the Boer War was not a case 
of amateurism winning out over professionalism. The army’s reemphasis on values such as 
initiative, common sense, instinct, and determination provided a framework that better suited its 
myriad commitments. These values – espoused in Robertson’s 1916 letter - endured throughout 
the First World War. Commenting on the 4th Australian Brigade’s training exercise in February 
1915, Colonel William Braithwaite (General Staff Officer [GSO] 1, New Zealand and 
Australian Division) remarked on the ‘want of initiative’ of one battalion commander and 
cautioned that it was ‘altogether inadvisable to lay down any such hard and fast rule’ as it ‘must 
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be left to the initiative’ of the individual.50 Such values remained important during the latter 
stages of the war. In June 1917, the British Salonika Force’s [BSF] summer training programme 
reemphasised the importance of ‘the unshakeable determination of each individual to achieve 
success’; that, despite the ‘scientific additions and the growth of numbers’, the physical, mental, 
and moral quality of the individual was paramount.51 In July 1918, Major-General Sir William 
Heneker (General Officer Commanding [GOC], 8th Division) commented on the continuing 
need for ‘ginger and common sense’, particularly in training.52 Flexibility was the army’s 
watchword, particularly given the tension between its continental and colonial commitments. 
This tension contributed to the second factor that shaped the army’s ethos: Britain’s geostrategic 
situation. 
 Unlike its continental neighbours, the British army did not know who or where it would 
fight next. It had to prepare for numerous different roles in a variety of different geographical 
and cultural environments throughout a global empire.53 A 1911 memorandum from the British 
General Staff neatly summed up this uncertainty: 
 
 We must remember that our officers must be prepared to fight in every country 
on the globe. Arrangements that are desirable in England, or even on the 
continent of Europe, will be very different from those which will be necessary 
in South Africa, or on the North Western Frontier of India.54 
 
Despite this, successive governments had failed to provide a clear statement of what they saw as 
being the army’s priorities. In fact, the 1888 Stanhope Memorandum provided the most recent 
outline of the army’s responsibilities. Of the five priorities listed, aid to the civil power in the 
United Kingdom was placed first, provision of drafts for India second, provision of garrisons for 
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colonies and coaling stations third, home defence fourth, whilst the employment of an 
expeditionary force on the continent occupied last place.55 At the time, such an ordering made 
political and military sense. Fenian activities and agitation were still a threat to the safety of the 
nation with attacks on the mainland from 1881-1885.56 According to Robertson, however, this 
focus on aid to the civil power meant that ‘mobilisation plans dealt principally with home 
defence, and that broad military plans essential for the defence of the Empire as a whole 
received no adequate treatment’.57 The understanding with France and the increasing threat of 
German hegemony in Europe suggested that the provision of an expeditionary force for the 
continent was increasingly likely. Even so, the army was still mindful of its colonial 
commitments. As Tim Bowman and Mark Connelly argue, on the outbreak of the First World 
War, the most effective part of the British army remained in India.58  
 As a result of its multiple commitments, the army was loth to prioritise one set of 
lessons over another. It also appeared reluctant to apply the lessons learned from its nineteenth 
century small wars to a larger conflict against a major power. For example, General Sir 
Frederick Roberts’ troops had gained considerable experience in hill warfare against Afghan 
irregulars in 1879-1880. However, many officers who took part in the invasion of Afghanistan 
were cautious about applying the lessons of that campaign to the quite different circumstances 
they might encounter if confronting a regular Russian army across the same terrain.59 According 
to Edward Spiers, some officers deprecated this colonial experience. In 1889, Colonel Lonsdale 
Hale, for example, observed that: 
 
 An officer who has seen service must sweep from his mind all recollections of 
that service, for between Afghan, Egyptian, or Zulu warfare and that of Europe, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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there is no similarity whatever. To the latter the former is merely the play of 
children.60 
 
As a result, there was a tendency to refocus on the continental lessons of Plevna or Gravelotte, 
rather than those of Majuba Hill or Tirah. The variety of these colonial campaigns and their 
small scale tended to leave little mark on the army as a whole.61  
Owing to the sheer diversity of conditions, the tactics required for one war could be 
markedly different for the next. General Sir Neville Lyttelton, the first Chief of the General 
Staff, remarked: 
 
Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as 
Omdurman and Colenso. In the first, 50,000 fanatics streamed across the open 
regardless of cover to certain death, while at Colenso I never saw a Boer all day 
until the battle was over, and it was our men who were the victims.62 
 
The army had to be flexible, yet this often led to an incomplete and far from uniform approach. 
For example, those units who had served on the North West Frontier focused on the individual 
soldier’s initiative and marksmanship, placing a premium on fighting in open order. Sir Ian 
Hamilton’s successful attack at Elandslaagte in 1899, for example, involved infantry in open 
order formation, a flanking manoeuvre, and cavalry.63 As a veteran of the North West Frontier, 
Hamilton recognised the similarities between Boers and Afghans. However, such initiatives 
were limited to individual commanders and formations. Units or commanders who had 
experienced warfare in the Sudan against the Mahdi’s forces often continued to rely on close 
order, volley-firing, and the bayonet.64 Major-General Arthur Fitzroy Hart, a veteran of the Zulu 
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and Sudan wars, typified this approach at Colenso in 1899. Unlike Hamilton, Hart advanced his 
5th Brigade in close order quarter columns up to the Boer lines with disastrous results.  
 The army’s conflicting geostrategic priorities were further compounded by military 
initiatives, such as the establishment of the General Staff in 1906 and the publication of FSR in 
1909. Rather than providing the army with a formal, authoritative doctrine, both served to 
reinforce the army’s initiative-driven ethos. The impact of the General Staff will be considered 
first. 
 According to Pope-Hennessy, the British General Staff ‘selected for the Army a 
“method of action” [yet] it has failed to give it a “doctrine of war”’.65 Unlike the German 
General Staff, the British General Staff lacked its own identity and spirit. It also lacked power, 
status, and influence over the army itself. These limitations were partly due to ineffective 
leadership by its first chief, Neville Lyttelton, and its own confused raison d’être. The question 
of whether the army should adopt a German model General Staff was an important 
consideration throughout the late Victorian era. In 1887, Major-General Sir Henry Brackenbury 
lamented that ‘want of any such great central thinking department is due to that want of 
economy and efficiency which to a certain extent exists in our army’.66 The Hartington 
Commission in 1889-1890 called for the establishment of a Chief of Staff, but this was rejected 
for a number of reasons, including financial implications, Liberal opposition, and fear that a 
General Staff might engender Prussian militarism. There was also concern that a General Staff 
would prepare for continental war, rather than respond to imperial crises.67 Published on the 
same day as the Hartington Commission’s report, Spenser Wilkinson’s The Brain of an Army 
was vocal in its call for a General Staff. For Wilkinson, the commission’s proposals did not go 
far enough. He feared that a Chief of Staff would be given ‘no authority over the army’, merely 
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the ‘general power to meddle’. 68  In 1904, the appointment of Commander-in-Chief was 
abolished and replaced by an Army Council. On this Council, the Chief of the General Staff was 
primus inter pares. However, he neither inherited nor acquired the same authority that 
Commanders-in-Chief had enjoyed in the past. Wilkinson’s earlier fears proved to be correct. 
The eventual establishment of the General Staff in 1906 suggested a growing 
professionalism within the army. However, the General Staff lacked a clear remit and a clear 
direction. Even had it wanted to, the army was unable to model its General Staff on the German 
system. The British General Staff was not a dominant institution like its German counterpart. 
The Chief of the General Staff had to negotiate and deal with both the Adjutant General and the 
Quartermaster General. Additionally, despite calls from Wilkinson and Brackenbury, it was 
neither able nor designed to serve as the brain of the army and lacked the power to develop and 
enforce doctrine. Underpinning the differences between the two General Staffs were the 
geostrategic realities of each country. Germany’s strategic problem was relatively clear-cut: it 
had to defend its eastern and western frontiers.69 However, in Britain’s case, the sheer number 
of scenarios it might face, given its hugely diffuse empire, precluded any simple, narrow 
definition of purpose and aim.70 The General Staff had to balance attempts at continentalism 
with the country’s imperial commitments.  
 Further undermining the General Staff’s influence was the army’s lack of scale and 
political visibility, particularly when compared to the Royal Navy. Successive governments 
were simply unwilling to spend money on the army when they were pursuing a naval arms race. 
As First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John ‘Jacky’ Fisher lamented that ‘every penny spent on the 
army is a penny taken from the Navy’.71 The unwillingness to spend was also underpinned by 
traditional Liberal distrust of the army, as well as the Liberal party’s commitment to social 
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reforms at the expense of military spending. Without a clear role, the General Staff was far 
removed from Wilkinson’s original conception: that it can only ‘perform its functions… in 
connection with a body adapted to its control, and united with it by the ramifications of a 
nervous system’.72 From the beginning, the General Staff fought for acceptance within an army 
that prioritised individual initiative and ultimately sought a universal, rather than just a 
continental, approach to war.  
 As we have seen, the army’s lack of common strategic purpose, coupled with the 
embryonic nature of its General Staff, impeded its ability to develop a clear doctrine. John 
Gooch has remarked that ‘the differences in practice and in outlook across the globe… made the 
search for general uniformity in empire, dominion and colony something of a fruitless task’.73 
The production of an over-specific doctrine would be a positive danger. This was realised by 
military figures at the time. In a draft article entitled ‘The Doctrine of a “Doctrine”’, Capper 
asked the following of his readers: ‘can we imagine a “doctrine” which will meet the ever 
varying conditions in which a British army, with its many degrees of organisation, composition, 
qualities of individuals, standards of training, [and] possible theatres of operations, may find 
itself’?74 He went on to assert that ‘a doctrine of procedure, of necessity, leads to one type and 
one system’.75 Adherence to a single doctrine that ‘attempts to apply itself to every possible and 
universal requirement’ was dangerous.76 Instead, the army stressed pragmatism and flexibility, 
rather than formalism and rigidity. It was against this backdrop that FSR was formulated. 
 Prior to 1909, the army had begun to move from an organisation focused on drill and 
obedience to one that used initiative guided by Jominist principles. Following the army’s poor 
performance during the Boer War, the training manuals produced from 1902 onwards pushed 
for greater initiative and less rigidity. However, this did not alleviate the difficulties of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Wilkinson, Brain of an Army, p. 97. 
73 J. Gooch, ‘“A Particularly Anglo-Saxon Institution”: The British General Staff in the Era of Two 
World Wars’, in French and Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff, p. 196. 
74 LHCMA, Shea Papers, 2/5, ‘Doctrine of a “Doctrine”’, p. 3. 
75 LHCMA, Papers of Brigadier-General T. Capper, 2/4/20, Ms draft of ‘The Doctrine of a “Doctrine”’, 
n.d. (c. 1912), p. 9. 
76 LHCMA, Shea Papers, 2/5, ‘Doctrine of a “Doctrine”’, p. 5. 
! 40 
balancing initiative and control. The preface to Combined Training (1902), the army’s first 
‘modern all-arms manual’, stressed that the principles within ‘have been evolved by experience 
as generally applicable to the leading of troops in war’. These principles, however, were to ‘be 
regarded as pointing out the dangers involved rather than as precepts to be blindly obeyed’.77 As 
Nick Evans has argued, the publications emphasised thought, principles, and cooperation, but 
they were not prescriptive in nature.78 Infantry Training (1905), for example, stated that it was 
‘impossible to lay down a fixed and unvarying section of attack or defence… It is therefore 
strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a normal form of either attack or defence’.79  
 The reluctance to embrace one single, authoritative doctrine was reinforced by the 
publication of FSR in 1909. The publication was split into two parts: Part I dealt with 
operations, while Part II focused on organisation and administration. This section will limit its 
comments to Part I, as it was this first part that generated, and continues to generate, discussion. 
FSR has been held up by some to be a work ‘of the greatest value for the inculcation of one 
central doctrine’.80 For one captain, it was ‘the Bible of the Army’.81 Though FSR provided a 
documented snapshot of the army’s ethos prior to the First World War, it did not provide a 
uniform doctrine. The introduction to FSR spoke of principles rather than prescription, but such 
principles ‘should be so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every commander that, whenever 
he has to come to a decision in the field, he instinctively gives them their full weight’.82 The 
focus here was on instinct and initiative. This was explored further in the second chapter ‘Inter-
Communication and Orders’, which stressed the flexibility, individuality, and freedom afforded 
to junior commanders. It advised that: 
 
An operational order… should tell him nothing which he can and should 
arrange for himself. The general principle is that the object to be attained… 
should be briefly but clearly stated; while the method of attaining the object !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should be left to the utmost extent to the recipient, with due regard to his 
personal characteristics… It is usually dangerous to prescribe to a subordinate at 
a distance of anything that he should be better able to decide on the spot, with a 
fuller knowledge of local conditions, for any attempt to do so may cramp his 
initiative…83 
 
It was clear that the army understood the importance of decentralised command. It placed a 
premium on initiative and flexibility. However, the discussion lacked specifics. How would this 
decentralisation actually work on the battlefield? At what level of command could subordinates 
sensibly exercise initiative? Such questions were left unanswered. According to Palazzo, 
sections on the conduct of battle were ‘presented so poorly and vaguely as to be virtually 
useless’.84 This is unfair. Those sections on all-arms cooperation, the principles of envelopment, 
and planning an offensive were presented in a clear and tangible manner.85 When framing 
orders for an attack, for example, FSR provided a list of the various aspects of such an order, 
including the objective, limits of front, direction of attack, and command flexibility.86 However, 
for Pope-Hennessy, an advocate for a ‘definite doctrine’, such principles were not tangible 
enough: 
 
There is… a dictum which we are unable to accept without considerable 
reservation. It is this: ‘… success depends not so much on the inherent 
soundness of a principle or plan of operations as on the method of application of 
the principle and the resolution with which the plan is carried out’. As it stands 
this dictum is so like a platitude as to be convincing in its simplicity, and yet it 
is liable, if not rightly interpreted, to lead an army very far down the smooth 
path of loose thinking which leads to disaster.87 
 
However, other commentators, such as Capper, were far more positive. He thought FSR an 
‘excellent and sufficient guide. They describe… which method may probably be found 
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generally most suitable… and they provide clear and simple principles for the application of any 
method’.88 
Although FSR was formulated against the backdrop of colonial warfare, it was intended 
for use in all situations, including operations against a major power on the continent. The 
appearance of FSR allows for comparison with similar publications issued by the French and 
German militaries at this time.89 Indeed, the British army’s decision to produce its own 
regulations could be seen as an attempt to emulate these continental publications. Certainly, for 
Douglas Haig, FSR was designed for the eventuality of a major continental war.90 Haig, as 
Director of Military Training and then Director of Staff Duties, was one of the key architects of 
FSR. In his Final Despatch in 1919, Haig stood by the applicability of FSR, noting that ‘the 
principles of command, Staff work and organisation elaborated before the war have stood the 
test imposed upon them and are sound’.91 He went on to state that, although ‘some modification 
of existing ideas and practice will be necessary… if our principles are sound these will be few 
and unimportant’.92 This was a view promoted at the highest levels of command. A May 1917 
memorandum from Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
[CGS] on the Western Front, reminded each Army that ‘the pre-war manuals remain in force 
and that the instructions issued by GHQ are merely amplifications of these manuals’.93 The 
relevance of FSR found support further down the chain of command and within the army’s 
subsidiary theatres. Following the battle of Beersheba in October 1917, Major-General Sir John 
Shea (GOC 60th Division) remarked that ‘the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations 
Part 1 once more proved to be absolutely sound, and there is little to add to them’.94 On the 
Italian front in December 1917, Major-General Sir Herbert Shoubridge (GOC 7th Division) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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stressed the ‘necessity for studying open-warfare’ as outlined in FSR and that this was to be the 
subject of ‘Brigade, Battalion, Battery and Company Conferences’.95 
While FSR had its supporters, some generals questioned its applicability. Robertson, for 
example, noted that ‘Field Service Regulations will require a tremendous amount of revising… 
Principles, as we used to call them, are good and cannot be disregarded, but their application is 
a very difficult business, and I think that we still take those principles too literally’.96 Though 
praising FSR to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse in September 1918, Major-General Cyril 
Deverell (GOC 3rd Division) inadvertently underlined its lack of specifics. For Deverell, FSR 
was ‘a work that requires to be read and reread and I know that after many years of study of it I 
always find some new point or a different aspect of the point which strikes me every time that I 
open it’.97 Its inherent flexibility was both a strength and a weakness. With its mantra of 
deference to the man on the spot, it encouraged individual initiative, but, conversely, its lack of 
guidance resulted in a proliferation of different interpretations and tactical methods. 
Despite the establishment of the General Staff and the publication of FSR, the advocacy 
and application of particular techniques remained the prerogative of the individual commander. 
This resulted in an individualised and personality-driven approach to problem solving and 
learning. It was an approach that prized ‘common sense’, whilst shunning stereotyped thinking 
and prescription. This attitude was underpinned by the fourth factor that shaped the army’s 
ethos: the homogeneity and influence of the officer corps. A number of historians have 
examined the background and relative homogeneity of the Edwardian army officer corps, so it 
is not necessary to go into detail here.98 However, it is worth highlighting certain commonalities 
that existed within the officer corps that shaped its uniformity, notably its social background, 
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Regular army officers were drawn from a fairly small section of British society. There 
was a strong link between the landed classes and the military. P. E. Razzell estimated the 
proportion of officers from landed classes, namely the aristocracy and the gentry, as 53 per cent 
in 1830, 50 per cent in 1875, and 41 per cent in 1912.99 Spiers suggests that amongst senior 
officers in 1914, 42 per cent were from the landed classes, 25 per cent from an armed forces 
background, 6 per cent from the clergy, and 27 per cent from other professions.100 In hindsight, 
we can see that the demography of the officer corps broadened in the lead up to the First World 
War, yet it was still overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and upper class.101 Kinship or 
marriage also served to enhance the homogeneity of the officer corps. Major (later Lieutenant-
General Sir) Hew Fanshawe married the daughter of Field Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, for 
example; while a number of officers and generals were brothers-in-law, including Field Marshal 
Lord Cavan and General Sir Julian Byng, Field Marshal Lord Chetwode and General Sir Noel 
Birch, and Major-General Sir John Shea and Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve VC.102 
The educational background of the officer corps reinforced this class consciousness. 
From his sample of 700 senior commanders and staff officers who served on the Western Front 
during the First World War, Robbins has shown that 537 officers (77 per cent) attended public 
school; of whom 93 (13 per cent) attended Eton.103 The bulk of the officer corps came from a 
very narrow band of schools, namely Eton, Cheltenham, Clifton, Harrow, Marlborough, and 
Wellington.104 Attendance at the same school formed an important social network for officers. 
Indeed, some Anglo-Irish officers were sent to English public schools in order to ‘establish the 
social networks they would later need’.105 During the First World War, the ‘old school tie’ 
manifested itself in the numerous school, university, and regimental dinners that took place on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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all fronts during the war. These dinners, often advertised in the General Routine Orders [GROs] 
of each expeditionary force, served to provide extra lubricant for the mechanics of 
socialisation.106 Old Etonians throughout the army’s theatres celebrated the ‘Fourth of June’; 
while Brigadier-General Ernest Craig-Brown, an old boy of Merchiston Castle School, arranged 
a dinner in August 1918 for over fifty ‘old academy’ boys in the BSF who had attended Fettes, 
Glenalmond, Loretto, and Merchiston.107  
The public school system aimed to instil certain values within its pupils, such as 
character, initiative, integrity, and loyalty. These values reflected what it meant to be a 
gentleman or, perhaps more importantly, an ‘English gentleman’. Indeed, the public school 
system had, perhaps, the ‘largest share in moulding the character’ of such a man.108 However, 
the term ‘gentleman’ was not a static concept. Indeed, it is so amorphous that it eludes simple 
definition. According to Christine Berberich, the idea of the gentleman is better illustrated than 
defined; it comprises ‘so many values – from behaviour and morals to education, social 
background, the correct attire and table manners – that it would… be restrictive to limit it to just 
one brief, defining sentence’.109 To be a gentleman meant different things to different people 
throughout history. In 1714, Richard Steele commented that ‘the appellation of Gentleman is 
never to be affixed to a man’s circumstances, but to his Behaviour in them’.110 An 1845 article 
in The Spectator declared that the ‘English gentleman is that ideal character which all 
Englishmen aspire to be, or at least to be thought’.111 After listing the various qualities of the 
gentleman - physically and morally brave, veracious, educated, humane, and decorous – the 
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author outlined the perception of the gentleman by ‘the mob’ or the lower classes: the mob had 
‘never been long faithful to any leader who was not by education and habits a gentleman’.112  
For the Edwardian officer corps, to be an officer was to be a gentleman. Some officers, 
such as Captain Reginald Hawker, an Old Wykehamist, believed one could not simply become 
a gentleman unless born to it. Remarking on a lecture entitled ‘Duties of an Officer’, Hawker 
hoped it was ‘addressed to Officers of K[itchener]’s Army who have had no chance of learning 
how to be gentlemen’.113 However, as Martin Petter has argued, some Kitchener army officers 
had educational and social backgrounds that were not ‘radically different’ from those of the pre-
war officer class.114 If, Petter argued, a Kitchener army officer lacked gentlemanly qualities, it 
might simply have been ‘in the sense of not possessing a private income, not sharing the 
regular’s interest in landed pursuits, or not having attended a sufficiently exclusive school’.115 
To be a gentleman did not necessarily confer the full range of professional ability, however. 
Commenting on the Australian general, Sir Harry Chauvel, Lieutenant-General Sir William 
Birdwood noted that he was ‘a very nice fellow and a gentleman’, but lacked ‘great character or 
ability’.116 Similarly, in a June 1915 letter to the War Office, Major-General Walter Braithwaite 
(CGS, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force [MEF]) remarked that, although the new Inspector-
General of Communications [IGC] of the MEF was a ‘very worthy and charming gentleman’, 
he ‘knows nothing whatever about the organisation of the British Army’.117 
In addition to the ‘old school tie’ of the public schools, shared attendance at the military 
colleges, the Staff College, or membership of a regiment also played an important role in 
nurturing desired qualities, as well as fostering links between British officers. In his 
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consideration of Major-General Oliver Nugent’s career, Nicholas Perry noted that ‘hardly any 
of Nugent’s patrons during his career were Irish’, and that the most important contacts came 
from ‘operational or regimental links’.118 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter’s experience also 
offers a good example of the importance of these operational and regimental links. Following 
his appointment as head of the Training Directorate at GHQ in October 1917, Bonham-Carter 
wrote to his sister about his new colleagues:  
 
I know a good number of the men at GHQ so shall be among friends. As a 
matter of fact of the other three Brig-Gens of the General Staff at GHQ - two, 
[John] Davidson and [Kenneth] Wigram, were at Sandhurst with me - and 
Wigram was as you may possibly remember at Winchester with Phil and came 
and stayed at Woodside once or twice... The Deputy Chief of the GS is 
[Richard] Butler who was with me at the Staff College and also in the First 
Army. The Chief of the GS is [Launcelot] Kiggell whom I have known since I 
served with him in the Warwickshire Regiment.119 
 
Such connections were also forged through membership of social networks outside the 
army, including the church and the freemasons. As we shall see in later chapters, the role of the 
gentlemen’s club was also important in this respect. The officer corps was dominated by the 
values of the gentry whose leisure pursuits were largely based around horses, hunting, and 
sport.120 These pursuits not only reinforced the educational and social exclusivity of the officer 
corps, but also served to strengthen the social bonds between its members. Cavan, for example, 
was Master of Foxhounds for the Hertfordshire Hunt, which counted Brigadier-General Charles 
FitzClarence VC, Brigadier-General Viscount Hampden, and Captain the Honourable Fergus 
Bowes-Lyon among its members.121 Such encounters often added colour to future military 
relationships. Brigadier-General Webb Gillman (Brigadier-General, General Staff [BGGS], 
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BSF, 1917-1918) recalled an eventful hunting anecdote involving Major-General Frederick Koe 
(IGC, BSF] and Lieutenant-General George Milne (CinC, BSF) before the war: 
 
… the only time Milne met him [Koe]… was some years ago while hunting 
with the ‘United’ in Cork, when Koe belted Milne’s horse over the nose for 
shoving its head into his new pink coat. We have pulled Koe’s leg and told him 
that Milne has been looking for him ever since!122 
 
 As we have seen, the public schools were instrumental in strengthening the interplay 
between organised sports and war. A similar link was drawn between hunting and war. 
Contemporaries were well aware of the connections between the regular army and hunting. This 
connection went beyond the hunt as a ‘network of sociability’. 123  It was believed that 
proficiency in hunting led to proficiency on the battlefield. In his contribution to Riding and 
Hunting, Captain W. H. King highlighted the importance of field sports to competency in 
military riding, stating that ‘most of the officers who join the army have ridden from 
childhood… They are encouraged to hunt and play Polo from the time they join a regiment, 
which makes them first-class horsemen’.124 Lieutenant-Colonel Edwin Alderson’s Pink and 
Scarlet, with its subheading ‘hunting as a school for soldiering’, provides another obvious 
example. In its preface, Alderson declared that ‘the hunting man is already a more than half-
made soldier’.125  The very existence of the yeomanry regiments reinforced this belief.126 
However, as Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell (CGS EEF, 1915-1917) remarked in 
September 1916, ‘we have got far too many of the grand old Yeomanry type of commanding 
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officer and fellows who think that because they can hunt a pack of hounds they can command a 
Yeomanry brigade’.127 
The shared educational and social background of the officer corps was shaped by and, 
in turn, shaped the army’s ethos. The values instilled within the officer corps reflected the 
public school ethos, which was in itself an articulation of what it meant to be British; the one 
fundamentally supported the other. Initiative, devotion to duty, courage, and obedience were 
touchstones of what it meant to be both an officer and a gentleman. In addition to these 
characteristics, the relatively small size of the pre-war army helped promote a highly 
individualised officer corps. Bonham-Carter’s letter, for example, emphasises the close links 
that existed between officers who knew each other through school, military training, sport, or 
the regiment. As later chapters will show, these shared networks would play an important role 
in the development of learning relationships between individuals and operational theatres. 
 Although the officer corps was fairly homogeneous in its education and social 
background, the army produced officers and generals that were capable of exerting significant 
influence. This was enhanced by the army’s devolution of authority. As David French has 
argued, ‘unit commanders could on occasion flout higher directives, and sometimes even the 
orders of their own immediate superiors’.128 Indeed, according to Stephen Badsey, the lack of an 
authoritative doctrine pre-1914 resulted from the ‘social and organisational structure of the 
army and of its officer corps, including the formal and informal power of the regiments, and of 
prominent generals’.129 Officers did not take kindly to general directives from above which 
appeared to limit their freedom of action.130 Unsurprisingly, for certain officers, the General 
Staff was seen as a challenge to their influence. In an attempt at appeasement, the Army Council 
declared that nothing in the creation of the General Staff was ‘intended to relieve Commanding 
Officers of their prime responsibility for the efficiency and proficiency of their officers in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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institutional and professional respects’.131 This left unit commanders with considerable scope 
for developing solutions peculiar to their own formations. In 1907, the Duke of Connaught 
noted that there was a ‘go as you please’ attitude towards tactics, and a ‘tendency to [form] 
cliques around particular Generals’.132 These ‘cliques’ were exemplified by the Wolseley and 
Roberts Rings, which proved to be a divisive factor in the politics of the late Victorian army.133 
 The free hand granted to individual officers further undermined the ability to enforce 
uniformity within the army. This lack of uniformity encouraged a broad range of different 
training practices and approaches, some of which were ‘manifestly wrong’.134 Although the 
General Staff was able to issue seemingly binding injunctions, it had very limited means of 
enforcing them owing to the army’s laissez-faire tendencies. In spite of this, however, the army 
decided to establish the position of Inspector-General of the Forces [IGF] in 1904.135 The duties 
of the IGF were straightforward in principle. He was to:  
 
… review generally and to report to the Army Council on the practical results of 
the policy of that Council, and for that purpose to inspect and report upon the 
training and efficiency of all troops under the control of the Home Government, 
on the suitability of their armament and equipment, on the condition of 
fortifications and defences, and generally on the readiness and fitness of the 
Army for war.136 
 
The creation of the IGF led to a system of feedback generation based on lessons learned, 
inspiring lengthy annual reports on training. However, this system did not necessarily result in 
uniformity. If a particular regimental commander disagreed with accepted practice, the variance 
would become apparent in the annual inspection of performance in combined training or 
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manoeuvres. The responsibility for the correction of these variances rested with the Army 
Council, but whether the correction was made or not is the sticking point.137  
 Despite attempts to unify training methods, the nature of the officer corps served to 
reinforce the primacy of local custom, thwarting the army’s attempts to impose and disseminate 
central guidance. This was acute in the years leading up to the First World War. In 1908, the 
IGF reported that ‘there is not yet sufficient uniformity of system, either in adherence to 
authorised principles, or in the methods by which these principles are put into practice’.138 The 
1913 ‘Memorandum on Army Training’ noted that ‘commanders should endeavour to establish 
a common school of thought among their subordinates… so that all in the formation may be 
imbued with a common doctrine and be ready for the closest co-operation’.139 The IGF also 
reported in 1913 that some progress had been made towards imbuing a common method in 
some units. Time was all that was needed to achieve more satisfactory results.140 However, in 
hindsight, this time was fast running out. 
 Critics of the army’s pre-war officer corps have pointed to its anti-intellectual bent, 
aversion to book learning, and lack of formal doctrine as evidence of its unthinking and insular 
nature.141 This is both unfair and untrue. While the army may have railed against prescribed 
doctrine and stereotyped thinking, it did not object to individual officers debating and writing 
their own works on tactical or doctrinal matters. These debates took place outside the army’s 
organisational structure, notably through the medium of lectures, service journals, and 
commercial publications such as Charles Callwell’s Small Wars (1896), Ernest Swinton’s The 
Defence of Duffer’s Drift (1904), and Richard Haking’s Company Training (1913). The years 
after the Boer War saw a considerable increase in journal articles, particularly in the Journal of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Royal United Services Institute and United Service Magazine. The Cavalry Journal was also 
launched in 1905, providing a forum for intellectual development and discussion within that 
particular arm. Individuals such as Maxse, Haking, and Fuller regularly contributed to debates 
in service journals. Indeed, Maxse, Reginald Kentish, and other infantry officers were involved 
in an intense debate in the RUSI Journal on the decision to restructure the battalion into four, 
rather than eight, companies.142 These debates were not isolated occurrences. Jay Luvaas 
deemed these developments ‘signs of a great intellectual awakening’.143  
 The army was aware of the potency of service journals as a seedbed for discussion and 
dissemination of best practice. This led to the establishment of the short-lived Army Review in 
1911 under the auspices of Field Marshal William Nicholson (Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff [CIGS], 1909-1912).144 As John Gooch argues, the continental armies had benefitted from 
a number of such journals for some years.145 For Nicholson, the Army Review provided a public 
vehicle through which the General Staff’s view could be disseminated throughout the army. The 
aims of the journal centred on the distribution of the latest information on military subjects, 
inculcating the lessons of history, and encouraging the formulation and expression of individual 
ideas on matters open to discussion.146 Undoubtedly aware of the variety of different methods, 
Nicholson hoped that the Army Review would not only encourage ‘the discussion of matters of 
military interest’, but that it may also prove conducive ‘to the unity of doctrine and the 
intelligent application of the principles laid down by a superior authority, which are essential to 
the systematic training in peace and successful action in the field’.147 
While the service journals and the Army Review provided an intellectual and 
professional outlet for the discussion of military subjects, knowledge derived from experience !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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still tended to reside within individual soldiers or formations. This resulted in lessons and 
experience failing to influence the army as a whole and, once again, served to widen the 
different practices and tactics employed by individual formations.148  Field Marshal Lord 
Roberts’ well-known publication Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare is a case in 
point. Issued after he replaced General Sir Redvers Buller, the publication was heavily 
influenced by Roberts’ North West Frontier experience. It supported Hamilton’s actions at 
Elandslaagte with its call for the abandonment of close order formations between 1,500 and 
1,800 yards from the enemy, keeping an extension of between six and eight paces per man, and 
making maximum use of cover.149 These precepts were not new. They had been hinted at within 
service journals in the aftermath of the Tirah Expedition.150 However, the British army’s limited 
methods for dissemination, and distaste for prescription, meant that these lessons remained 
within the regiments that served in these campaigns, or they were consigned to military 
journals. In the case of the latter, the army had no mechanism for ensuring these articles were 
read by its personnel, let alone acted upon. Though an observation on official doctrine, Brian 
Holden Reid’s comment on publications is apposite in this instance: ‘publishing a doctrinal 
pamphlet or circulating a paper is no more proof of the acceptance of a doctrinal policy than 
shouting its conclusions from the roof of the old War Office’.151  
 This section has shown that, on the outbreak of the First World War, the army’s ethos 
was one that encouraged flexibility. This was shaped by its experience of small wars, the post-
Boer War reforms, and its geostrategic realities. The army required a universal approach to war; 
the upshot was a preference for general principles, as outlined in FSR, and a rejection of 
specifics. However, this preference for principles had its weaknesses, particularly as FSR did 
not spell out what those principles were. The experience of one war could hardly be assimilated 
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for the general military good. It was, therefore, left to units to find out the most suitable 
approach.152 With little ability or desire to enforce a central doctrine, the army unwittingly 
encouraged a proliferation of different tactical methods. Its centre of gravity remained fixed on 
the regiment and the individual commander. How its ethos influenced or, indeed, survived the 
First World War will be considered in the final part of this chapter.!
 
Priding itself on its adaptation and devolved decision-making, the army had developed an ethos 
that was both flexible and highly individualised. The small size of the pre-war army and the 
relative homogeneity of the officer corps made this approach feasible. However, with the 
industrialised nature of the First World War, the army was forced to expand and transform from 
a small professional force to a mass citizen army. The officer corps alone (including territorial 
and Special Reserve officers) expanded from 28,060 to 164,255 – an increase of nearly 600 per 
cent.153 As we shall see, this transformation would have an effect on the army’s approach to 
learning and the survival of its pre-war ethos. 
The army initially adhered to an individualised approach, but realised early on in the 
war that this would not suit a rapidly expanded army primarily made up of citizens in uniform. 
Although FSR offered guidance, it militated against commonality of method. While this 
approach was acceptable in a small war, or in a small army, the lack of common tactics, 
techniques, and procedures served to increase the possibility of friction in a large scale conflict. 
Initiative and individual action were still held up as the norm, yet the army could not expect its 
citizen soldiers to display the same level of initiative as a battle hardened regular. Their 
inexperience required the army to adapt and embrace a far more standardised approach to 
learning. 
GHQ-endorsed pamphlets appeared as early as December 1914 offering just one 
example of this move towards standardisation. As later chapters will show, these pamphlets not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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only collated the latest experience for the benefit of regular and citizen soldier alike, but also 
provided much-needed handrails, particularly for newcomers. Throughout the war, the army 
still emphasised the importance of initiative, pragmatism, and deference to the ‘man on the 
spot’. However, it was not blind to initial deficiencies in that quarter. In SS109 Training of 
Divisions for Offensive Action, published in May 1916, commanders were to remember that:  
 
… officers and troops generally do not now possess that military knowledge 
arising from a long and high state of training which enables them to act 
promptly on sound lines in unexpected situations. They have become 
accustomed to deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders. 
 
Officers and men in action will usually do what they have been practised to do 
or have been told to do in certain situations…154 
 
For some commentators after the war such as Major-General Arthur McNamara, the army’s use 
of pamphlets had fundamentally undermined the ability and willingness of officers to show 
initiative. He argued that: 
 
… solutions to all problems are rapidly becoming almost standardised, the 
quality, quantity and action of the enemy often getting scant attention. At 
conferences lessons are rubbed home by quotations from manuals and 
pamphlets, and as enemy methods and action are constant, the officer is apt to 
get an impression that there is a stereotyped right answer, and that he is 
ignorant, or unfortunate when he gives the wrong one.155 
 
McNamara’s comments suggest that this plethora of pamphlets somehow undermined the 
army’s pre-war ethos. However, this is untrue. The very nature of this ethos allowed the army to 
recalibrate its approach to learning, moving from a highly individualised approach to one that 
was far more standardised. That the army was able and willing to recalibrate its approach speaks 
to the inherent flexibility of the organisation. This, as later chapters will show, also allowed it to 
absorb a huge increase in numbers and tremendous changes in tactics and technology without 
having to undergo wholesale reorganisation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Although the army expanded and changed, its ethos survived this turmoil. This was, in 
part, due its alignment with the values of the society from which it sprung. It was not transient 
or contingent on the presence of a single individual. During the First World War, its survival 
can be attributed to three key factors. First, there was continuity of command at the highest 
levels of the army. Certainly, commanders were replaced or changed and those who held senior 
commands were not always the best men for the job. However, the point is that regular army 
officers continued to dominate the high command.156 These men were members of an officer 
corps imbued with the army’s ethos. In some instances, these regular officers found themselves 
in positions where they could influence the training of the various forces. For Shea, the need for 
‘sufficient pre-war personnel capable of imparting instruction’ was vital.157 In this respect, ethos 
remained the golden thread running through the entire organisation. 
Secondly, and related to the first point, FSR remained in force throughout the war. 
Although some commanders did not find its principles applicable, it was often required reading 
or, at least, a key text for training schools in each expeditionary force.158 General Sir Edmund 
Allenby, as CinC of the EEF, declared that it was ‘unnecessary to issue instructions from GHQ 
as to the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action. The principles in Field Service 
Regulations Part I, and in the various pamphlets, are a sufficient guide and should be read in 
conjunction with one another’.159 Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bulfin (GOC XXI Corps) 
upheld Allenby’s belief in the relevance of FSR, calling for its principles to be ‘carefully 
studied’, and requesting that his divisions ‘devote their attention to the application of these 
principles to the present situation’.160 The universality of FSR also proved to be useful for the 
XIV Corps when faced with the prospect of mountain warfare on the Italian front. A warning 
order to the corps’ divisions noted that points on this type of warfare were ‘fully dealt with in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 Robbins, British Generalship, pp. 210-212. 
157 LHCMA, Shea Papers, 6/4, Lecture on Palestine Campaign, n.d. 
158 See, for example, TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Infantry School, Course Syllabus, 3 February 1918; AWM, 
AWM 25 881/34, Course in Staff Duties in 1st Australian Division, Memo, 28 June 1917. 
159 TNA, WO 95/4368, EEF GHQ War Diary, Chief of the General Staff’s Conference, 20 August 1917. 
160 TNA, WO 95/4635, 54th Division GS War Diary, BGGS XXI Corps to GOC 54th Division, 27 
December 1917. 
! 57 
Field Service Regulations Part I’, but were also to be ‘amplified’ in a pamphlet.161 As later 
chapters will show, FSR was also used to integrate newcomer organisations, such as the AIF, 
into the army, forming the basic building block of their training schools. 
Thirdly, the army developed a series of socialisation methods ranging from regimental 
affiliations to the attachments of newcomers to long serving formations. Regarding Lord 
Kitchener’s new armies, Palazzo argues that the decision to append the battalions to existing 
regiments helped instil a sense of tradition and familial association. This not only linked these 
new battalions to the victories of the past, creating loyalties, but also helped to ensure a 
continuity of ethos between the regular and the Kitchener army. 162  For one anonymous 
individual in the RUSI Journal, the ‘“halo of the traditions of the old regiment” has been a very 
great factor in the making of the new units… there is much journalistic gush about the “spirit of 
the New Army”; as if that spirit were something new, and not the legacy handed down by the 
old Regulars’.163  The Kitchener army was very much ‘modelled on the old; trained on its 
system, and imbued with its traditions’.164 As later chapters will show, the army also used 
socialisation methods, including training schools, tactical exercises, and attachments, to instil 
within newcomers the values of the army. Attachments proved a particularly useful way of 
integrating newcomers, introducing them to the front line, but also setting an example in terms 
of discipline, esprit de corps, and soldierly tradition. 
 
When revisiting Robertson’s July 1916 letter to Rawlinson, it is clear that the importance of 
common sense and initiative was not solely a wartime phenomenon. Rather, both qualities were 
fundamental aspects of the army’s pre-war ethos. This ethos, shaped by perceptions of what it 
meant to be British, the country’s geostrategic situation, military initiatives, and the social 
background of the Edwardian officer corps, provided a framework within which the army could !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 TNA, WO 95/4212, XIV Corps GS War Diary, Corps Warning Order, 12 March 1918. 
162 Palazzo, Seeking Victory, pp. 16-17. 
163 C. N. W. (pseud.), ‘The Making of the New Unit’, JRUSI 61 (1916), p. 606. 
164 Ibid., p. 607. 
! 58 
interpret, develop, and modify its method of waging war. Although there are examples in 
history where military ethos has ossified, this did not occur within the British army. Grounded 
in the cultural values of its parent society, its ethos was well developed to operate and thrive in 
the uncertain environment posed by the First World War.  
 That is not to say that such an ethos did not cause problems for the army. Its emphasis 
on pragmatism, and a preference for principles over prescription, posed problems for citizen 
soldiers who had little to no experience of battle. As a result, the army had to recalibrate its 
learning method, pursuing a far more systematic approach to knowledge creation and 
dissemination. The pamphlets produced as part of this change in method, though considered 
mere amplifications of pre-war manuals, were far more prescriptive in nature. That the army 
was able to carry out this recalibration, whilst still stressing the importance of initiative and 
deference to the man on the spot, speaks to the inherent flexibility of the organisation. 
 This flexibility was also demonstrated by the army’s ability to absorb a huge increase in 
numbers without having to undergo wholesale reorganisation. Over the course of the war, the 
army’s social composition changed almost beyond recognition. However, in spite of this, its 
ethos remained relevant and, ultimately, survived the organisational challenges of the First 
World War. It endured because it was representative of the values of civil society; it was 
propagated by individuals in positions of power; and, more importantly, there was a genuine 
desire to see this ethos maintained and passed on to newcomers. Whether through the 
continuing use of FSR or by appending Kitchener units to existing regiments, the army sought 
to imbue newcomers with its characteristic spirit, ensuring they were able to adapt to the 
changing nature of war. 
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CHAPTER'2'
LEARNING'FROM'THE'PRESENT'
 
Although the pre-war army had a number of formal mechanisms through which to share 
information, including the Staff College and military journals, the advent of the First World 
War required the development of additional formal methods. These particular methods allowed 
for the dissemination of explicit knowledge across the army’s various expeditionary forces. 
Publications, for example, were one of these formal methods. They contained information that 
had been extracted from an individual or unit, made independent, and reused for various 
purposes. This particular approach gave individuals access to organised knowledge without 
having to go direct to the originator.1 This approach also ensured that the army’s forces were 
aware of the latest developments taking place around the globe and not just on the Western 
Front. As this chapter suggests, the scale and intensity of the First World War compelled the 
army to adopt a far more bureaucratic approach in its dissemination of knowledge. 
 However, the army was far from ignorant of the importance of people-centred methods. 
These particular methods promoted knowledge sharing between individuals through mentoring, 
secondments, or command appointments. The army utilised all these approaches, partly in 
response to its existing ethos, but also because of its increasingly civilian composition. Also, 
owing to the proximity of the enemy and the inability to disengage fully from the battlefield, 
heuristic or ‘on the job’ learning was just as necessary as more explicit methods. For 
organisational learning to take place, there needed to be an effective relationship between the 
two approaches. 
 This chapter addresses two questions: first, what learning methods did the army develop 
in order to share knowledge, particularly between its operational theatres, and secondly, how 
effective were these methods? To answer these questions, the chapter will first identify and 
detail the army’s formal methods in turn, namely publications, training schools, and lectures. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 M. T. Hansen, N. Nohria and T. Tierney, ‘What’s Your Strategy for Managing Knowledge?’ Harvard 
Business Review (March-April 1999), p. 2.  
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Secondly, it considers the army’s people-centred methods, including secondments and 
attachments, and inter-theatre command appointments. Thirdly, it considers the role of personal 
interaction between individuals through written correspondence and gentlemen’s clubs. Finally, 
it will assess the effectiveness of these methods and reflect on their importance to the army’s 
learning process. 
 
One of the most prominent and well-documented formal methods of sharing knowledge was 
through the medium of military publications. The formulation and dissemination of the SS 
pamphlets has been a subject of interest for scholars such as Griffith and Beach.2 Ultimately, SS 
pamphlets provided a way of codifying and distributing best practice without needing to revamp 
FSR. They were an explicit form of knowledge in that they were portable and could be readily 
transmitted to different parts of the army. For the high command, these publications were 
‘merely amplifications’ of the army’s pre-war manuals, produced to ‘meet the varying 
requirements’ of the war.3 These ‘amplifications’ covered a myriad of topics, ranging from the 
training and employment of bombers, to lessons drawn from specific operations. The use and 
subsequent adaptation of the SS series went beyond the Western Front and was widespread 
throughout the army’s operational theatres. 
Although there was provision for a printing depot in the field as part of the BEF’s 
mobilisation plans, the initial production of military publications was the responsibility of the 
War Office’s Central Distribution Section [CDS]. Once printed, these CDS publications were 
despatched to France for distribution via the Army Printing and Stationery Service [APSS], 
located in the field. Although the APSS began printing its own material at the beginning of 
1915, it was not until early 1916 that this material gained the SS prefix. To cope with the 
demands of a growing army, the APSS in France expanded to accommodate the influx of 
requests for general stationery and publications. In addition to internal requests, the APSS also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Beach, ‘General Staff’, pp. 464-491; Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp. 179-191. 
3 AWM, AWM25 947/76, Infantry Training France 1917, O.B./165, 8 May 1917. 
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received direct requests from the GHQs of the subsidiary theatres who desired the latest 
Western Front publications.4 
Initially, these ad hoc requests were met by the APSS or, in some cases, the War Office. 
However, the practice soon became unworkable. Following a request for recent SS pamphlets 
by the Mesopotamia and Salonika theatres in February 1917, GHQ BEF instructed the APSS to 
issue three copies of all publications forthwith to ‘G[eneral].O[fficers].C[ommanding] Egypt, 
Salonica, Mesopotamia [and] C[ommander].in.C[hief] India’. 5  Further copies of these 
pamphlets were to be produced locally or requested from the War Office directly. The Royal 
Engineers [RE] initiated a similar practice from 1916 onwards for the distribution of its own 
notes and publications. Five hundred copies of each publication were sent to the War Office for 
issue to home units and the various expeditionary forces.6 The army’s decision to standardise 
the distribution of SS pamphlets marked the transition from ‘pulled’ transfer – where theatres 
requested pamphlets which would be of use to them – to ‘pushed’ transfer – where all 
publications were sent out to the various theatres, irrespective of need or relevance. This 
decision ran counter to the army’s pre-war ethos. The pushed transfer of publications aimed to 
reach as many individuals as possible. However, this decision did not represent a complete 
departure from its ethos. It still remained up to each expeditionary force to judge whether or not 
to circulate the material. This suggests that there was flexibility within the military organisation, 
allowing for independent learning in the subsidiary theatres. 
 As the subsidiary theatres grew in size, individual base supply depots were established; 
one of their functions was fulfilling a force’s printing needs. This not only allowed the theatres 
to meet their own general stationery demands, but it also allowed them to publish their own 
pamphlets, based on their experience in theatre. Examples of this include the Italian 
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4 TNA, WO 95/4189, DAPSS War Diary, 24 May 1916. See also TNA, WO 95/4362, EEF GHQ War 
Diary, Lynden-Bell to Corps, 26 April 1916. 
5 TNA, WO 95/4189, DAPSS War Diary, 14 February 1917. Instructions for the formal dissemination of 
SS pamphlets to the Italian Expeditionary Force were agreed on 13 January 1918.  
6 G. H. Addison, The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: The Organization of 
Engineer Intelligence and Information (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2006 [1926]), p. 81. 
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Expeditionary Force’s [IEF] SS652 I.E.F. Traffic Orders, and a publication on ‘Hill Training’, 
as well as the EEF’s Notes on the Employment of Lewis Guns in the Desert.7 In some cases, 
these publications were sent to the War Office for the consumption of other expeditionary 
forces. In January 1918, for example, the EEF sent its pamphlet Notes on the Employment of 
Hotchkiss Automatic Rifles during Recent Operations to the War Office, the Cavalry Training 
Centre at Uckfield, and the Machine Gun Training Centre at Grantham. In return, the EEF asked 
for ‘any information you have regarding Hotchkiss Guns in connection with the recent fighting 
in France’.8 A report on the EEF’s experiments with tanks also found its way to the War Office 
in February 1918 as it was felt that this ‘might be of interest to the Headquarters, Tank Corps’ 
on the Western Front; while in September of the same year, 120 copies of Action of 6th 
Mounted Brigade at El Mughar were forwarded to the Director of Staff Duties for ‘instructional 
purposes’, with a further five copies despatched to India and Mesopotamia.9 
Despite the production and wider dissemination of these theatre-specific publications, 
the appetite for Western Front pamphlets remained considerable. Naturally, one of the dangers 
of drawing on the lessons of the Western Front was their relevance to the different theatres. As 
Serena has argued, certain knowledge resists translation into circumstances foreign to its 
genesis. Knowledge can often be ‘localized, temporal, or only pertains to specific unit types’.10 
It may also be subject to ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome. This syndrome is endemic to 
bureaucratic institutions like the military. The expression refers to a negative attitude to 
knowledge that originates from a source outside the immediate institution or informal group.11 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 TNA, WO 95/4203, Director of Supplies and Transport War Diary, 21 March 1918; TNA, WO 95/4366, 
EEF GHQ War Diary, Lynden-Bell to War Office, 9 November 1916. 
8 TNA, WO 95/4369, EEF GHQ War Diary, GHQ to War Office, Uckfield, and Grantham, 14 January 
1918. 
9 Ibid., GHQ to War Office, 19 February 1918; TNA, WO 95/4371, EEF GHQ War Diary, GHQ to War 
Office, 16 September 1918. 
10 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation, p. 113. 
11 ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome has been covered by a number of scholars. See R. Katz and T. J. Allen, 
‘Investigating the Not Invented Here (NIH) Syndrome: A Look at the Performance, Tenure and 
Communication Patterns of 50 R & D Project Groups’, R&D Management 12 (1) (1982), pp. 7-20; U. 
Lichtenthaler and H. Ernst, ‘Attitudes to Externally Organizing Knowledge Management Tasks: A 
Review, Reconsideration and Extension of the NIH syndrome’, R&D Management 36 (4) (2006), pp. 
367-386. 
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Existing members of the organisation are reluctant to accept new practices that challenge the 
status quo. Writing after the war, Major-General Guy Dawnay, a senior staff officer both in 
Palestine and on the Western Front, noted the ‘well marked tendency to apply the lessons of 
experience indiscriminately’; while McNamara criticised commanders at Gallipoli for trying to 
‘apply the methods applicable to the war in France, to which they had little relation’.12 During 
the Gallipoli campaign, General Sir Ian Hamilton (CinC, MEF) was overtly derogatory about 
the influx of Western Front methods. In a letter to Kitchener, Hamilton wrote that senior 
officers have been ‘saturated with pamphlets and instructions about trench warfare, and their 
one idea is to sit down and dig an enormous hole to hide themselves in’.13 Although the army 
favoured principles over prescription, this attitude echoed the pre-war reluctance to apply the 
tactics and lessons from one campaign to another.14 
A number of pamphlets were broad enough to cover most operational requirements, 
such as SS135 The Training and Employment of Divisions and SS143 The Training of Platoons 
for Offensive Action, providing the foundation for infantry training in the subsidiary theatres. 
The BSF’s infantry school listed both SS135 and SS143 as required reading for officers 
undertaking the course.15 Corps and divisional commanders’ conferences in the IEF drew 
attention to the same pamphlets for the purposes of patrolling and hill warfare in April 1918.16 
However, the majority of pamphlets were concerned with battle conditions on the Western 
Front. This required commanders and staffs of the various expeditionary forces to modify these 
pamphlets for use in theatre. The EEF’s distribution of SS139/3 Artillery Notes No. 3 and 
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12 IWM, Papers of Major-General G. P. Dawnay, 69/21/1, Draft Lecture on Dardanelles and Palestine, 
n.d., p. 19; LHCMA, Kirke Papers, 4/4, Notes by Major General A. E. McNamara on training in 
peacetime and in war, May 1932. 
13 LHCMA, Papers of General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton, 7/1/6, Hamilton to Kitchener, 11 August 1915. 
14 Moreman, The Army in India, pp. 38-41; French, Military Identities, p. 65. 
15 TNA, WO 95/4946, BSF Infantry Training School War Diary, ‘Instruction for “first hour”’, 3 February 
1918. 
16 TNA, WO 95/4229, 23rd Division GS War Diary, ‘Corps Commander’s Conference with Divisional 
Commanders, 24 March 1918’ and ‘Proceedings of a Conference held at Divisional Headquarters, 26 
April 1918’. 
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SS139/4 Artillery Notes No. 4 in May 1917 offers a good example.17 Two pages of notes by 
Major-General Sydenham Smith (Major-General, Royal Artillery [MGRA], EEF) accompanied 
the pamphlets, offering guidance on their use in Palestine. In his consideration of SS139/4, for 
example, Smith noted that ‘the whole tenour of this book applies to conditions of trench warfare 
such as appertain in France… we must therefore be careful to adapt the principles to the nature 
of such defences as confront us from time to time’.18  
This process of adaptation was not confined to the higher levels of command. With 
tactical publications such as SS143, divisions had latitude to interpret and adapt them to their 
local situation.19 During a period of ‘arduous training’ in August 1917, battalions of the 74th 
Division were reorganised ‘based on the development of the modern infantryman’s weapons 
within the platoon’ as found in SS143.20 This publication represented a ‘vital milestone in 
tactics’, separating ‘the Victorian era of riflemen in lines from the twentieth century era of 
flexible small groups built around a variety of high firepower weapons’.21 The platoon, as 
advocated in SS143, was made up of rifle, grenade, rifle grenade, and Lewis gun sections. On 
the Western Front, GHQ determined that this particular structure should be adopted throughout 
all Armies in France. However, in the case of the 74th Division, this structure was deemed 
incompatible with conditions in Palestine. Whereas other Palestine commanders, such as Shea, 
declared the system to be ‘absolutely correct’, the 74th Division adapted the platoon structure to 
meet its own needs and experience.22 In line with SS143, the 74th Division reorganised its 
platoons into four sections, yet rather than a section of rifle grenadiers, a sniper section was 
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17 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, ‘Notes by MGRA on the two pamphlets SS 139/3 and 
SS139/4’, 4 May 1917. 
18 Ibid. 
19 This was in contrast to the Western Front where GHQ BEF was determined that SS143’s platoon 
structure should be ‘adopted throughout all Armies in France’. See GHQ, SS144 The Normal Formation 
for the Attack, 1917. 
20 GHQ, SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917. 
21 Ramsey, Command and Cohesion, p. 33. 
22 TNA, WO 95/4660, 60th Division GS War Diary, Memorandum on Lessons Learned, 13 November 
1917. 
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included instead.23 The reason for this substitution is undocumented. However, in desert 
conditions, the enemy was rarely within assaulting distance, thus rendering the rifle grenade - a 
trench warfare munition – superfluous. Instead, a section of snipers offered a useful way of 
engaging the enemy at long range. The decision to reorganise based on Western Front principles 
suggests that expeditionary forces were not isolated from the wider developments taking place 
in other theatres. 
Although adaptation was encouraged, a clear attempt to promote uniformity endured 
across the army’s expeditionary forces. The BSF, for example, ordered its formations to 
reorganise based on SS143 so as to ‘assimilate the organisation of battalions in this Force with 
that of battalions in the British armies in France and to ensure the necessary degree of 
uniformity of training in battalions’.24 This served to highlight the tension between ensuring a 
systematic approach, while simultaneously encouraging devolved decision-making. 
Expeditionary forces were not compelled to adopt Western Front practice, but it was ill-advised 
to prepare for just one type of warfare. This represented a continuation of the army’s pre-war 
ethos. The possibility of transferring to another theatre of operations at relatively short notice 
meant that formations often had to prepare for two types of warfare: offensive operations in 
their current theatre, and warfare as conducted on the Western Front.25 The move towards a 
systematic approach to doctrine dissemination meant that formations were better able to 
negotiate changes in circumstance. 
 Military publications also provided the basis for the army’s second formal method for 
disseminating knowledge: training schools and classes of instruction. The simple dissemination 
of a publication was not always enough. Recalling preparations for the Second Battle of Gaza, 
one soldier in the 5th Battalion Highland Light Infantry recalled that ‘pamphlets on the attack, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 C. H. Dudley Ward, The 74th (Yeomanry) Division in Syria and France (London: John Murray, 1922), 
p. 67. 
24 TNA, WO 95/4757, BSF GHQ War Diary, Memo, Gillman to GOCs XII and XVI Corps, 5 June 1917. 
25 Whilst serving on the Western Front, the 27th Division, for example, had little more than two weeks 
between notification and embarkation for Salonika. It received information on 31 October 1915 that it 
was to entrain for Salonika and began its subsequent embarkation on 17 November 1915. See TNA, WO 
95/2255/2, 27th Division A&Q War Diary, 31 October 1915. 
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written for trench warfare in France, were liberally issued. One’s brain became terribly 
confused’.26 Although the ‘pushed’ distribution method was working, this soldier’s account 
suggested that pamphlets were not always read or understood. No soldier was ever expected to 
read every training pamphlet issued, nor did the army have the means to enforce this. The 
pamphlets read would have depended on that soldier’s rank or role. However, in some cases, 
these pamphlets still required interpretation and to be put into practice. Training, both in schools 
and in units, offered that method of interpretation. The BEF’s approach to training was not 
formalised until the inauguration of the Training Directorate, under Major-General Arthur 
Solly-Flood, in France in January 1917. The Directorate was established for ‘the co-ordination 
of all training, whether carried out at G.H.Q., the Armies, the corps, or the divisions’.27 
Although the establishment of the Training Directorate was a visible act, this was not GHQ’s 
first ‘hands on’ attempt at improving the training of the British army in France. In 1915, 
Robertson, then Sir John French’s Chief of Staff, had given responsibility for training to his 
deputy before Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler subsequently assumed this duty in 
December 1915.28  
Prior to the creation of the Training Directorate, the establishment of training schools 
was left to the initiative of individual commanders. By the winter of 1916-1917, there were a 
number of schools at Army, corps and divisional levels, but, in a manner reminiscent of the pre-
war army, little uniformity existed as to how these schools were run or the methods taught. 
Owing to GHQ’s limited involvement at this point, individual commanders and their staff took 
it upon themselves to determine the course content and how it was to be delivered.29 The 
Training Directorate offered a way of enforcing uniformity of doctrine, as well as standardising 
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26  F. L. Morrison, The Fifth Battalion, Highland Light Infantry in the War, 1914-18 (Glasgow: 
MacLehose, Jackson & Co., 1921), p. 147. 
27 W. Miles, Official History of the War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, II (2 vols., 
London: Macmillan 1938), p. 571. 
28 A. Geddes, ‘Major-General Arthur Solly-Flood, GHQ and Tactical Training in the BEF, 1916-1918’, 
MA dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2007, pp. 11-12. 
29 IWM, Papers of Captain T. C. Owtram, 83/17/1, Ts memoir, n.d, p. 14. Owtram’s memoirs detail a 
course for ‘instruction in staff duties’ run by 1st Division in mid-1915. 
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the teaching of that doctrine. Bonham-Carter, successor to Solly-Flood, recalled his position as 
being ‘in charge of the Schools of Instruction directly under GHQ’, visiting divisions, and 
‘learning their experiences in order to keep everyone up to date with any tactical development 
that takes place by sending round pamphlets’.30 The task had similarities with that of the pre-
war IGF in that it involved ‘ensuring that similar principles and methods of training’ were 
adopted throughout the army.31 
The publication of SS152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France 
encapsulated this drive for uniformity. Published as a provisional document in June 1917, 
SS152 set out the army’s ‘general policy of training’, and the system it would use to ensure 
‘uniformity of doctrine’.32 The policy of training in France was based upon two beliefs: first, 
that, much like the pre-war army, the responsibility for the training and efficiency of all officers 
and men in a unit belonged to the commanding officer; and secondly, that special instructors 
were to be trained at schools to assist them in that task.33 Its publication led to a complete 
overhaul and standardisation of the schools system within the BEF. The reduction of the 
number of schools limited the opportunity for different training creeds.34 This made the system 
more manageable. Corps schools were placed on an even footing, providing training for platoon 
commanders and non-commissioned officers [NCO], while divisional schools were abolished. 
Training at the tactical level continued, but in the form of ‘classes of instruction’. To 
complement the standardised school system, SS152 was highly prescriptive regarding the 
syllabus for each school, including the number of students in each cohort and the types of 
publications to be used.35 Instructors were also expected to keep up to date with the latest 
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30 CAC, Bonham-Carter Papers, BHCT 2/2, Bonham-Carter to sister, 8 October 1917. 
31 CAC, Bonham-Carter Papers, BHCT 9/2, Ts copy of autobiography, Chapter 9, n.d. 
32 A slightly revised version of SS152 was published in January 1918. 
33 Geddes, ‘Solly-Flood’, pp. 19-20. 
34 Ibid., p. 20. 
35 Ibid., p. 21. 
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developments through refresher courses and visits to the front line.36 However, as Jonathan Boff 
has argued, SS152 attempted to perform two conflicting roles simultaneously: to help 
disseminate common doctrine, and to preserve the independent responsibility of divisions and 
their units for training their men.37 In essence, it was promoting both obedience and initiative. 
Though SS152 constituted a coherent attempt to standardise training, it was not followed 
religiously. There was diversity in approach, highlighting the army’s inherent unwillingness to 
adhere to prescription. 
Though devised for use in the BEF, SS152’s dissemination to the other expeditionary 
forces meant that it also provided the basis for their schools. Its use was notable in the BSF with 
the establishment of GHQ schools for infantry, artillery, signal, gas, and Lewis and Vickers 
Guns.38 Surviving records for the BSF’s Lewis and Vickers Gun school outline the development 
of a new programme of training, prepared ‘on the lines laid down in… “Instructions for the 
Training of the British Armies in France” with reference to the latest literature from France and 
Grantham’.39 However, the training syllabus had to be made relevant to local conditions. The 
BSF Lewis and Vickers Gun school decided to eliminate certain aspects from SS152’s 
prescribed syllabus, notably revolver training and ‘warfare of highly organised defences’.40 This 
flexible approach was also evident in the BSF’s infantry school. The core pamphlets mirrored 
those used in France, including SS135, SS143, and SS185 Assault Training, yet responsibility 
was placed on the commandant and his instructors to ensure that the course was relevant to 
conditions in Salonika. This, once again, served to highlight SS152’s conflict of purpose. It also 
suggested that the centre (the Western Front) was positively delegating responsibility to the 
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36 GHQ, SS152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, 1917, pp. 14-15. This 
practice was also initiated in non-Western Front theatres, notably Palestine. See TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF 
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37 Boff, Winning and Losing, p. 59. 
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periphery. This policy of adaptation and decentralisation is also evident within the EEF. In a 
letter to the force’s corps commanders, Dawnay wrote that: 
 
The various pamphlets, published on training, cannot be accepted as containing 
the final word so far as the preparations for operations in this country are 
concerned. It is considered that the experience gained on the subject, which may 
have called for modifications and variations in the pamphlets referred to, are 
worth… collating and placing on record for future guidance. 41 
 
Although syllabi were adapted to suit local training needs, training in Western Front 
warfare was not neglected. Prior to his departure as CinC EEF in June 1917, General Sir 
Archibald Murray established a specialist branch of the Imperial School of Instruction at El 
Arish. Unlike the main Zeitoun school, the El Arish branch was established for the sole purpose 
of instruction in trench warfare. The syllabus included the ‘combined training and tactical 
handling of Stokes Guns, Lewis Guns and bombers’.42 Though starting with the best of 
intentions, the El Arish school came under fire from senior officers in the EEF, notably 
Dawnay. In a report to Lynden-Bell, Dawnay wrote that ‘the organisation and training of a 
platoon, as laid down in “Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917” 
[SS143] does not appear to be taught’.43 Although candidates at El Arish received practical 
instruction in ‘revetting trenches, siting tactical wire and fire trenches’, there was no practical 
instruction in ‘attacks from a trench against other trenches by strong points, cooperation 
between infantry and M[achine] G[un]s and Art[iller]y, [or] siting of Lewis and Machine Guns 
in Trenches’.44 The EEF also established a sniper school to be ‘conducted on the lines of an 
Army Sniper School in France’. 45 This was, in large part, due to the success of the BEF’s First 
Army sniping school under Major Hesketh Hesketh-Prichard.46 
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41 TNA, WO 95/4368, EEF GHQ War Diary, Memo to GOCs XX, XXI and DMC, 16 October 1917. 
42 TNA, WO 95/4367, EEF GHQ War Diary, 12 June 1917. 
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To ensure that training remained up to date, the schools sought instructors with relevant 
experience and the ability to ensure that both military publications and the wider training syllabi 
were understandable to the student. Schools in the subsidiary theatres wanted instructors with 
‘recent experience in France’, as well as those familiar with the latest literature from schools in 
Britain.47 In Salonika, a regular regimental sergeant-major was brought over from France to act 
as ‘Sergeant of Training’ at the force’s infantry school, while two assistant instructors and three 
sergeant instructors were sent from Grantham to run the Lewis and Vickers Gun school.48 The 
EEF was just as keen as its Salonika counterpart, requesting ‘two regular officers with recent 
experience in France’ to run the senior officers’ course at Heliopolis.49 Brigadier-General 
Geoffrey Salmond (GOC Middle East Brigade, Royal Flying Corps [RFC]) called for the 
attachment of a GSO1 to help him ‘keep in touch with progress at home and in France’, but also 
to help ‘coordinate methods of training out here with those at home’. For Salmond, the current 
lack of expertise meant that it was ‘not possible to keep abreast of improvements in France… 
and this affects operations’.50 The need for these experienced staff officers was clear with the 
EEF’s appointment of three regular officers, with experience of staff duties and instruction, to 
run its staff school at Mena House.51 Of these three officers, two of them had been instructors at 
the junior staff school at Clare College, Cambridge, prior to their appointment to Mena House. 
The EEF staff school, established in January 1917, was run on similar lines to the staff schools 
at Cambridge and in France with an intake of thirty students; fifteen of these students were 
nominated by the BSF.52 As part of their participation on the course, the BSF candidates were 
taken ‘to see something of the work on the eastern front’.53 This gave them an appreciation of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the situation facing the EEF and a thorough grounding in the administrative requirements of 
fighting in desert conditions.  
The use of Western Front publications and instructors ensured that training schools and 
courses of instruction served as key fora for the practical dissemination of Western Front 
knowledge. This knowledge spread throughout the expeditionary forces by the army’s use of 
cascade training, or ‘teach the teacher’ systems.54 Cascade training focuses on the training of a 
small group who then pass on what they know to others further down the organisation 
hierarchy. It allows for the dissemination of information through the ranks in a relatively short 
period of time.55 Officers and men who attended formal schools were expected to cascade the 
information to their respective units either as an instructor or through less formal means such as 
lecturing. Major-General John Monash, for example, wrote that, to keep up the supply of trained 
instructors in the 3rd Australian Division, ‘selected officers and NCOs do courses of from one 
to three weeks… and are then returned to their units to continue the training of the junior 
personnel’.56  
The use of lectures provided the third avenue for the formal sharing of knowledge. Like 
training schools, they provided a good way of sharing knowledge as well as distilling the 
information found within military publications. Brigadier-General Herbert Gordon (GOC 70th 
Brigade), for example, decided to deliver a lecture to his men on his ‘recent course with the 
French at Verona’.57 Gordon’s approach was recommended by SS152, which advised that 
‘lectures should be given on matters of interest by Officers recently returned from Schools, by 
Staff Officers and outside Lecturers when procurable’.58 This suggests a greater emphasis on the 
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individual as a way of sharing knowledge. Where possible, instructors from training schools 
would visit formations to deliver lectures on the latest methods.59  
The army also recognised that ‘subordinate commanders have not always the time or 
the inclination to study official books’. This attitude could be remedied by ‘lectures given by 
officers of all ranks’.60 These lectures made the explicit information found within publications 
accessible to a larger group. Colonel Roderick Macleod, an artillery officer in the 48th Division, 
practised this approach, making ‘all the officers in this battery give lectures in the evenings. 
Each Officer has one subject, and he lectures on it once a week’.61 This was important to the 
battery, as ‘officers are quite keen on listening to what one of their number is saying’.62 In the 
EEF, Captain Noel Drury, an officer in the 6th Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, recounted a 
‘very informal lecture by Gen F[rederick] A[ugustus] Greer, all of us sitting round in shirt 
sleeves, and smoking’.63 The informality often found in these lectures was a welcome departure 
from the prescriptive syllabi of the training schools. As Macleod recalled, although he enjoyed 
the senior officers’ course at GHQ IEF, he found that some of the syllabus was ‘quite old’ and 
covered principles he had already learned during initial training at Woolwich.64 
 
Through the use of lectures and experienced instructors, the individual could play an important 
role in the sharing of knowledge. As this section will show, people-centred methods formed a 
central part of the army’s learning process.65 This aligned with the army’s ethos, its amateur 
tradition, and the continuing importance of personalities. However, this approach to learning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was not limited to the British army. Research into corporate workplace learning has revealed 
that nearly two-thirds of work-related information comes from face-to-face meetings, 
mentoring, and apprenticeships.66 The army recognised the importance of these ‘on the job’ 
methods through its promotion of secondment and attachment schemes, and inter-theatre 
command appointments. 
Secondments generally serve one of two purposes: they either focus on the personal 
development of the individual, or they fulfil a strategic function, enabling a team or organisation 
to gain new knowledge or skills. For the British army of the First World War, secondments and 
attachments not only played a key role in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge 
between theatres, but also between allies. By seconding individuals to different theatres and 
different forces, the army enhanced its own potential for learning. 
 The army’s policy for secondments and exchanges was multi-faceted. In order to 
influence or share current knowledge with allies, for example, the War Office established 
formal military missions, such as the Baker mission to the USA and Brigadier-General Charles 
Delmé-Radcliffe’s mission to Italy. 67  To understand the situation facing the army’s 
expeditionary forces, the War Office deployed a number of liaison officers for attachment at the 
various GHQs. Liaison between the War Office and Salonika was established as early as 1916.68 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Barge, a liaison officer to the BSF, was instructed to ‘keep the War 
Office acquainted with the situation on the Macedonian front, particularly the British sector, and 
with the needs of the British Forces at Salonika’.69 Barge was expected to gather information 
relating to ‘details of defence, method of holding the line, and system of reliefs’, along with 
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supply and transport considerations. In July 1917, Robertson appointed a liaison officer between 
the War Office and the EEF: Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Wavell. Explaining his motives to 
Allenby, Robertson was at pains to stress that Wavell is ‘in no way a spy’, but rather he was 
appointed ‘to help you and to help me’.70 By establishing this system of liaison officers, the War 
Office had the eyes and ears to appreciate the many difficulties facing the different 
expeditionary forces, both tactically and administratively. The system also provided the means 
of sharing information and knowledge. 
 In addition to these liaison officers, the army also established a series of less formal 
attachments. Governed by the GHQs of the various expeditionary forces, these attachments 
were often in response to identified gaps in that force’s knowledge or skill base. The request for 
suitable instructors for training schools is a good example of this. The same can be said for staff 
officers or those individuals with specialist knowledge.71 As early as March 1916, Brigadier-
General Philip Howell (BGGS, BSF, 1915-1916) drew attention to the ‘rapidly decreasing’ 
proportion of staff officers with Staff College or specialist training. Howell suggested arranging 
‘permanent or temporary transfers’ to widen the experience and knowledge of new and existing 
staff officers.72 Milne was vocal in his support for secondments. In early 1918, he advocated ‘an 
interchange of officers between Salonica and the French and Italian fronts’. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edward Plunkett, a liaison officer to the BSF, wrote how Milne believed that: 
  
80% of the officers at Salonica would volunteer for service in France, while a 
large number of officers now in France would welcome a change to Salonica 
although they would not take the initiative and apply for a transfer […] There 
are many officers at Salonica with from 10 to 20 years’ experience, and Lt-Gen 
Milne does not consider that the country is getting full value from the time and 
money spent on their military education. Their reliefs would soon learn their 
work at the Salonica front which is an excellent training ground.73 
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 In addition to this ‘interchange of officers’, Milne was also keen to benefit from the up 
to date methods found on the Western Front. To realise this, he sanctioned two visits to the 
Western Front in 1917. Both these visits highlighted the roles that individuals could play in 
promulgating new methods within an organisation. The first was the despatch of Gillman to 
Britain and the Western Front in early July 1917. Whilst on the Western Front, Gillman went 
‘round all the training schools in General [Sir Arthur] Holland’s 1st Corps and picked up a lot 
of tips as regards modern developments of training which will, I hope, be useful at Salonika’.74 
Upon his return to Salonika later that month, Gillman went ‘round the various fronts 
and explained what I had learnt in France as to the system of training’. In a letter to his wife, he 
noted how busy he was ‘explaining to our corps and division commanders the innovations and 
good points I noticed… and shall get things going on the newer lines’. Of paramount 
importance to Gillman was that ‘we must keep up to date here’.75 
 The second of these visits was the attachment of a number of senior artillery officers to 
formations on the Western Front to ‘study modern artillery methods’ in early July 1917.76 This 
party included, amongst others, Major-General William Onslow (MGRA, BSF), Brigadier-
General Hugh White-Thomson (Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery [BGRA], XII Corps) and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Holbrooke, who later became the XII Corps’ first counter-battery 
staff officer [CBSO] in August 1917.77 By sending these senior officers, Milne increased the 
likelihood that modern, Western Front artillery methods would disseminate throughout his 
force. Gillman recalled how these senior officers ‘gave an interesting account of their visit. 
The difference between there and here is in masses of guns. In France for an attack you require 
a gun for every 8 yards of front... Here we have one gun for every 200 yards’.78 The decision to 
sanction this attachment likely explains the subsequent decision to trial a CBSO at XII Corps in 
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order to ‘carry out counter battery work as employed in France’.79 CBSOs were established on 
the Western Front from January 1917 onwards – seven months earlier than Salonika.80 Sound 
ranging, a vital component of counter-battery work, was pioneered and developed on the 
Western Front.81 By November 1918, there were twenty-five sound ranging groups on the 
Western Front and a handful scattered among the Italian, Palestine, and Salonika theatres.82 To 
benefit from this new technology, the subsidiary theatres relied on the despatch of trained 
officers from France, or alternatively, they were required to send their own officers for 
attachment and training on the Western Front.83 It was only in January 1918 that sound ranging 
was added to the establishment of the Field Survey Companies in Salonika. Even with 
attachment programmes and liaison officers, the limited availability of equipment for the 
subsidiary theatres could often result in a lag when importing Western Front practice.84 
Much like secondments, the use of inter-theatre command appointments provided 
another highly personalised way of sharing knowledge. Personnel movement is an important 
transmission channel. Not only do individuals bring their own experience and knowledge with 
them, but they are also capable of challenging taken for granted assumptions. As Kristen 
Harkness and Michael Hunzeker have argued, leadership turnover can facilitate adaptation. The 
appointment of new commanders can disrupt institutional memory, exposing units to new 
practices and approaches, particularly when those leaders have different backgrounds or 
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experiences from their predecessors.85 Conversely, they may also experience a certain degree of 
‘stickiness’.86 As an outsider, their ways of working may be considered inappropriate and 
subject to ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome, resulting in a battle against existing cultural or social 
processes. General Sir Edmund Allenby’s appointment to command the EEF in June 1917 
offers a good example of the successful impact of such an appointment. 
Before his departure for Palestine, Allenby supposedly broke down in front of Sir Julian 
Byng, his successor as commander of Third Army. Allenby was ‘desolate’ at being moved to 
Palestine and saw it as a punishment for his failings as commander of Third Army during the 
battle of Arras.87 In spite of this, his presence in Palestine contributed to an increase in morale 
and a greater dissemination of Western Front practice throughout the EEF. Although the 
appointment of commanders and senior officers was both political and bureaucratic, the 
subsequent impact of that commander was highly individual.88 
As the newly appointed CinC of a demoralised expeditionary force, Allenby had little 
difficulty impressing his way of working on to the EEF. Within six weeks of taking up his 
appointment, he requested ‘gas equipment and personnel’ from Robertson. Gas had been used 
to great effect by Third Army in the opening stages of the battle of Arras in April 1917, and 
Allenby was certain that gas ‘ought to be of great use opposite Gaza, and possibly elsewhere’.89 
Although there was no denying the differing tactical and geographic conditions of the Western 
Front and Palestine, he encouraged the dissemination of Western Front material. In a conference 
with senior officers, Allenby informed them that GHQ would produce extracts from certain SS 
pamphlets and distribute these to the troops.90 However, this process of dissemination was not 
passive. The EEF used lectures and demonstrations to great effect, ensuring that its men were 
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up to date with the latest Western Front methods. On 15 October 1917, Major-General Sir Louis 
Bols, the EEF’s newly appointed CGS and Allenby’s former Chief of Staff at Third Army, 
delivered a lecture to senior officers in the 52nd Division on recent fighting methods utilised on 
the Western Front.91 Allenby also had no qualms about bringing his recent knowledge to bear. 
Following an inspection of the Eastern Force’s trenches in July 1917, he wrote to the force’s 
commander, voicing concern over the narrowness of the trenches. To Allenby, this contradicted 
the ‘experience in France’, which suggested that narrow trenches led to greater casualties. He 
simply asked the commander to consider the matter and report his modifications.92  
In addition to the promulgation of Western Front methods, Allenby actively sought 
‘young and vigorous’ officers with ‘French experience’ to fill key positions in the EEF.93 
Brigadier-General Sir Richard Howard-Vyse was one of these officers. A known quantity to 
Allenby, Howard-Vyse had served as BM to the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which formed part of the 
Cavalry Corps – a formation Allenby had commanded from late 1914 to May 1915. Allenby 
requested him directly in order to take up the position of BGGS to the Desert Mounted Corps. 
In a letter to Robertson, Allenby recognised that bringing in an outsider was likely to cause a 
‘little soreness’, but he felt that: 
 
A little new blood… will do good. There is some slight tendency to put forward 
the local article as being the only one worth considering. Changes are always 
uncomfortable; but I am being firm…94 
 
By virtue of his position as CinC, Allenby was able to select the best man for the job. This was 
particularly important where staff officers were concerned. The inadequate supply of trained 
staff officers was a problem in all theatres. In correspondence with Sir James Edmonds, the 
British official historian, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Dobell, former GOC Eastern Force, 
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bemoaned the ‘inadequate staff’ as a ‘weakness’.95 It is unsurprising then that within months of 
his arrival, Allenby had secured three senior officers with Western Front experience, placing 
them in key staff appointments: Bols as CGS, Howard-Vyse as BGGS, Desert Mounted Corps, 
and Brigadier-General William Bartholomew as BGGS, XX Corps.96 
 The frequency and intensity of operations on the Western Front provided staff officers 
with considerable experience in operational planning and execution. This experience was vital 
in theatres where operations were necessarily complex, but often infrequent in nature. By using 
Western Front staff officers, Allenby ensured that commanders with combat experience in 
Palestine were supported by staff who had cut their teeth in high tempo operations. Lieutenant-
General Sir Philip Chetwode (GOC XX Corps) was uncommonly praiseworthy of 
Bartholomew’s talents, particularly in the preparations for the battle of Beersheba in October 
1917. Chetwode recalled how the plan was ‘worked out by him [Bartholomew] for me and the 
complications were so great in moving four divisions… that my heart nearly failed me’.97 The 
relationship between Bartholomew and Chetwode was a particularly close one. In a letter 
congratulating Bartholomew on his promotion to Allenby’s staff in April 1918, Chetwode 
reminisced about their ‘unforgettable experience’ together and praised his former BGGS’s 
‘clear head, grasp of detail, [and] tactical knowledge’.98  Their personal and professional 
relationship continued well into the 1930s with Bartholomew’s appointment to CGS during 
Chetwode’s tenure as CinC, India. 
Similarly to Allenby, Lieutenant-General The Earl of Cavan (GOC XIV Corps and 
subsequent commander of the IEF) brought his own Western Front experiences to bear during 
his time on the Italian front. However, unlike Allenby, Cavan went to Italy as part of the 
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original expeditionary force. He was not an outsider and, therefore, did not have to navigate the 
existing cultural or social mores unique to each expeditionary force. The divisions that 
constituted the IEF were all despatched from the Western Front.99 They had all seen recent 
action during the Third Battle of Ypres. The Western Front was, therefore, a natural reference 
point for commanders and men. This was typified in the XIV Corps’ orders on 20 January 1918 
requesting that infantry support all isolated machine gun emplacements as a result of experience 
during the German counter-attack at Cambrai.100 The proceedings of a conference held at the 
23rd Division’s HQ in April 1918 also drew attention to ‘the various letters issued dealing with 
the experiences gained from the recent German offensives in France’. Training was to focus on 
‘forestalling those of the enemy’s method of attack, which proved successful’. 101  Some 
formations, such as the 69th Brigade, actively reorganised their defensive disposition as a result 
of their experience on the Western Front.102 In December 1917, the 69th Brigade established 
‘strong lines of Lewis Gun defence on to the lower slopes of the hill with lines of Machine Gun 
defence on the middle and higher slopes’.103 
The 48th Division also made the decision to defend in depth, most notably during the 
battle of Asiago in June 1918. Major-General Sir Robert Fanshawe, the division’s commander, 
had actively encouraged elastic defence as early as 1915 and, through this tactic, had never lost 
a defensive position.104 However, when the Austrian assault fell on 15 June 1918, the 23rd 
Division checked the advance, but the 48th Division could not hold. The Austrians penetrated 
the centre of the 48th Division, forming a pocket in its front line. The subsequent loss of ground 
resulted in Cavan dismissing Fanshawe. In correspondence with Edmonds, Cavan claimed that 
he dismissed Fanshawe due to the latter’s decision to man the front line thinly and the fact that 
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he gave way too easily.105 However, Fanshawe had fought a model defence in depth battle as 
laid out in SS210 The Division in Defence.106 He had encouraged an elastic defence, counter-
attacking, and reoccupying the lost ground the following morning.107 It could be argued that had 
the British line been strongly held ‘in the Italian fashion’ then there might have been no break-
in.108 However, the British had no experience of mountain warfare in Europe. Used to German, 
rather than Austrian, bombardments, IEF formations decided to adhere to the principles of 
defence in depth as developed on the Western Front. The Austrians’ lack of drive in pushing the 
attack forward allowed Fanshawe to utilise his Western Front experience by counter-attacking 
and retaking the lost ground. However, whether through Cavan’s misunderstanding of the 
principles of defence in depth or through his desire to scapegoat Fanshawe, the incident reveals 
the potency of both previous experience and personal command to the conduct of operations in 
other theatres. 
 Allenby and Cavan were not exceptions to the rule. There are wide-ranging examples of 
other commanders transferring their knowledge and experience from one theatre to another. 
Both Harrison and Syk, for example, have shown how Maude drew on his experience of 
commanding in France and Gallipoli to overhaul medical and logistical practices when 
appointed to command the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force; while Kristian Coates Ulrichsen 
labelled General Sir Charles Monro’s staff appointments when CinC India as ‘a prime example 
of cross-campaign absorption of lessons learned’.109 This transfer of experience was apparent at 
the divisional level too. The appointment of Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to the 
27th Division in Salonika saw an increase in both Western Front practice, and the sharing of 
ideas and schemes between formations. Forestier-Walker had formerly commanded the 21st 
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Division on the Western Front before taking up command of the 27th Division in December 
1916. As a regular division, the 27th Division had a good reputation. One of its former 
commanders, Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall, wrote in January 1916 how ‘very 
pleased’ he was at commanding the 27th Division, as ‘everyone tells me its first class and 
certainly from the little I have seen I think so too’.110 Forestier-Walker was keen to draw on his 
Western Front experience to ensure that the division was kept up to date with the latest 
techniques.111 Much like Allenby, Forestier-Walker reinforced the need to read and, where 
appropriate, adopt SS144 The Normal Formation for the Attack and SS135. He also frequently 
wrote to contacts in France and Britain to seek clarification on certain tactical methods, 
including advice on precautions against gas and the methods of carrying Lewis Guns.112 One of 
his first decisions upon taking command was to inaugurate weekly conferences. These would 
allow for ‘discussing questions of general interest at a time when everybody concerned was 
present’, whilst also giving commanders and staff officers ‘an opportunity of getting to know 
each other well’.113 This provided a solid bedrock for the sharing of ideas and knowledge. 
Forestier-Walker insisted on circulating ‘all interesting schemes received from Inf[antry] 
B[riga]des or 16th Corps’, as ‘an interchange of ideas would be interesting and perhaps lead to 
further ideas’. In addition to this, he believed that ‘for perfect co-operation… all should know 
what their neighbours are doing and how they did it’.114 Brigade commanders were actively 
encouraged to ‘visit one another’s defence lines’, as a ‘great deal of information can always be 
obtained by such visits’.115   
However, as with the use of military publications, practices learned in one theatre were 
not always relevant or applicable to other theatres, particularly when they failed to consider 
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local conditions. In a letter to the Director of Supplies and Transport [DST] at the War Office, 
Koe, then DST to the MEF, commented on the work of Brigadier-General Reginald Ford who 
worked on the MEF Lines of Communication. Though ‘an extremely able man’, Ford suffered 
under ‘the disadvantage of not having been up here and… does not realise the conditions’. His 
method for the advanced supply of rations – ‘obviously the result of his experience in France’ – 
was incompatible with the conditions faced by the MEF.116 Ford’s decision to undertake 
automatic supply was predicated on the complex logistical infrastructure as found on the 
Western Front. However, this infrastructure simply did not exist in the MEF in late 1915. Koe 
rightly complained that if automatic supply were to be used, the result would be a ‘harbour full 
of ships which [I] could not get unloaded’. As with the combat formations on the Italian front, 
Ford’s natural reference point was the Western Front. However, unlike those combat 
formations, Ford implemented his method with little understanding of the complexities facing 
the Mediterranean theatre.117 
Although personnel movement ranked highly as a transmission channel, its 
effectiveness was often determined by the influence and position of the individual concerned. 
As CinCs of independent expeditionary forces, Allenby and Cavan took advantage of their 
positions to impress their experience and ways of working on to their subordinates. For 
‘outsider’ mid-level officers joining formations in new theatres, the possibility of encountering 
‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome increased. As later chapters will show, this was particularly 
acute when officers or combat formations moved to the Western Front after serving in a 
subsidiary theatre. This two-tier view of the Western Front and the ‘other’ theatres resulted in a 
snobbery that largely favoured the former. In response to Brigadier-General Henry Sloman’s 
request for employment on the General Staff in France, Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot 
Kiggell (CGS, BEF, 1915-1917) candidly replied that:   
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… it is not easy to place officers of your rank and age on the General Staff 
when they have not had recent experience out here. The attempts we have made 
in that direction have not proved encouraging, as the responsible Commanders 
are naturally anxious to get men who are absolutely up to date with 
various peculiarities of this war.118 
 
This attitude towards ‘outsiders’ can also be found in Edmonds’ memoirs. In an anecdotal 
account of the German spring offensive, Edmonds recalled how ‘information of the GHQ policy 
became essential’, but he could ‘learn nothing’ from Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Lawrence 
(CGS, BEF, 1917-1918) or Dawnay, as both were ‘Palestrinians [sic.] and not used to fighting 
Germans. They seemed terror stricken’.119 There is no evidence to support Edmonds’ assertion, 
but this attitude towards individuals and formations with experience in the subsidiary theatres 
was far from unusual. In a letter to Robertson, Kiggell wrote how commanders and formations 
on the Western Front were ‘up against it’ in a way that they [those in the subsidiary theatres] are 
not and can never be in those countries’.120  
 
As we have seen, secondments and command appointments provided a fruitful avenue for 
sharing knowledge. However, as this section will show, personal interaction and the act of 
socialising also provided a potent method for sharing knowledge between theatres. Owing to 
restrictions on publication, it was very rare for knowledge to be shared through the medium of 
professional service journals during the war. A 1916 Army Council order declared that ‘officers 
and soldiers are forbidden, without special authority, to publish any article, whether purporting 
to be fiction or fact, which in any way deals with the war or with military matters’.121 This 
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declaration also extended to the publication of regimental magazines in the EEF. In November 
1916, a GRO declared that:  
 
no Regimental, Trench, Station or Camp Magazine is in future to be issued 
without sanction from superior authority… Information regarding the 
movements, actions and situations of units which would be of value to the 
enemy will not be published…122 
 
The constraints imposed on professional journals and trench magazines limited the number of 
ways that information could be exchanged informally between theatres. This often meant that 
personal interaction was the most effective way of sharing information. This could be through 
face-to-face interaction, correspondence, or individual socialising, both inside and outside the 
confines of the army. 
Some modern management theory depicts the process of organisational learning as an 
iceberg. The small section above water covers formal learning, while the larger, submerged 
section represents informal learning.123 The prevalence of informal learning can be attributed to 
the fact that individuals are often likely to turn to each other, rather than documents, for 
information.124 The use of informal social networks allows individuals to circumvent often 
unwieldy formal systems, thus reducing the problem of knowledge lag.125 In modern parlance, 
these ‘water cooler’ conversations are vital occasions for knowledge transfer. Naturally, some 
of the talk will focus on gossip and mutual interests, but these conversations will also focus on 
work. They allow individuals to discover what they know, share it with colleagues, and create 
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new knowledge for the organisation.126 These informal conversations are often more effective 
than formal structures in affecting organisational activities and outcomes.127  
Although the army’s shared ethos bound individuals together, the importance of 
informal networks to the working of the army cannot be overlooked. Knowledge does not 
simply result from processes or activities; it comes from people and communities of people. 
However, for conversations to take place at all, a connection is required. As we have seen, 
connections in the military were made in a number of ways: public school, shared attendance at 
Sandhurst or Staff College, previous military service, or through membership of other social 
groups, such as hunts, shooting syndicates, and gentlemen’s clubs. In a letter to Lieutenant-
General Sir Alexander Godley (GOC II Australian and New Zealand Army Corps [ANZAC]), 
for example, Milne reminisced on the fortunes of his cohort at the Staff College, noting that: 
 
… a good many of us who were at the S[taff] C[ollege] together seem to be 
fairly busy in the war. You, Robertson, Gough, Hunter Bunter, Braithwaite… 
and many others… We know little of the war in France and anxiously pick up 
all the crumbs we can.128 
 
Historians’ tendency to focus on formal, hierarchical methods of learning has meant that the 
impact of these informal, lateral relationships has sometimes been overlooked. As these 
interactions were social and often ad hoc in nature, the process and outcome were very rarely 
written down. However, evidence of these interactions can be found in personal 
correspondence, particularly between senior officers. Like Milne, Maude was keen to keep in 
touch with Western Front developments during his time in Mesopotamia. Writing to his family, 
Maude noted that he was ‘getting a good many letters now… from the War Office, and from 
Army, Corps and Divisional Commanders in France and Egypt’. This ensured that he was kept 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 T. Davenport and L. Prusak, Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know 
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 1998), pp. 90-92. 
127 This point is brought out more fully in A. J. Delmonte and J. E. Aronson, ‘The Relationship Between 
Social Interaction and Knowledge Management System Success’, Journal of Knowledge Management 
Practice 5 (2004) http://www.tlainc.com/articl71.htm [Accessed 5 January 2015]. 
128 LHCMA, Papers of General Sir A. Godley, 3/180, Milne to Godley, 26 January 1916. 
! 87 
‘posted with what is going on there’.129 Throughout the Gallipoli campaign, Rawlinson was in 
regular communication with senior officers in the MEF, including Godley, Walter Braithwaite, 
and Hamilton. The correspondence between these men considered the reasons for success or 
failure in the different theatres. In a letter to Clive Wigram, Rawlinson wrote that he had: 
 
… heard from Braithwaite the other day describing the difficulties of the 
situation which confronts them – Achi Baba is not dissimilar to many of the 
fortified strongholds which confront us here so I sent him some of our 
experiences on the best way to deal with barbed wire and trenches.130 
 
While serving at Gallipoli, Major-General Henry de Beauvoir De Lisle (GOC 29th Division) 
kept in close contact with his former staff from the 1st Cavalry Division.131 Much like Gillman 
and Forestier-Walker, Beauvoir De Lisle was able to disseminate Western Front methods within 
his theatre of operations. In a letter to Hamilton, he noted that he had: 
 
… heard last night from my old Bde Machine Gun officer, Captain 
McGillicuddy, 4th D[ragoon] G[uards], who is now Assistant Instructor at the 
GHQ Machine Gun School, France. He has worked out my idea of MG Indirect 
Fire and sent me his circulars. I consider them so valuable that I enclose them 
for your information. You may consider the advisability of a MG School here. 
In France it was a necessity…132 
 
 Far from preventing these informal exchanges, the army tolerated and, in some cases, 
encouraged these discussions. There was an acknowledgement that the army did not constitute a 
single culture. This ‘culture of sub-cultures’ was made even more apparent with the influx of 
citizen soldiers and temporary gentlemen into the expanded army. Formations such as the 1/8th 
Battalion London Regiment (Post Office Rifles), the 1/15th Battalion London Regiment (Prince 
of Wales’ Own Civil Service Rifles), and the 15th Battalion Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow 
Tramways) had shared work or social associations, thus strengthening the bonds between 
individuals. Shared membership of these external groups transcended the shared identity of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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army. It also provided another way of communicating and sharing information. These groups 
were social networks. Predicated on trust and shared values, they were a fundamental part of 
late Victorian and early Edwardian society. This was particularly true for gentlemen’s clubs.  
The gentlemen’s club provided an informal space that facilitated encounters between 
individuals and ideas. George Ivey wrote that ‘membership of a Club is now accepted as a 
guarantee of the position of a gentleman of various professions… and, as a bond of union, it is 
scarcely too much to say that Clubs preserve much of the virtue of the early chivalry in its 
cosmopolitan features’.133 Clubs provided ‘a reassuringly fixed point’, working in tandem with 
the ‘old boy network’ created by the public schools, the universities, and the military.134 One 
commentator notes that the gentlemen’s clubs on Pall Mall were ‘important, and seemingly 
timeless, monuments of national English culture’.135 They were centres of socialisation and 
played the role of an information hub. It was a place where the masks of the powerful were 
dropped, where gossip and knowledge could be shared, protected by a strict code of ethics.136 
As Amy Milne-Smith has argued, gentlemen’s clubs were key sites of male gossip. They were 
distinctly male spaces where talk was a leading attraction, which could sometimes lead to 
practical results in the outside world.137  
 Although the clubs’ power peaked just before the outbreak of the First World War, they 
remained a vital part of society at home. During the war, a number of generals and senior 
officers were members of at least one club. The Army and Navy, United Service, and Naval and 
Military Clubs were the most popular. However, a number of generals, including Rawlinson, 
Murray, Sir Herbert Plumer, and Sir Steuart Hare, were also members of the Travellers’ Club, 
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whilst Sir Bryan Mahon, Cavan, and Chetwode were members of the Turf Club. When 
returning to Britain, the club was often the first place to visit. It was ‘an invaluable house of 
call’ where ‘one met all one’s friends, coming or going’.138 In July 1915, for example, 
Rawlinson noted hearing ‘from a man in the Travellers’ that the question of withdrawing our 
expedition from the Dardanelles was discussed. I saw both Lord Lansdowne and Sir Arthur 
Nicolson at the Travellers’ but could not get out of them what the cabinet had decided’.139 For 
officers serving in Palestine with limited access to home leave, the gentlemen’s clubs of Cairo 
provided an important site for gossip and socialising. The Gezira Sporting Club and the Turf 
Club, in particular, were notable examples.140 According to Lanver Mak, the Turf Club became 
‘the hub of administrative discussions for many British officials’, and a ‘centre for exchanging 
gossip and discussing business’.141 As Anthony DiBella notes, these serendipitous meetings and 
conversations in officers’ or gentlemen’s clubs throughout the world offered an informal mode 
of disseminating knowledge.142 
  ‘Clubbability’ and the ‘old school tie’ encompassed a variety of pre-existing social 
networks that overlaid the shared identity of service in the army. These concepts still held 
currency in Edwardian society and were exploited by the army with the establishment of 
officers’ clubs and social clubs both abroad and in Britain. In a letter to his fellow brigade 
commanders in the 4th Australian Division, for example, Monash recommended the 
establishment of a divisional officers’ club at Tel-el-Kebir for ‘the social intercourse of officers 
of the Fourth Division’, including ‘special arrangements to be made for receiving and posting 
war and other news and bulletins of interest’.143  
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Although these groups provided potential avenues for sharing knowledge, the army also 
used its own formal training schools to promote socialising and discussion. The object of the 
first RE school of instruction at Le Parcq in 1916, for example, was to ‘enable officers from 
different parts of the line to exchange their experiences and methods, to their mutual 
advantage’.144 The second RE school, which started at Blendecques in December 1917, built on 
the exchange principles espoused at Le Parcq. However, unlike Le Parcq, officers at 
Blendecques ‘came to know each other much better and consequently more discussion took 
place’.145 This forum for discussion was not simply reserved for attendees on the course. In 
connection with the school, several conferences of divisional RE commanders were held under 
the presidency of an Army Chief Engineer, thus affording ‘an invaluable opportunity for 
exchange of ideas’.146 The expansion of both the senior and junior staff schools at Cambridge 
University provided another way of encouraging socialising. Initially established for the training 
of staff officers in France, the staff schools extended their offer to candidates in subsidiary 
theatres from 1917 onwards. In January 1918, the EEF was allotted three places on the senior 
course and four places on the junior course.147 For both the BSF and the EEF, this was a 
welcome offer given the premature closing of the staff school at Mena House on 19 June 1917. 
The extension of centralised staff training to the various expeditionary forces allowed those 
future staff officers to meet and converse with fellow candidates from the Western Front. It also 
gave them the opportunity to consider the type of administrative problems encountered on the 
Western Front. To encourage close working, candidates were organised into syndicates. The 
type of work at the junior staff school included preparing maps, drawing up march tables, and 
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writing orders.148 This work was based on actual operational orders from Armies or corps in 
France, thus placing learning in an operational context, rather than an invented theoretical 
scenario.149 The evenings were spent socialising and, much like the RE schools, allowed 
candidates to discuss their own experiences and methods. 
 
The army used both formal and informal methods enthusiastically across all its operational 
theatres. As we shall see in this final section, the effectiveness and importance of these methods 
varied. For an institution that prided itself on adaptation and devolved decision-making, the 
army began producing formal publications very early on in the war. The earliest known CDS 
pamphlet, CDS2 Notes from the Front, was published in December 1914. The need to codify 
information in an accessible format was important and necessary. There were certain barriers 
that prevented a solely ad hoc approach to sharing knowledge. These barriers related to the 
increasingly civilian make up of the army, along with its multiple commitments across the 
globe. As later chapters will show, there was a need for formal methods, such as publications 
and training schools, when attempting to integrate both combat formations and national 
contingents into the army. Given the intensity of war and the rapid development of new 
technologies and tactics, it was necessary to codify this new knowledge for the benefit of both 
professional soldiers and citizens in uniform. However, the fact that ad hoc, informal methods 
were still practised alongside these formal approaches raises two points: first, that the formal 
methods may not have been as effective as anticipated, and secondly, that ad hoc methods were 
still seen as important. The effectiveness of formal methods will be considered first. 
 Although formal methods were useful for the dissemination of common doctrine and 
for integrating newcomers, their effectiveness was subject to certain weaknesses, such as 
knowledge lag and the army’s ethos. As we have seen, publications and, by extension, training !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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schools were continually reviewed to ensure they were responsive to front line realities. 
However, as Beach has shown, it took time to institutionalise this best practice.150 It is easy to 
forget that doctrine production had its own learning curve. For the subsidiary theatres, the 
publication had to first arrive in theatre before being adapted (if necessary) to the situation 
confronting that particular force. This often resulted in a form of knowledge lag. In this respect, 
it is understandable that people-centred methods were used in order to secure up to date 
information to combat this lag. Gillman’s brief attachment to the Western Front, for example, 
gave him the opportunity to talk with fellow commanders, as well as visit training schools. This 
knowledge, gained through informal means, was brought back to Salonika, leading to the 
establishment of an infantry training school to produce ‘machine made soldiers’.151 In this 
instance, knowledge was not lost to the organisation. Instead, Gillman sought to codify it with 
the establishment of a training school.  
 In addition to the problems of knowledge lag, a considerable weakness of formal 
methods related to the influence of the army’s ethos. The army was an organisation traditionally 
suspicious of, and disinclined to promote, top-down standardisation. The case of SS152, as we 
have already seen, highlighted this suspicion and conflict of purpose. GHQ sought to promote 
commonality of method and uniformity of doctrine, specifying the types of courses to be 
offered at division and brigade levels. This was a coherent approach, but one that was undercut 
by the army’s decision to preserve a commander’s responsibility to train his own men. SS152, 
however, was just a manifestation of a deeper, unresolved tension between the ‘man on the 
spot’ and the higher command. A similar tension can be seen in the army’s decision to move 
from pulled to pushed transfer in its dissemination of SS pamphlets.   
 The continuing importance of ad hoc, or informal, methods can also be attributed to the 
army’s ethos.152 Connections, patronage, and networking were important aspects of its culture. 
As Beach has argued, the ‘contribution of training systems and the tactical beliefs of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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commanders and their staffs are probably more important than pamphlets issued by higher 
headquarters’.153 This was also underscored by the fact that individuals were more likely to turn 
to each other for knowledge or advice: who they knew had a significant impact on what they 
came to know.154  
 Owing to his innovative artillery tactics, Major-General Sir Henry Tudor, for example, 
was often consulted in an informal capacity by generals at GHQ for his views on smoke 
barrages.155 As we have seen, generals in the subsidiary theatres took advantage of their existing 
social networks for advice, or sometimes to ascertain the lie of the land for promotion purposes. 
Prior to the Beersheba operations in October 1917, for example, Chetwode consulted 
Rawlinson, a fellow Old Etonian, over the difficulties of water supply in the Palestine theatre. 
The reply from Rawlinson was sensible enough: ‘Why don’t you do as I’ve done in my Army 
Area here? I’ve got nearly twenty miles of pipe lines laid down.’ Chetwode smiled, remarking: 
‘I must tell him ... we’ve already got one hundred and fifty miles of pipe line.’156 Although this 
example highlighted the infrastructure difficulties faced by the different theatres, it also 
demonstrated that individuals were comfortable using their personal relationships to help solve 
specific problems. In Salonika, Howell took advantage of his personal relationship with Haig to 
secure up to date publications prior to the army’s decision to standardise distribution. This 
resulted in Haig sending him ‘some reports which may interest you, and [I] have also got 
[Lieutenant-General Sir Richard] Butler to make up a package of publications on training 
questions which might be of use to you’.157 
  Even had it wanted to, the army could not prevent informal exchanges between 
individuals either inter- or intra-theatre. The difficulty was attempting to capture knowledge that 
fell outside the army’s formal processes. As with the RE schools at Blendecques and Le Parcq, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the army tried to harness the knowledge found within these informal exchanges through 
conferences and discussions after training schools. There was a recognition that such knowledge 
was important. However, the ad hoc occurrence of informal exchange was far more difficult to 
capture and codify. Ultimately, as Catignani has shown, organisational learning is ‘not only 
determined by an organisation’s formal learning systems, but also influenced by the 
pervasiveness of informal learning systems in which individuals are able to interpret and make 
sense of their experiences and share new operational knowledge through social interaction’.158 It 
was impossible, and ill-advised, for the army to pursue a solely formal or informal approach. 
 
In summary, owing to its rapid expansion and its increasing global commitments, the army was 
forced to develop or refine a series of formal methods to share knowledge between its 
expeditionary forces. It could no longer solely pursue the ad hoc, highly personalised approach 
that had typified its pre-war experiences. As a result, forces were bombarded with the latest 
literature and tactics. However, owing to its ethos, the army was reticent when it came to 
enforcing this literature. Western Front publications often came with a caveat around the 
‘considerable dissimilarity in conditions and methods’.159 The various forces were not obliged 
to adhere to Western Front practice, suggesting that the army had not completely departed from 
its tendency towards decentralised decision-making.  
As both Foley and Beach have argued, the development of formal methods took time to 
mature. However, the army could not favour these formal methods over informal ones. In 
keeping with its highly personalised approach, the army actively encouraged a variety of 
‘people-to-people’ methods for sharing knowledge. It also had little choice but to tolerate 
underlying informal social networks. These networks were heavily influenced by social and 
cultural affiliations that transcended the shared culture of the army. The army exploited these 
affiliations. It understood the benefits of networking and conversation as a way of sharing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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knowledge, both in theatre and between theatres. Such methods were a legacy of the army’s 
preference for pragmatic solutions. However, as we shall see later, these methods were not just 
used to share knowledge between theatres. They were vital tools for integrating combat 
formations into new theatres, as well as national contingents such as the AIF. 
Although the various expeditionary forces had their own tactical and geographical 
peculiarities, coupled with the inevitable differences in scale and tempo, lessons and 
innovations from the Western Front were highly sought after. Training schools based their 
syllabi on Western Front publications and preferred instructors with ‘experience gained in 
France’. Senior officers and commanders were willing to engage with these publications in 
order to identify, assess, and, where required, adapt the learning process of the Western Front to 
suit conditions in their own theatres. As one soldier theatrically recalled: 
 
… these minor theatres were not very reputable places of entertainment, and 
failed consequently to attract the best kind of public. But later on -- after 
perhaps two or three years -- they had learned some lessons in the presentation 
of the drama; the influence of the Principal Theatre was, I believe, responsible 
for many improvements. The performances certainly became more “legitimate”, 
more conventional… and starred names, even, appeared upon the bills.160 
 
The swift and efficient transfer of knowledge was important to the army’s success. This 
transfer would also involve looking not only beyond the Western Front, but also beyond the 
army’s institutional boundaries. It was only by identifying and acting on innovation – whether 
military or civilian – that the army could respond effectively when faced with the ‘adapt or die’ 
dilemma. 
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CHAPTER'3'
A'CULTURE'OF'INNOVATION?''
 
In a statement to the House of Commons on 19 November 1917, David Lloyd George 
announced that he had ‘only twice… acted against the advice of soldiers’.1 The first related to 
his time as Minister of Munitions where he ‘laid down a programme which was in advance of 
the advice of soldiers and against it’ for the ‘extravagant’ manufacture of guns and shells. The 
second case where he ‘pressed’ his advice on soldiers ‘against their will’ was with the 
appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to reorganise transportation on the Western Front. His 
implication was that the army, and indeed the wider military establishment, not only shunned 
civilian involvement, but was also averse to change. Lloyd George saw himself as a radical 
innovator, willing to take chances. This was evident during his tenure as Minister of Munitions. 
In his War Memoirs, Lloyd George saw the military as rigid and restrictive. Its methods 
‘allowed no play for initiative, imagination and inventiveness’, while ‘the men on the heights 
offered no encouragement or chances to genius down below’.2 If Lloyd George was to be 
believed then it was only through the forcible efforts of individuals outside the military 
establishment that innovation could be realised. 
 This idea that militaries are averse to change is not new and has proved an important 
element in military innovation literature. The hierarchical nature of military establishments is 
viewed as a barrier to change.3 Militaries are seen as rigid and bound by rules. The tendency 
towards what Lloyd George called ‘instinctive obedience’, coupled with rigidity in dress and 
parade-ground practice, would suggest rigidity of military thought. However, as Kollars has 
argued, rule-based, hierarchy-driven military organisations tend to become fluid when exposed 
to Clausewitzian friction.4 Decisions made in wartime, for example, do not always reflect a 
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‘cautious, bureaucratic approach’.5 Previous chapters have shown that the British army of the 
First World War was far from rigid. The flexibility of its organisational structure and ethos 
allowed it to respond effectively when faced with the ‘adapt or die’ dilemma. Most large 
organisations realise that innovation is key to institutional survival. They, therefore, attempt 
transformation to remain ahead of their competitors.6 This was true for the British army. To 
defeat its adversary, the army had to be superior in the art of learning and adaptation. This 
superiority was underpinned by the army’s ability to identify the need for change, embrace its 
possibility, and generate support across the organisation.7 However, fear of, or resistance to, 
change is endemic in organisations irrespective of their commercial or military nature. This is 
exacerbated by suspicion of knowledge from outside the immediate organisation. This suspicion 
was just as likely to occur with knowledge imported from another operational theatre, as it was 
from a civilian expert. 
This chapter discusses change as a deliberate policy, rather than as a spontaneous act. It 
examines whether the army was flexible enough to respond to or instigate change through the 
appointment of particular individuals to positions of influence. It also assesses whether the 
appointments of such individuals were a symptom or the cause of a culture of innovation within 
the army. The army could be both responsive and flexible when it came to sharing knowledge 
and using expertise. It combined a mixture of informal and formal methods to accommodate 
these various aspects. This particular chapter examines whether the army demonstrated a similar 
ability when faced with the potential for developing or acting on innovative solutions. Geddes is 
a success story when it comes to implementing change, but was he the norm, or the exception to 
the rule?  
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The chapter first considers the types of change experienced by the army, namely 
proactive and reactive. Secondly, it examines how particular individuals, whether they were 
‘change agents’ or facilitators, were selected to realise change, examining four particular 
avenues that provided the army with such individuals. These include top-down appointments by 
the War Office, the army’s own acknowledgement and request for external expertise, direct 
approaches by individuals to the War Office or army, and the identification of individuals from 
within the army itself. Thirdly, it examines some of the organisational and personal challenges 
faced by these individuals both upon selection and appointment. Fourthly, it determines how the 
army mitigated these challenges and how successful it was in doing so. Finally, it assesses 
whether these individuals were able to bring about change, and whether the army had to modify 
its organisational and cultural norms to accommodate this. 
 
Both change management theorists and military innovation scholars suggest that change does 
not often begin until the organisation faces the possibility of defeat, or ‘some real threat of pain 
that in some way dashes its expectations or hopes’.8 This can be seen as reactive change – the 
most common form of change. However, proactive change is also possible. This sort of change 
represents an active attempt to avoid a future threat, or capitalise on a future opportunity. The 
establishment of the IWT, for example, is an instance of proactive change that came from the 
periphery of the military organisation. 
The need for the IWT was highlighted by Commander Gerald Holland, a retired officer 
of the Royal Indian Marine who was employed as Marine Superintendent on the London and 
North Western Railway. Known to both Brigadier-General the Honourable Richard Montagu-
Stuart-Wortley (Assistant Director of Movements, 1914-1915) and Lieutenant-General Sir 
James Wolfe Murray (CIGS, 1914-1915), Holland argued for the advantage ‘to be gained from 
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the utilisation and development of the French waterways for military transport purposes’.9 
Initially, Holland was turned away. The War Office was of the opinion that ‘the railway systems 
in the theatre of war would be capable of coping with all demands made upon them’.10 
Undeterred by the initial response, Holland persisted. He had experience in such matters with 
his previous service on the naval transport staff during the Boer War, along with his subsequent 
appointment as principal port officer at Rangoon. 11  Convinced by a combination of his 
arguments, expertise, and military contacts, the War Office gave Holland a temporary 
commission in the RE and despatched him to France to consult with Brigadier-General John 
Twiss (Director of Railway Transport). Holland’s direct approach bore fruit with the 
establishment of the IWT in January 1915. Aided by his role within the military establishment 
and his professional experience, Holland was able to convince the War Office that proactive 
change was required even though the existing transportation structure in France appeared, at 
that time, to accommodate the demands placed upon it. The scale of effort eventually involved 
was considerable. The tonnage conveyed on the IWT (including cross-channel barge traffic) in 
1916 totalled 839,519, increasing to 2,378,342 in 1917, and then to 2,842,418 in 1918.12  
 For much of the time though, change in the army was reactive. This type of change is 
usually discontinuous, ad hoc, and often triggered by a crisis situation, which can be external or 
internal to the organisation.13 With so many urgent stimuli to respond to, the army had little 
opportunity for anticipatory thinking. However, it is simplistic to suggest that the tendency 
towards reactive change was the result of military conservatism. Reactive change still led to a 
number of innovations, notably the establishment of the Special Brigade, tunnelling companies, 
and the Inspectorate of Training. 
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 The formation of the Special Brigade and the British use of gas on the Western Front 
was in response to the German gas attack on 22 April 1915. Following the attack, Field Marshal 
Sir John French telegraphed the War Office ‘asking for respirators’ and demanding that 
immediate steps were taken for retaliation.14 Within four days of the attack, Bernard Mouat 
Jones, a private in the London Scottish and Assistant Professor at Imperial College, was 
commissioned into the RE and ordered by GHQ to organise a ‘small emergency chemical 
laboratory’ at St Omer.15 From this laboratory, Mouat Jones and two other civilian professors 
were able to visit gas casualties at Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe, whilst also investigating 
protection measures in case of future attacks. 16  At the War Office’s Trench Warfare 
Department, Colonel Louis Jackson was tasked with heading up ‘preliminary investigations’ 
into gas reprisals, which involved liaising with the Royal Society’s Chemical Subcommittee. 
This subcommittee formed part of the Royal Society’s larger War Committee established in 
November 1914 to offer advice to the government on scientific matters.17 A Conjoint Board of 
Scientific Societies – a scientific ‘War Cabinet’ – was also established to support the committee 
and coordinate Britain’s twenty-seven scientific and professional societies.18  
 The War Committee’s terms of reference were to ‘organise assistance to the 
Government in conducting or suggesting scientific investigations in relation to the war… and to 
appoint Sub-Committees not necessarily restricted to Fellows of the Society’. 19  Its 
subcommittees were organised around distinct disciplines: physics, chemistry, physiology, and 
engineering.20 Both the government and military soon embraced the Royal Society’s wealth of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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experience, incorporating a number of its members into the newly formed Ministry of 
Munitions in May 1915. As Marion Girard has argued, the administration required for chemical 
weapons research in Britain was rapidly established.21 On the Western Front, Colonel Charles 
Foulkes, a regular RE officer, had been appointed Gas Advisor to GHQ and given ‘practically a 
free hand’ to organise and train the gas troops which eventually became the Special Brigade.22 
By February 1916, the chemical warfare service had its own distinct command structure. 
Brigadier-General Henry Thuillier became Director of Gas Services at GHQ, while Foulkes 
continued to direct the Special Brigade and offensive operations.23 Soon enough, gas had 
representation from Army down to division. Each divisional gas officer was given six NCOs to 
carry out anti-gas measures of which four were attached to brigades.24 
 The establishment of tunnelling companies also came in response to a German attack. 
However, their creation could have been proactive. Rawlinson had suggested the possibility of 
mining on 3 December 1914 – less than three weeks prior to the German army’s first use of 
mines near Givenchy.25 Major Sir John Norton Griffiths, an MP, army officer, and civil 
engineer, had also raised the possibility independently of using miners for military purposes in 
mid-December 1914.26 He argued that ‘coal miners and other underground workers should 
be specially enlisted for this purpose’ with ‘great stress… laid on the secrecy and silence with 
which professional “clay kickers” could work’.27 The potential for proactive change was there. 
However, it took until the German gas attack on 20 December 1914 for this – now reactive – 
change to be realised. Following an interview with Kitchener, Norton Griffiths was despatched 
to France on 13 February 1915 to gain support for his tunnelling initiative. It took him only two 
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days before he was granted approval in principle to mine using the clay-kicking technique. The 
establishment of the tunnelling companies was drawn up in consultation with Brigadier-General 
Sir George Fowke (Engineer-in-Chief, BEF) in just a matter of hours.28 In fact, just ten days 
after his initial interview with Kitchener, the sixty-six men who comprised Norton Griffiths’ 
clay-kickers, along with a number of mining men transferred from front line regiments, had 
arrived in France to form the basis of the first tunnelling companies.29 Like chemical warfare, 
mining was integrated into the command structure. In January 1916, Brigadier-General Robert 
Harvey, former assistant to Fowke, was appointed the BEF’s Inspector of Mines at GHQ, while 
a Controller of Mines was appointed to each Army headquarters.30 
 Given its earlier support for IWT, why did the military fail to act upon Rawlinson and 
Norton Griffiths’ initial requests? There is no simple answer, although the military’s reluctance 
to admit stalemate cannot be overlooked. One also cannot discount Britain’s general reluctance 
to develop and use ‘ungentlemanly’ or cowardly methods, such as gas and propaganda.31 This 
reluctance is borne out by a telegram from Kitchener to French on the possibility of chemical 
retaliation. Kitchener refers to the Germans as ‘degraded’ and that ‘these methods show to what 
depth of infamy our enemies will go in order to supplement their want of courage in facing our 
troops’.32 
 Both the Special Brigade and tunnelling companies were established in response to 
direct, external threats, yet the army also had to respond to internal threats relating to training. 
As we have seen, the Training Directorate had been established in January 1917, first under 
Solly-Flood and subsequently Bonham-Carter. The eventual establishment of the Inspectorate 
of Training at BEF GHQ on 3 July 1918 was envisaged for the purpose of relieving pressure on 
the existing Training Directorate. According to senior officers at GHQ, the training carried out !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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on the Western Front was ‘neither perfectly coordinative nor altogether evenly distributed’, 
resulting in the teaching of ‘different doctrine and different methods’ between commands.33 
Bonham-Carter supported this view. He recalled that 
 
 … the progress in obtaining uniformity of training methods was not rapid 
enough and [that] I was not senior enough to carry the weight required to 
compel Army and Corps Schools to adopt similar methods. I 
recommended, therefore, that there should be appointed a general of high rank 
as Inspector General of Training, that my branch should be reduced and given 
the task only of executing the policy recommended by the Inspector General.34 
 
The possibility of ex post facto justification cannot be ruled out, but the rationale was still 
strong enough for the War Office to sanction GHQ’s request for additional training machinery. 
That the Training Directorate was not shut down in July 1918 suggests that the Inspectorate was 
further, rather than new, machinery. It had ‘no executive functions’, but would ‘advise and 
assist in the preparation and revision of training manuals, instructions and syllabuses of training 
for issue by the General Staff at GHQ’, and in the ‘supervision and control of training 
establishments’. 35  The Directorate underwent limited change to accommodate the new 
Inspectorate; its BGGS was downgraded to a colonel who became the Assistant Director of 
Military Training; its staffing was reduced from eight to seven; and it was renamed by Dawnay 
as his ‘Training Branch’.36 It still retained responsibility for the BEF’s training policy, tactical 
doctrine, and schools system. The Inspectorate’s responsibilities were intended to be 
complementary. It was to assist the Training Branch with its existing duties, whilst broadening 
the scope of GHQ’s influence in training matters.37  
  
Whether change is proactive or reactive in nature, it requires the identification and appointment 
of individuals who are capable and empowered to implement it. Modern management theory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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describes these individuals as ‘change agents’ – people who have the skill and power to 
stimulate, facilitate, and coordinate change in an organisation.38 They may be internal or 
external to the organisation, but, irrespective of background, they must be able to promote 
change throughout the organisation. In that respect, they require legitimacy, expertise, and 
organisational support to face and defeat inevitable resistance. This organisational support was 
particularly important. As Goya suggests, during the First World War, there were three 
categories of individuals that were essential to the promotion of change and innovation. First, 
there were the ‘experts’ – professionals such as the French flying ace, René Fonck. Secondly, 
there were ‘entrepreneurs’. These were the individuals who, although not innovators, were able 
to lead a project to a successful conclusion. In modern terms, they can be seen as facilitators. 
Dawnay, for example, would sit in this category for his work in promoting the Inspectorate and 
smoothing over organisational resistance. Finally, there were the ‘generals’. As Goya states, the 
generals had to simultaneously lead operations as well as manage adaptation.39 They could be 
seen as the ‘benevolent protectors’ of the innovators.40 They are the project sponsors. As 
Harkness and Hunzeker suggest, leaders foster adaptation by ‘creating a coherent vision and 
encouraging purposive action’.41 Their prestige and support was often vital for an innovation to 
succeed. This reflects Rosen’s ideas on the reasons for military innovation, notably the role of 
‘visionary’ senior military figures who, with their own strategies for innovation, create 
promotion pathways for their subordinates.42 These high-ranking figures use their legitimacy 
and position within the organisation to protect these mid-level officers, enabling them to 
innovate. 
 The army had a number of avenues available to it for the identification of these change 
agents. It was positioned in the centre of a network where it could pull in expertise when 
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required, but conversely, it could also have individuals pushed on to it from outside. The first 
avenue - the pushing of individuals on to the army - was responsible for the appointment of 
transport experts, namely Sir Percy Girouard in 1914 and Geddes in 1916. Forced upon the 
army by Kitchener and Lloyd George respectively, their reception was not universally positive, 
despite the fact that they were experts in their field with pre-war experience of working in or 
with the military. 
Unlike Geddes, Percy Girouard was not an ‘outsider’ to the military establishment. 
Graduating from the Royal Military College at Kingston in 1886 with a diploma in engineering, 
Girouard worked for two years on the engineering staff of the Canadian Pacific Railway before 
accepting a commission in the RE in 1888.43 Seconded to the Egyptian army in 1896, he served 
as director of the Sudan Military Railway during Kitchener’s invasion of the Sudan. His 
construction of the railway bypassing the Nile cataracts made possible Kitchener’s victory over 
the Mahdi’s forces at Omdurman. His railway skills were so highly regarded that he became 
director of the South African Railways during the Boer War. Girouard compiled his experiences 
and lessons of that war into a multi-volume work entitled History of the Railways during the 
War in South Africa, 1899-1902. This work was a valuable educational tool for military officers 
on the ‘practical working of a great system of Railways on which an Army in the Field is 
dependent for all its supplies’.44 It highlighted, inter alia, the importance of ‘the presence of 
experienced civilian railway engineers’, and to what extent ‘Military Control [of railways] is 
necessary and at what point it becomes harmful’.45 Although Girouard left the military in 1907, 
he was hailed as ‘the greatest authority in the British Empire upon the use of railways in war’.46 
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It is unsurprising that Kitchener called on his services to investigate the British and French 
transportation networks on the Western Front in October 1914.  
 Girouard’s report challenged the status quo and highlighted the overlapping duties and 
general inefficiencies within the existing transport system.47 The transportation network at that 
time aligned with guidelines found in FSR. The directorates governing supply and movement 
were not controlled by a single authority, but were responsible to both General Sir Ronald 
Maxwell (Quartermaster-General [QMG] in France) and Robertson.48 Girouard recommended 
abandoning the structure laid out in FSR and aligning with the French system.49 Unsurprisingly, 
his recommendations were criticised by senior officers. Major-General Sir Frederick Robb, 
former IGC in France, noted that Girouard’s proposal was ‘nothing new’.50 General Sir John 
Cowans (QMG to the Forces) was far more critical: 
 
In my opinion it would have been better if Sir P. Girouard had restricted himself 
to what he was told to do. He has far exceeded his instructions. He was not told 
to produce a scheme for uprooting organisations deliberately laid down after 
deep deliberation... The Regulations have been issued and acted upon and it is 
no time in the middle of a campaign to tinker with them.51 
 
According to Cowans’ biographers, Girouard’s report ‘appears to have been shelved’.52  
Geddes fared little better at first. Upon reading the proposal for a transport 
investigation, Maxwell noted that: 
 
It is not stated why the time has arrived to strengthen the transport arrangements 
of the BEF. So far as the work in France is concerned these arrangements have 
worked perfectly smoothly and efficiently: 1. In the ports; 2. On the railways 
and canals; 3. On the roads.53 
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For Geddes, such a response was to be expected. He was aware that:  
 
Officers who are responsible for the work out there will say – “Has the Army 
ever wanted for anything in these last two years of fighting?” My answer to that 
is that if the Army has not wanted for anything, it is because it has been a 
stationary Army… In the only place where we have made an advance, and not 
one involving great mileage, the road repair and the capacity of the roads are 
both matters of anxiety.54 
 
Grieves describes Geddes’ initial reception at GHQ as ‘chilly’, while Haig recorded in his diary 
that Geddes was ‘afraid that the Inspector General of Communications resents his visit!’55 
Unsurprisingly, Geddes’ subsequent appointment as both Director-General of Military Railways 
at the War Office and Director-General of Transportation [DGT] for the BEF was met with 
‘fierce opposition’, with Lloyd George accused of having ‘fluttered the military dovecotes by 
this unconventional appointment’.56 Both Stuart-Wortley and Maxwell threatened to resign from 
their positions.57 However, Haig’s confidence in Geddes was ‘unshakeable’.58 He was able to 
convince Maxwell that Geddes had not ‘been sent out by… Lloyd George to take over the 
duties which I had assigned to him [Maxwell]’.59 Maxwell was happy with Haig’s assurances 
and instructed his directors to cease their criticisms of Geddes. It was this support from the very 
top of the army that paved the way for Geddes’ success. 
The initial responses to both Girouard’s and Geddes’ reports suggest individual rather 
than organisational inertia. However, to focus on these individual responses overlooks the wider 
context, namely that Britain was the junior partner in the coalition at this point. Moreover, the 
army’s demands and needs changed over time. The decision to shelve much of Girouard’s 
report lay in the fact that many of his recommendations assumed that the stalemate of winter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick [MRC], Papers of Sir W. Guy Granet, MSS.191/3/3/4-
13, Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 September 1916, p. 6. 
55 K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes: Business and Government in War and Peace (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1989), p. 29; TNA, WO 256/12, Ts Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, 24 
August 1916. 
56 Quoted in Grieves, Geddes, pp. 30-31. 
57 TNA, WO 256/13, Haig Diaries, 30 October 1916. 
58 Grieves, Geddes, p. 32. 
59 TNA, WO 256/13, Haig Diaries, 30 October 1916. 
! 108 
1914 was an anomaly. Although certain generals expected a long war, there was little impetus to 
overhaul existing procedures when they appeared to be functioning reasonably well.  
 The government’s appointment of both Girouard and Geddes to audit transport shows 
that attempts were made to force change on the army: the first attempt was largely unsuccessful; 
while the second succeeded despite initial opposition. However, the army was also capable of 
acknowledging when change was necessary. It was not beyond the army to recognise and 
request expertise that did not exist within its own organisation. This second avenue – that of 
acknowledging the need for expertise - is clear in the army’s request for geologists, particularly 
hydrogeologists. The appointment of these individuals was entirely flexible based on each 
theatre’s need. Not all of these men held military rank, nor were they all embedded within the 
military establishment. 
 In April 1915, Major-General William Liddell (Deputy Director of Works [DDW], 
BEF) wrote to the War Office requesting a geologist to advise on water supply. This request 
resulted in the appointment of Lieutenant William King.60 King was a geologist with the 
Geological Survey of Great Britain, but had volunteered on the outbreak of war and was 
commissioned into the 7th Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers.61 Upon receiving Liddell’s request, 
the Director of the Geological Survey, Sir Aubrey Strahan, nominated King to serve as a 
geologist to the BEF’s Engineer-in-Chief. King proceeded overseas in June 1915.62 
The appointment of King, along with the Australian geologists, Tannatt Edgeworth 
David and Loftus Hills, allowed for new, civilian procedures to take root within the army. These 
geologists developed new pre-printed forms and a card index for information on water bores. 
The forms were ‘foolscap size and had spaces for details of the strata and pumping machinery, 
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output etc’.63 These forms were received from the various Armies and the information entered 
on to cards and kept in the card index. Information was, therefore, easily accessible whenever 
required.64 In addition to this, a map of 1/250,000 scale, with the position of each bore marked 
by a small circle and the place name by which the bore was known, was also kept up to date so 
that the map acted as a cross index to the cards. 
At the time of King’s appointment to the BEF, the MEF had also requested a water 
supply expert to work with its engineers at Gallipoli. The War Office despatched Arthur Beeby 
Thompson – a ‘water engineer of considerable experience’ – who provided advice to the army 
from 1915-1919.65 Upon his arrival at Gallipoli, Beeby Thompson noted that the problems of 
water supply occurred because ‘little or nothing is known of the geology or hydrography’.66 
Recounting his experience on the peninsula, Beeby Thompson noted that hand-worked tools 
had been considered adequate when drilling for water and that ‘no REs had been trained in the 
working of mechanical drilling plants of modern design’.67 Unlike King, Beeby Thompson did 
not possess a military rank. It was felt that his status as a ‘consultant civilian engineer’ would 
give greater weight to his recommendations.68 His lack of military rank did not appear to impact 
on his suggestions either. In a letter to the War Office, Brigadier-General Alain Joly de 
Lotbinière (Director of Works, MEF) wrote that ‘the water supply at Imbros is in a very fair 
condition’, and that ‘Mr Beeby Thompson… has every hope that… ample water supply will be 
obtained from deep wells at Imbros’. 69  Following the evacuation from Gallipoli, Beeby 
Thompson’s expertise was secured by the BSF from January 1916 onwards where, once again, 
he was employed as an engineer without military rank, working directly to Brigadier-General 
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Hubert Livingstone (Chief Engineer, BSF). Beeby Thompson’s influence within the BSF was 
far reaching with boreholes sunk in the base area, as well as on the Lines of Communication and 
in corps areas. He also ensured that lorries were fitted with suitable personnel and equipment to 
ensure plentiful water supply during the BSF’s final advance in 1918.70 
Much like the other expeditionary forces, the EEF also realised the need for geological 
expertise. This was secured by two means: first, through the Geological Survey of Egypt, and 
secondly, through a request to the War Office. As both GHQ EEF and the Geological Survey 
were located in Cairo, the army could easily call upon the services of this well-established 
organisation to advise on water supply. Dr William Hume, the Director of the Survey, was 
placed ‘at the disposal of the military authorities’ where he offered continuous advice to the 
force between 1915-1917.71  In addition to Hume’s geological expertise, the War Office 
despatched Edward Sandeman – a consulting civil engineer specialising in water supply – 
following a request from the EEF.72 The advice of both Hume and Sandeman led Major-General 
Henry Wright (Engineer-in-Chief, EEF) to remark in November 1918 that when ‘dealing with 
water supply the services of an expert geologist have been necessary’.73 Like Beeby Thompson, 
neither Hume nor Sandeman held military rank. Instead, they remained in advisory 
appointments, offering information and assistance that was communicated at a high level. 
The army’s policy towards these appointments was flexible. As we have seen 
previously, the army could not pursue a ‘one size fits all’ approach across all theatres. On the 
Western Front, where conflict was intense, it was deemed necessary for King to serve in 
uniform with military rank at GHQ. However, at Gallipoli and Salonika, where infrastructure 
was less developed, the advisor was embedded within the engineering branch at GHQ without 
military rank. In Palestine, where the hostile, desert terrain exacerbated infrastructure problems, 
both Hume and Sandeman provided advice to GHQ when required, but they were not embedded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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within the military organisation.74 The army clearly acknowledged the need for hydrogeological 
expertise within the majority of its operational theatres and requested these experts accordingly. 
The appointment and subsequent success of these experts resulted from the legitimacy of their 
professional background regardless of whether they were in uniform or not.75 
 As well as identifying required expertise from outside the military establishment, both 
the army and the War Office were subject to direct approaches from individuals or institutions 
that were eager to offer suggestions or innovations. This third avenue enabled the military to 
draw on a wide range of expertise, particularly from the learned societies. In September 1914, 
the councils of both the Institution of Electrical Engineers [IEE] and the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers [IMechE] had forwarded ‘several offers of assistance’ to the War 
Office.76 The IEE also noted that offers of service had been placed at the disposal of both the 
Admiralty and the RFC in particular.77 The military took advantage of these offers by engaging 
individuals directly, or drawing on the societies’ combined expertise. In the case of the former, 
the IMechE was approached by Major-General Sir George Scott-Moncrieff (Director of 
Fortifications and Works [DFW], 1911-1918) for a ‘list of Mechanical Engineers with whom 
the War Office might communicate as occasion arise in connection with problems arising out of 
the War’.78 Where general expertise was required, the IMechE often printed announcements in 
its informal wartime circular asking for ‘well thought out solutions’ to problems that had arisen 
from the war. 79  These problems included ‘an arrangement for destroying barbed-wire 
entanglements’, ‘an arrangement for clearing mines from the products of the explosion of the 
mine’, and ‘some light and portable form of protection against burning liquids’.80 At the council 
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meeting on 16 July 1915, some nine letters had been received in response to these problems and 
forwarded to the War Office. By engaging with these learned societies, the military was able to 
access relevant expertise in a timely fashion. 
The significant numbers of learned society members volunteering for military service 
bolstered the support offered to the government. In April 1915, the IMechE reported that ‘not 
less than 400 members’ were serving ‘in one capacity or another in HM Naval or Military 
Services’;81 while, as of March 1915, 139 members of the Institution of Automobile Engineers 
[IAE] were serving in the army or navy.82 For the IAE, this represented just over 15 per cent of 
its total membership.83 Indeed, its President-Elect, President, and immediate past President were 
all appointed to senior positions within the Army Service Corps’ [ASC] Motor Transport 
branch.84 In August 1915, through its Conjoint Board of Scientific Societies, the Royal Society 
published a list of ‘scientific and technical men on active service’. This list was broken down 
into four categories: chemists, civil and mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, and 
physicists and meteorologists. It revealed that 904 eminent scientific men were serving in the 
army by August 1915, as shown in Figure 1. Of this number, 230 men were serving in the RE 
with electrical engineers making up 57 per cent of this figure. Chemists were seconded from 
their original units to the RE to serve in the Special Brigade, which partly explains the high 
number of chemists serving in the infantry. Of the 208 chemists listed as infantry, forty-six of 
them would go on to serve as officers in the Special Brigade during the war.85 
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Figure 1: Breakdown of Royal Society’s list of scientific and technical men by corps86 
  
The flood of expertise into the army contributed to the fourth avenue for securing talent: 
the identification of individuals, civilian and military, from within the military organisation. As 
later chapters show, the army moved from an ad hoc to a systematic process for identifying and 
transferring skilled personnel. However, individuals often fell through the net. Lieutenant-
Colonel Vivian Fergusson recalled meeting a 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery who, 
in civilian life, was a concrete expert. In August 1915, tests were being carried out on the 
effectiveness of artillery fire on concrete dugouts. Fergusson recalled how this officer was: 
 
… very plain spoken about the experiments and said the man who built the 
concrete posts didn’t know anything about concrete. The man who did build the 
thing is a Sapper General on the Corps staff - so I rang up Corps Intelligence 
and told them about our friend as there was not use my discussing it with him. 
It’s rather absurd - this fellow is years older than I am and has a large 
engineering business in Canada and is now a Second Lieutenant in the Field 
Art[iller]y.87 
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Most of the problems centred on the army’s unawareness of its civilian soldiers’ skills. In this 
respect, the army was forced to rely on the learned societies, trade unions, or, indeed, employers 
themselves to provide information that could help identify the skill sets of these specialists. The 
IMechE, for example, noted in May 1918 that: 
 
In connexion with the methods adopted in recent years to introduce members 
where their services might be required… nearly 400 standard cards of 
membership had been issued since 1907; and… epitomes of the professional 
training and experience of 310 members has been laid before 16 Government 
Departments periodically during the War… many of these epitomes had been 
sent to 16 other Departments at their request.88 
 
Chemists who had enlisted in infantry regiments, for example, were ‘requested to volunteer for 
a change of work’ and encouraged to transfer to the Special Brigade.89 This request was given 
greater impetus when the War Office ‘began to receive from universities and colleges… the 
names of those students who had a knowledge of chemistry. As the lists came 
in, instructions were sent to the COs of their units, transferring them without question since 
they were designated “chemists”’. 90  Unsurprisingly, it was not always ‘without question’. 
Infantry COs were loth to part with good men. However, the importance of gas work was such 
that Robertson himself expedited the transfer of infantrymen with a series of ‘peremptory 
orders’.91 Douglas Edwardes-Ker, a pre-war chemist who became Assistant Director of Gas 
Services at GHQ, recalled his former manager at Brunner Mond advising him to transfer to the 
RE to help ‘dash the Germans’ in gas warfare. On the outbreak of war, Edwardes-Ker had 
enlisted as a private in the 5th Battalion East Kent Regiment, but upon his arrival in France, he 
was commissioned and immediately seconded to the RE owing to his chemical expertise.92 
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 The identification and transfer of individuals with necessary skills was not limited to 
civilian soldiers. The establishment of the Inspectorate of Training, for example, required the 
services of a ‘senior officer’ with ‘full experience of war in this theatre [the Western Front]’.93 
The appointment of General Sir Ivor Maxse to the position of Inspector-General of Training 
[IGT] had been in discussion since mid-April 1918.94 Maxse was acutely aware that some 
individuals viewed his appointment as an olive branch after his supposed ‘stellenbosching’ 
following the German spring offensive.95 While it is difficult to refute this, Maxse also had a 
proven track record as a trainer of troops, as someone willing to speak his mind, and, at times, 
challenge the status quo. This was underscored by his access to strong journalistic contacts 
through his brother, Leo. Ivor Maxse’s publication, Hints on Training, published during his 
time as GOC XVIII Corps, was highly influential. Its reach extended beyond both XVIII Corps 
and the Western Front itself. Writing to Maxse in September 1918, Major-General Robert 
Whigham (GOC 62nd Division) praised Hints on Training, noting that ‘I obtained copies of 
them for issue down to Platoon commanders in the 59th Division - which I have just been 
reorganising - and I find they are also being extensively used in this division [the 62nd 
Division]’.96 Major-General Sir Archibald Macdonnell (GOC 1st Canadian Division) wrote ‘I 
will never forget the way I pounced upon and devoured your Hints on Training and how eagerly 
my Brigadiers and Battalion commanders followed it up’.97 The publication was also used by 
formations in Italy. The proceedings of the 23rd Division’s conference on 1 February 1918 
record that ‘Battalions to reorganize their sections and platoons on a permanent basis. The 
instructions on training by Lt-Gen Maxse, commanding 18th Corps… will be carried out’.98 
Further endorsement from Italy came from Shoubridge in June 1918. Shoubridge, GOC 7th 
Division and one of Maxse’s former brigadiers in the 18th Division, wrote that:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 IWM, Maxse Papers, PP/MCR/C42 File 53, Haig to War Office, 16 June 1918. 
94 IWM, Dawnay Papers, 69/21/3, Dawnay to wife, 19 April 1918. 
95 J. Baynes, Far From a Donkey: The Life of General Sir Ivor Maxse (London: Brassey’s, 1995), p. 210. 
96 IWM, Maxse Papers, PP/MCR/C42 File 60, Wigham to Maxse, 7 September 1918. 
97 Ibid., Macdonnell to Maxse, 1 February 1919. 
98 TNA, WO 95/4229, 23rd Division GS War Diary, Proceedings of Divisional Conference, 1 February 
1918. 
! 116 
 
Hints on Training are most popular and I am getting many applications from 
company commanders for more copies. My prestige as to training has gone 
from 1000 to 0 as they now realise more fully where I learnt most of the things I 
have tried to teach them!! Do you think you could send me another 300 copies 
so as to allow of each platoon commander having one and to also have 
sufficient copies for my Brigade schools etc?99 
 
 Maxse had a reputation as someone who could effect change through his own 
persuasiveness coupled with support from the top of the army. The support he received from 
entrepreneurial individuals such as Haig and Dawnay was invaluable. Much like the French 
army, the British army had adapted itself into a modern organisation that ‘understood the 
feelings and ideas of the men in the field’, and had ‘organised the spreading of ideas via a 
coherent training structure’.100 Maxse was also given a relatively free hand when choosing his 
staff. Major John Evetts, a GSO2 in the Inspectorate, recalled that Maxse ‘picked these people 
himself’, and that such men were ‘forward thinking’.101 According to Basil Liddell Hart, Maxse 
was a ‘red hot enthusiast for efficiency who would sack his best friend if his slackness or 
stupidity imperilled the army’.102 It was to be expected that the men he recruited were intelligent 
in training matters. Some of these working relationships endured after the war. Maxse, Evetts, 
and Winston Dugan, one of the Inspectorate’s Assistant Inspectors of Training [AIT], for 
example, maintained a close relationship in the 1920s. Evetts served as Maxse’s GSO3, while 
Dugan was commissioned to write a new version of Infantry Training with Maxse’s support.103 
For Evetts, there were two particular men – Maxse aside – who stood out in the Inspectorate: 
Major Robert Barrington-Ward and Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Levey. 
 According to John Baynes, Maxse recruited Barrington-Ward, a BM in the XVIII 
Corps, after he ‘spotted him in [the] Flanders fighting’.104 On the outbreak of war, Barrington-
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Ward was a journalist at The Times. Like Evetts, he was a GSO2 in the Inspectorate and was, 
according to the former, ‘the most important man’ to the Inspectorate. His journalistic skills 
were put to great use in the production of training pamphlets and he was seen as ‘the keystone 
of all the leaflet production’.105 His role echoed that of fellow Times employee, Edward Grigg. 
Having also served under Maxse in the XVIII Corps, Grigg was appointed to GSO2 in the 
operations staff (Oa) at GHQ from September-December 1917. He was responsible for the 
writing of SS198 Tactical Instructions for the Offensive of 1918.106 Owing to their journalist 
careers, both Barrington-Ward and Grigg were able to present information in a readable and 
succinct manner. This made them particularly valuable in the production of training pamphlets. 
 Also known to Maxse from the XVIII Corps and as a fellow guardsman, Levey was 
appointed as Deputy AIT responsible for infantry training.107 According to Evetts, Levey was 
one of the brains behind the working of the Inspectorate. In 1915, as adjutant to the Royal Naval 
Division’s training staff, Levey had authored two privately published training pamphlets dealing 
with fire instruction and landscape targets. 108  The latter presaged Levey’s work at the 
Inspectorate with its focus on ‘Progressive Stages of Training’, including sections on the 
explanation of the object, vocabulary, visual training, indications of targets, and simple tactical 
exercises.109 This process also foreshadowed Maxse’s own training dictum of ‘explanation, 
demonstration, execution, battle’.110  
 Though it had the potential for innovation, there are disputes as to the Inspectorate’s 
impact and influence. These centre on the limited time available to the Inspectorate from its 
establishment to the Armistice, as well as its attempts at ‘top down standardisation’, which went 
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against the army’s mantra of devolved command.111 Evetts himself noted that the training 
programme ‘couldn’t have been tested. There was no time. The Armistice came too quickly’.112 
Boff, however, suggests that it was Maxse’s top-down efforts that aroused considerable distrust 
and, therefore, hampered its impact.113 Although there is evidence to support this, there is also 
evidence to suggest that the ethos of the Inspectorate aligned with that of the wider army and 
found support within the organisation. 
 From the outset, Maxse and his team were aware of the advisory nature of their role. In 
a lecture on artillery employment, Major-General Sir Herbert Uniacke, Deputy Inspector of 
Training and former MGRA to the Fifth Army, noted that the Inspectorate had ‘been charged 
with the duty of establishing a fixed doctrine and with the dissemination of that doctrine. 
Unfortunately, we have not been invested with executive authority but told to exercise our 
powers of persuasion’.114 Evetts recalled how Maxse: 
 
 … always gave me the impression of having a very great amount of power and I 
am quite sure that if he got up against anybody who was really bloodyminded 
and wasn’t accepting of that sort [then] he could have gone to Haig and had him 
removed… but he didn’t because he was one of those fellows who could talk a 
man around… he would get hold of somebody who was anti these [sic.] 
organisation and walk away with him and just convert him.115 
 
 Within the Inspectorate, Maxse was able to engender a culture of innovation. However, 
this was not an isolated enclave. Throughout the army, there were numerous innovators who 
were identified and subsequently moved into positions of greater influence – often heading up 
training schools. Following his success as GSO1 to the 7th Division, Bonham-Carter, for 
example, was chosen to run GHQ’s senior staff school at Hesdin in October 1916. His 
autobiography recalls some of the administrative improvements he implemented in the 7th 
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Division, notably the issuing of ‘Instructions for Future Operations’, which ‘dealt with every 
conceivable subject and detail, both administrative and operational’.116  
 After proving his worth as an artillery brigadier in the 7th Division, Tudor was 
appointed as commandant to Third Army’s senior officers’ school in January 1916. Having 
acknowledged the importance of smoke in early 1915, Tudor built on this interest during his 
time at the school. He recalled gathering ‘the heads of the Survey, Ordnance and others to come 
and lecture and the discussions I had with these top officers were of great value to me. With 
Ordnance I went into the question of smoke-shell and was told that it was perfectly feasible’.117 
Upon completing his tenure as commandant, Tudor was appointed to command the artillery in 
the 9th Division where he further developed the use of smoke with the help of Major-General 
Sir William Furse, former GOC 9th Division and then Master-General of the Ordnance [MGO] 
at the War Office. An artilleryman and fellow advocate of smoke, Furse was deemed a 
‘considerable technologist and innovator’, which arguably led to his promotion to MGO in 
December 1916.118 Tudor benefitted from Furse’s patronage and his willingness to ‘send to us… 
many badly needed weapons… such was the result of appointing a man of vision and energy, 
who knew from personal experience what was wanted at the front, to such a vital post’.119  
 The different avenues available to the army for identifying and appointing individuals 
highlight the complexity of the change process. They also show that the army was capable of 
responsive action, acknowledging when it needed external expertise, but also its willingness to 
draw on the latent knowledge from within its own organisation. The process of change was far 
from smooth and, despite having some of the best minds at its disposal, the army was still a 
human organisation. The appointment of individuals into positions where they could effect 
change, or challenge the status quo was not without its difficulties.  
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Efforts to enact change often run into some form of human resistance. This is a natural response 
to a process that is associated with uncertainty and a move from the known to the unknown. 
According to modern theorists John Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger, there are four common 
reasons why individuals resist change. These are: a desire not to lose something of value, a 
misunderstanding of the change and its implications, a belief that change does not make sense 
for the organisation, and a low tolerance for change.120 In addition to these individual barriers, 
there are also strong organisational and social forces that can hinder change, such as group 
norms or organisational culture, institutional memory of prior failures, along with an 
organisation’s own regulations and procedures that may limit the flexibility to try new 
approaches.121 A number of these barriers were obvious after the appointment of individuals 
such as Geddes and Maxse. Certainly, resistance was not limited to civilian appointments. It 
applied equally to appointments from within the immediate military organisation.   
 Though, as later chapters show, there was a long-standing relationship between the 
civilian and military spheres, there was, at first, uncertainty over the appointment of civilians to 
positions of authority. This was partly due to their ‘otherness’ and position outside the military 
hierarchy, but also because, as outlined above, some of these appointments were pushed on to 
the military. Writing to General Sir Charles Monro in December 1917, Robertson recalled that 
‘we… at first regarded with suspicion the setting up of these transportation people’.122 His 
recollection supports Sam Fay’s concerns when replacing Stuart-Wortley as Director of 
Movements at the War Office. Stuart-Wortley had been particularly antagonistic towards what 
he perceived to be civilian encroachment and his replacement was not viewed favourably. Fay 
recalled how Cowans, a champion of civilian expertise, but a fervent supporter of Stuart-
Wortley, was particularly vociferous: 
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… he was angry and called me a damn fool. He said I could not carry on the 
job, that it was a military post that the tentacles of the Director of Movements 
were all over the War Office… He reminded me that he had held the position 
ten years before Stuart-Wortley, and knew something about it.123 
 
There was obvious sympathy for Stuart-Wortley, and, as Fay found out, a ‘resentment at the 
surrender to a civilian of a recognised military position… for a short time I had to bear the brunt 
of unhelpfulness’.124 Although Fay was an outsider to the military organisation, he still had 
contacts within the War Office, notably Robertson, who he had known during the Boer War. 
Fay’s appointment had aroused suspicion in Robertson also, but, unlike Cowans, ‘he 
[Robertson] never expressed it, on the contrary, he welcomed me straight away’.125  
 Even citizen soldiers involved in operations had to overcome barriers when challenging 
the status quo. Major Henry Hemming, for example, was appointed to GHQ to coordinate flash 
spotting across the various Armies on the Western Front. Before the war, Hemming was a 
Canadian engineering student, studying on a scholarship in Paris. Upon the outbreak of war, he 
joined the British army, obtaining a commission in the 12th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s 
Regiment. He was soon appointed to the artillery staff of the 18th Division, which, as he noted 
in his memoirs, had ‘remarkable consequences’. Hemming’s promotion from junior officer on a 
divisional artillery staff to advisor on flash spotting at GHQ highlights the importance of 
informal networks and the army’s promotion of innovation.126 According to Hemming, his 
appointment was due to a spontaneous visit by a divisional staff officer: 
 
… I heard a voice outside calling, “I say, can I come in?… Just wanted to have 
a look at the jolly old Hun”… and then seeing my alidade he said, “I say, what’s 
that wonderful gadget? No, don’t tell me, I wouldn’t understand”. I explained 
that it was to take bearings on the flashes of the enemy guns… “How perfectly 
marvellous,” he said, and then was gone […] Two days after the visit by the 
Hon. Freddie, I got a note from Brigadier Stone CRA, saying that the 18th 
Division had been ordered to send an officer to Third Army HQ to attend a 
course on flash spotting.127 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This course brought him into contact with Colonel Harold Winterbotham, a regular RE officer, 
who nurtured Hemming’s ideas and career. In this respect, Winterbotham typified Rosen’s 
concept of the senior officer as innovator. He supported and pushed forward key officers such 
as Hemming, whilst receiving the backing of senior individuals such as Haig, Rawlinson, and 
Allenby.  
Working closely with the 1915 Nobel Prize winner, Lieutenant Lawrence Bragg, and 
his sound ranging sections, Hemming held a conference for flash spotting officers to share best 
practice and knowledge. Although he had support from the regular RE officers commanding the 
Field Survey Battalions, he thought the conference a ‘great mistake’: 
 
The first clash occurred over [Captain John] Coburn’s graphs… I asked him if 
he would explain the use of the graphs to the whole conference… He replied 
that he had designed the graphs for his own group, and that he did not care a 
damn whether the other groups used them or not. I then asked if he would draw 
up instructions for their use. He said he was much too busy… I could damn well 
write them myself.128 
 
Hemming’s initial attempt at instigating change through the medium of knowledge sharing was 
unsuccessful. He admitted that his ‘position was weak and they all knew it’.129 To win them 
over, he realised that he needed to be ‘pretty humble’, which would involve him visiting each 
group individually, as well as sitting with officers in their observation posts at night.130 
According to Bidwell and Graham, Hemming had experienced such resistance before. They 
recount how a Royal Artillery brigadier told Hemming that ‘you damned surveyors with your 
co-ordinates and angles and all the rest, are taking all the fun out of war; in my day we galloped 
into action and got the first round off in thirty seconds’. Hemming had, apparently, been 
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tempted to reply ‘Yes Sir! and you hit nothing with it except possibly the backs of your own 
infantry’.131  
 For some individuals, their latent expertise, coupled with high level support from 
politicians or senior military figures, ensured that change took root. However, aspects of their 
personality threatened to undermine their success. This was true for Brigadier-General Robert 
Anderson, a Sydney businessman appointed by Senator Sir George Pearce, the Australian 
Minister for Defence, to implement business practices at AIF Headquarters in London. Pearce’s 
confidence was well placed. Within two months of his arrival, Anderson had negotiated a 
complete financial readjustment with the War Office. Instead of attempting to account for every 
item of clothing, arms, equipment, and other goods supplied to AIF troops, a fixed rate per head 
was agreed upon.132 Such was its success that the Canadian High Commissioner, Sir George 
Perley, wished to copy it for the CEF’s own administration.133 When negotiating with the War 
Office’s financial experts, Anderson’s business mind was ‘invaluable’. Anderson also 
established the War Chest Club on Horseferry Road in August 1916. This club, modelled on the 
Anzac Hostel in Cairo, was for NCOs and other ranks [OR] to ‘secure meals and sleeping 
accommodation’ when in London.134 His mind and drive were not in doubt. However, his 
personality and background threatened to undermine his efforts. 
 Impatient by nature and aggressive when thwarted, Anderson did little to endear himself 
to regular AIF officers. According to his biographer, Anderson distrusted regular officers who 
would ‘close up their ranks very solidly against the outsider, specially if that outsider possessed 
outstanding abilities’.135 In a letter to Birdwood, Anderson admitted that, although he was 
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prepared to prioritise permanent soldiers for promotions, ‘the soldier has not been nearly so 
good as other men alongside available’.136  Correspondence between regular AIF officers 
suggests that Anderson was an annoyance to be tolerated. In a letter to Major-General Cyril 
Brudenell White, Chauvel wrote that ‘the only saving clause about him [Anderson] is that he 
does not seem to stay in the same job very long, and if the war lasts long enough, he will have 
left the Defence Department before you and I get back’. 137  According to John Connor, 
Anderson’s non-military background was a virtue, but his position and attitude made him 
unsuitable as commandant at AIF Headquarters, London.138  He was replaced by Colonel 
Thomas Griffiths, a regular AIF officer, on 31 March 1917 and subsequently returned to 
Australia. 
 
The myriad challenges faced by individuals were not always easy to overcome. However, the 
army attempted to alleviate these initial difficulties through a series of methods that focused on 
cohesion, communication, and collaboration. Cohesion, for example, was brought about in two 
ways. The first was ensuring that change went with, rather than against, the organisational grain. 
Although change invariably resulted in new ways of working and the incorporation of new 
methods, it needed organisational support and to align with the organisation’s ethos if it was to 
succeed. The Inspectorate of Training’s advisory, rather than executive, function, for example, 
aligned with the army’s distrust of prescription. Its emphasis on ‘teach the teacher’ schemes – 
an important method when sharing knowledge or when integrating new formations – was a 
deliberate attempt to move away from accusations that it was dictatorial in its approach. In his 
opening lecture at the Inspector-General’s conference, Maxse hoped that the army would see the 
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Inspectorate ‘as your friends, that you will write us private letters if we are not clear, and that 
you will not look upon us with suspicion’.139 Maxse kept some of the positive responses from 
senior officers who reassured him that ‘you and yours are out to help and that is what is 
wanted’, and that he would ‘get plenty of support from everyone; you need not fear about 
that’.140  
 The Inspectorate’s ‘teach the teacher’ schemes were also aided by the appointment of 
AITs to the various Armies. Brigadier-General Gordon Guggisberg was responsible for the First 
and Third Armies, Brigadier-General Winston Dugan for the Second and Fifth Armies, while 
Brigadier-General Francis Marshall was appointed AIT to the Fourth Army as well as to Army 
and GHQ schools.141 Embedded into each Army, the AITs built up a rapport and relationship 
with members of that formation. This proximity led to greater openness and empathy with each 
Army’s needs, engendering trust between the two parties.142 In a letter to Dawnay, Lieutenant-
General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston (GOC VIII Corps) wrote that ‘the Inspectors of Training are 
doing an immense amount of good… The fact that they can be there for some time to live with 
the Divisions and to continuously supervise their training is worth anything’.143 Both Hunter-
Weston and Macdonnell highlighted Guggisberg for particular praise with the former noting his 
‘excellent work with the 20th and 63rd Divisions, and is proving to all that your Inspectorate is 
of real value’.144 
 The AITs realised Maxse’s desire for a ‘human element’ to training. As well as 
supervising training in each Army, each AIT and his GSO2 was allocated a sector on the front 
where they were expected to ‘watch the battles on the spot’. This was so they could ‘see the 
mistakes made in tactical handling… and then report back to Maxse’. Dugan and Evetts were 
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responsible for the Ypres sector of the front, working closely with the Second Army. Evetts 
recalled observing the 9th Division attacking in late 1918 using ‘Maxse formations’ (‘blobs’). 
Dugan was ‘taking notes and between us we produced a report which Maxse was extremely 
pleased with and gave him the picture of the adoption of his tactics’.145 Brigadier-General 
Spencer ‘Tom’ Hollond, the Inspectorate’s BGGS, and Barrington-Ward compiled these reports 
into training pamphlets that were then circulated to infantry brigadiers for their views. 
 The second means by which cohesion was promoted was through physical and 
organisational similarity. In change management literature, this is termed homophily - the idea 
that ‘similarity breeds connection’.146 Homophily is linked to successful change agency as it 
aids acceptance, particularly if the change agent is external to the organisation. For the army, 
this required the promotion of similarity whether through background, rank, or uniform. This 
was particularly relevant for certain civilian experts. A number of these experts shared a similar 
socio-economic background to senior military officials, which assisted their acceptance. In 
some cases, assimilation was aided through rank or uniform, although civilians did not always 
welcome this. Anderson recalled that he ‘would have much preferred to have come in mufti, but 
it was explained that circumstances here were such that a man in mufti would have no position 
of authority’.147 As a result, he was appointed as colonel and put in uniform. In a letter to 
Birdwood, Anderson wrote that he had ‘donned the uniform’, kept ‘pegging away at my job and 
felt gradually the atmosphere of suspicion clearing away’.148 Fay also railed against military 
rank and uniform, and was ultimately successful in his protestations with Robertson remarking 
‘I think you had better remain as you are’.149 Geddes was given the honorary rank of major-
general during his time as DGT, and subsequently vice admiral when appointed to Controller of 
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the Navy. His transportation staff in France also acquired military rank.150  According to 
Grieves, this was to ‘reinforce an authority based on a specialist skill with appropriate rank’.151 
 Attempts at homophily were not limited to appointments at the War Office either. In the 
Special Brigade, the rank and file were enlisted as full corporals. This was not unusual and was 
practised in other branches, such as the IWT.152 Though resulting in extra pay, it helped 
integrate these newcomers, while simultaneously recognising their specialist experience. 
However, according to Foulkes, this higher rank resulted in ‘certain anomalies’. Infantry units 
‘made rude comments when they saw soldiers who wore two stripes carrying out such menial 
regimental tasks’.153 Perhaps an even greater anomaly was the sight of ‘REs of lowly rank 
lecturing everyone from General downwards’.154 As we have seen with the geologists, the 
policy of providing civilians with a military rank was a flexible one and governed by the 
situation at hand.  
Cohesion was also facilitated by effective communication. If members of an 
organisation do not understand why change is required then they are less likely to accept it. The 
reason for the appointment of particular individuals required clear communication from the top 
of the organisation. This not only legitimised change, but it also indicated that those individuals 
had support and buy-in from senior decision makers. In addition, it served to confirm the scope 
of an individual’s appointment. In a letter to Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery (Major-
General, General Staff [MGGS], Fourth Army), Dawnay reassured him that Maxse was ‘an 
inspector and general helper, but he has no executive or administrative functions whatever and 
he acts only through the training branch here’.155 
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Transport missions to the various theatres also underscored the importance of 
communication. As we shall see in Chapter 4, these missions, chiefly led by civilian experts, 
were organised to understand better the problems facing the army across its different theatres. 
The War Office communicated with the expeditionary forces, outlining why these missions 
were being conducted. These communications highlighted the expert’s credentials, stressed the 
‘valuable advice’ they could provide, and that such advice came ‘with the best of intentions’.156 
Geddes’ success in France was often used as an exemplar, emphasising the proven track record 
of these particular experts. Robertson’s letter to Maude, for example, noted that ‘Haig is more 
than pleased with the way the transport department has overcome what seemed insuperable 
differences and has established quite a wonderful organisation’.157  If Maude had suspicions, he 
did not reveal them. Instead, he wrote that he was ‘looking forward very much to [Major-
General Henry] Freeland’s arrival’, and was ‘quite prepared to find that Freeland will be able to 
suggest a host of improvements’.158  
 In addition to cohesion and communication, the army also promoted attempts at 
collaboration between the change agent and the wider military organisation. The greater the 
collaboration, the more likely the change agent will be successful. This could occur in two 
ways. The first was by positioning these individuals in a collaborative setting. In the case of 
civilian appointments to senior military positions, there was usually a military member acting as 
deputy or immediate superior. Fay, for example, had a regular officer as his Deputy Director of 
Movements. Naturally, this arrangement was not without its difficulties. Lieutenant C. L. 
Hewson, a civilian superintendent on the Nigerian Railway, who had been seconded to work on 
the military railways during the Cameroons campaign, received sympathy from a fellow civilian 
regarding ‘the difficulty of being under a Military Officer who has not the same technical and 
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professional knowledge which you possess’.159 The chemists who formed the basis of the 
Special Brigade were grouped with ‘an equal number of men withdrawn from infantry 
battalions in the line, who supplied the necessary trench experience’.160 This mechanism was 
also used in artillery survey. Hemming reflected on the ‘skilful way in which this difficult 
and varied collection of enthusiastic amateurs was led by [the] six or seven RE senior officers. 
They were anything but hidebound in their attitudes and thinking, and eventually they and the 
units under their command achieved quite astounding results’.161 This collaboration not only 
provided necessary expertise, but it also served to integrate and, in some cases, legitimise 
‘outsiders’ within the military organisation. 
The second means of collaboration was by engaging members of the organisation in the 
change process. This could be through individual consultation, or via conferences and meetings. 
It was through this latter method that both GHQ and Maxse attempted to legitimise the work of 
the Inspectorate. Senior staff officers, such as Dawnay, actively laid the groundwork for the 
branch, smoothing over as many problems as possible beforehand. Not a change agent himself, 
Dawnay was a facilitator or, to use Goya’s term, an entrepreneur. Writing to his wife three days 
after the Inspectorate’s establishment, Dawnay recalled how he had been ‘round to half a dozen 
divisional and corps HQ, and had lots of talk about whether GHQ could do more to help and if 
we were going the right way about it’. He also ‘consulted commanders [as] to their views on 
various points. They all like this and it does good’.162  
Not long after its arrival in France, the 74th Division recalled an Inspectorate 
conference at Linghem. Representatives from all divisions in the Fourth Army were present to 
listen to Maxse outline the ‘general scheme for the training of Armies in France’.163 The 
conference introduced the Inspectorate as ‘practical men, not clerks’, impressing on delegates 
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that it was there to help them. Its role was to ‘interpret GHQ doctrine as regards training and 
inculcate uniformity’.164 Both GHQ and the Inspectorate made it clear that they wanted to hear 
from individuals on how training could be improved. This was not a case of lip service where 
opinions were sort and then ignored. In a letter to Uniacke, one BM in the Royal Artillery wrote 
that ‘Guy [Dawnay] has told me that you are asking for a few of our ‘experiences’ with single 
guns and mobile T[rench] M[ortars]’.165 Both Maxse’s and Uniacke’s papers contain numerous 
letters from brigade command upwards which outlined what they believed to be the ‘needs and 
requirements out in France’. The report of the 46th Division’s BGRA on the close support role 
of artillery sections in open warfare, for example, found its way to the Inspectorate. Maxse 
annotated the report, deeming it ‘An admirable report - which might well be epitomised and 
issued to our inspectoring staff’.166 
Collaboration not only informed the Inspectorate’s demonstrations and lectures, but, as 
previously suggested, it also fed into its training leaflets. These leaflets were not designed to 
supersede FSR or the Training Branch’s SS series, rather they were to ‘illustrate in “ocular” 
form the existing official manuals’.167 Maxse’s introduction to the 1919 collection of these 
‘Training Leaflets’ noted that ‘they are founded upon a comprehensive, if anonymous, body of 
experience. They are not the product of a single pen nor even of the Training Staff alone’.168 
Senior officers and generals were encouraged and, more importantly, were willing to write to 
the Inspectorate suggesting material for future publications. Brudenell White, for example, 
suggested two future pamphlets, one focusing on ‘how brigade commanders coordinate and 
influence training’, and another that showed how to ‘think out training programmes’.169 General 
Sir Charles Fergusson advocated a back to basics approach, suggesting ‘little schemes for 
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teaching advanced guards, outposts etc on the principles of company walks, i.e. by lecturing and 
demonstration’.170 
 By promoting cohesion, communication, and collaboration, the military attempted to 
overcome some of the barriers to change at an institutional level. However, change agents 
themselves were expected to display empathy and a willingness to work with others. In a sense, 
these individuals had to ‘self-integrate’. As noted previously, Maxse and his Inspectorate 
pursued this empathetic approach by means of collaboration with the wider soldier body. It was 
also evident in other areas of the army. The geologist William King, for example, noted the 
necessity of being both knowledgeable and sensitive towards the military’s needs, writing that:  
 
It did not matter to an army whether, for instance, Kemmel Hill was a remnant 
of a cuesta or what it was. As the hill was there, the question of importance was, 
whereabouts on the hill dugouts should be made and where wells should be 
sunk. In many cases sites which would have been the best from geological 
considerations might not have suited the military requirements; the geologist 
must know the military as well as the practical scientific side of the question.171 
 
The human touch was just as important as being knowledgeable. King went on to argue that 
geologists ‘must see the ground and be in close touch with the men’. It was also important for 
them to have tact and that it was ‘no good rubbing people up the wrong way and telling them 
they do not know anything about the subject’.172 This sympathetic approach went some way 
towards lessening the initial suspicion and resistance felt towards change agents. 
 Foulkes expressed a similar sentiment on the initial lack of interest in gas warfare. He 
found it necessary to rectify this by ‘delivering lectures throughout the Army in France in order 
to stimulate interest’. Foulkes also developed the SS184 Monthly Summary of Gas Warfare 
series in July 1917 with ‘the same object in view’.173 Individuals associated with artillery survey 
were also required to employ an approach that worked with the organisational culture of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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army. Artillery survey was a new development and, to overcome initial apathy and opposition, 
it required time to take root.174 Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Salmon, a pre-war surveyor in 
Ceylon and a topographical officer in the 3rd Field Survey Battalion, recalled how his formation 
started: 
 
… courses of instruction… for the artillery in order that they might make better 
use of survey data. The principle in use in the French army, of having a 
specially trained subaltern in each brigade… as an “officier orienteur” was tried 
but failed miserably. We are of a different temperament from the French. Few 
British gunner majors will listen to advice from a subaltern even if he is an 
expert in his subject.175 
 
This attitude required Salmon and his battalion to alter their knowledge sharing methods. They 
had to employ a method that was familiar to the army and one that followed the line of least 
resistance. Like Foulkes, they too started ‘lecturing the Majors and the Colonels with an 
occasional General thrown in, with rather more success’.176 
 
Through a combination of organisational and individual efforts, the challenges to change could 
be mitigated if not completely overcome. However, this did not guarantee that change would be 
successful. Change did not take place in a vacuum. Its success was affected by internal factors, 
but, less predictable, was the changing nature of warfare, driven by the actions of an adaptive 
adversary. Consequently, initiatives were subject to the exigencies of tempo and environment, 
as well as organisational norms. The most successful examples of change are those that had the 
support of the high command in the form of ‘entrepreneurs’ and generals, and were fully 
integrated within the army. 
Mining, as we have seen, was quickly integrated into the army with a network of 
advisors positioned at different levels of command. The establishment of this ‘specialised 
administration’ underscored the importance of mining to the army’s operations. Its presence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was also felt through the publication of Mining Notes, which acted as an important method for 
disseminating and collecting information.177 Prior to this, tunnelling companies had rendered 
reports of work to the division under which they were working. These were then forwarded up 
the command chain to GHQ. The production of Mining Notes ensured the systematic and timely 
publication of the most up to date developments. They were issued frequently, sometimes every 
four to seven days, and contained the experiences of front line tunnelling companies, as well as 
disseminating the results of experiments from the various Army mine schools.178 Mining Notes 
No. 1, for example, outlined the 170th Company’s experience of ‘enemy methods in chalk 
ascertained by listening’, which had been forwarded to GHQ by the Controller of Mines in the 
Third Army.179 The expansion of the Inspectorate of Mining and its growing responsibilities, 
including mine rescue, increased its prominence within the army. However, with the onset of 
semi-mobile warfare in 1918, the need for offensive and defensive mining lessened. The 
expertise that had developed over the three years since the original clay-kickers was soon 
deployed in new ways, such as building and demolition work. The change initiative had been 
successful and remained so with the army promoting adaptation and eschewing complacency. 
The experience of the Special Brigade tells a similar story. As we have seen, increased 
expertise at all levels of command ensured that gas warfare was effectively integrated into the 
army. As mentioned previously, the use of lectures and the development of the SS184 series 
ensured that individuals across the army were aware of this new type of warfare. Its utility was 
recognised by the artillery for counter-battery purposes; chemical shells soon became the 
preferred method for neutralising German artillery. By the end of 1917, gas was ubiquitous on 
the battlefield.180 
While the work of mining and gas were success stories, the Inspectorate of Training 
achieved mixed results. Its raison d’être was disseminated through conferences, dedicated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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personnel attached to Army headquarters, and training leaflets. However, it lacked the luxury of 
time. In operational existence for less than five months before the Armistice, it is difficult to 
measure its success. Unlike gas and mining, its reach was not ubiquitous. Its focus remained at 
the higher levels of command. As Uniacke suggested, ‘while training from the bottom never 
forget that you must teach from the top’.181 The Inspectorate ‘brought sharper teeth to the work 
of the Training Branch in enforcing compliance to the BEF’s standard operating procedures’.182 
It also brought a fresh focus to training prior to, and during, the Hundred Days campaign. 
However, that Maxse frequently complained that commanders ignored the advice from GHQ, 
suggests that the Inspectorate faced challenges, but had little time in which to overcome them. 
 
Far from allowing ‘no play for initiative, imagination, or inventiveness’, the British army was 
capable of responding to and instigating change – often with successful results. Though a rule-
bound and hierarchical organisation, the army exhibited great flexibility in wartime in order to 
meet and overcome the ‘adapt or die’ dilemma. This change did not always come easily, 
particularly when it was perceived as emanating from outside the immediate organisation. As 
Goya suggests, the first thing to put the brakes on anything new was scepticism.183 For the army 
and the individuals driving change, they had to address and mitigate this resistance and the 
wider challenges associated with change, such as suspicion, risk aversion, and redundancy. 
Through a combination of methods centring on cohesion, communication, and collaboration, 
change could be explained, aligned with the organisation’s ethos, with steps taken towards its 
institutionalisation. Without such methods, the capacity and willingness of individuals to accept 
these changes was limited.184 
 For change to succeed, it needed more than the likes of Maxse, Geddes, or Foulkes. It 
needed the support of leaders like Robertson and Haig who were prepared to back the innovator. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It also needed facilitators, officers like Dawnay and Fowke, to smooth over organisational 
resistance. Although the innovation might emanate from an individual or small group, it was 
reliant on a network of individuals at all levels of the organisation to aid its adoption. 
Underpinning this complex process was the army’s ethos – one that favoured pragmatism and 
solutions specific to the situation in hand. Change needed to work with, rather than against, this 
ethos.  
 Historians’ focus on Maxse and Geddes implies that innovation was a rare and isolated 
occurrence. However, this was not the case. Both men were far from exceptions to the rule. A 
culture of innovation or, what DiBella has called, a ‘climate of openness’ existed within the 
army.185 Like most organisations, there were individuals in the army who were over-promoted, 
reactionary, or simply ill-suited to such challenging working conditions. On the whole, where 
there was a possibility of securing a competitive edge over its adversary, the army ensured that 
such ideas and individuals were given the opportunity to flourish. One could undercut this 
‘culture of innovation’ by highlighting that most change in the army was reactive in nature. 
However, this does not mean that the army was conservative. According to Michael Oakeshott, 
to be conservative is to ‘prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact 
to mystery, the actual to the possible’.186  Change is ‘a threat to identity… an emblem of 
extinction’ and, for conservatives, is met with a ‘cool and critical’ disposition.187 The army may 
have been critical at times, but it did not sacrifice potential innovation to maintain the status 
quo. Having to respond to so many urgent stimuli, it is hardly surprising that the army had little 
time for ‘blue sky thinking’. While it did not appreciate top-down civilian interference, it was 
still receptive to, and willing to endorse, suggestions from individuals – often civilians - both 
inside and outside the organisation. As Foulkes commented, ‘I found officers of high rank 
almost too receptive to novel proposals, especially when they were based on anything 
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mysterious or scientific’.188 The army did not always get it right, but its attitude towards change 
was considered, organised, and responsive. This attitude was necessary for the army to establish 
and maintain its wartime superiority in the art of learning and adaptation. 
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CHAPTER'4'
‘WAR'HAS'BECOME'A'BUSINESS’'
 
Writing in 1918, the American journalist Isaac Marcosson remarked that ‘war has become a 
business’.1 For Marcosson, the British army’s organisation for supply was ‘in many respects the 
most amazing business institution that I have yet seen’.2 His account, designed to educate the 
American civilian and soldier alike with its ‘revelation of British methods’, drew distinct 
parallels between the world of ‘big business’ and the ‘business of war’. According to 
Marcosson, Haig was never afraid to ‘lean on experts’ both military and civilian, while Britain 
as a nation ‘completely commandeered’ the business talents of its civilian experts.3 This 
commandeering of talent is usually associated with the employment of transport experts such as 
Geddes who was appointed DGT on the Western Front and then subsequently Inspector-General 
of Transportation for all military theatres. Both Ian Malcolm Brown and Keith Grieves have 
considered Geddes’ contribution, along with the work of the pre-war Railway Executive 
Committee [REC], to streamlining the transport network.4 Such studies on the technical aspects 
of war tend to examine mobilisation plans, infrastructure, and high level decision-making in 
Whitehall. They also focus on the transport and infrastructure of the Western Front, rather than 
the army’s other military theatres.5 
 As we have seen, the army was not averse to change. This chapter examines this 
concept in greater detail, exploring how the army sought out civilian expertise from both inside 
and outside its institutional boundaries. The introduction of these transferrable occupational 
skills allowed civilian ideas and values to influence the army. To use Goya’s term, these 
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‘emigrants’ (émigrés) had an important role to play in ‘fertilising’ (féconder) units.6 They did 
not have the same preconceptions as professional soldiers; yet, like army officers, they were 
also used to managing individuals, making decisions, and assuming responsibilities.7 It was 
often the case that these civilians were able to provide more relevant expertise in the 
development of transport and supply methods. Sometimes, lessons derived from military 
experience were simply unsuitable. In a letter to General Arthur Long (DST, War Office), 
Colonel Philip Scott (Deputy DST, BSF) wrote that the BSF is: 
 
… under abnormal conditions, and nothing adds more to one’s trials and 
temper than the remark - often heard ‘We always did so and so in France’!!! 
Macedonia is not France, and Salonika does not compare with 
the combined advantages of Havre, Boulogne, Calais, with their short sea 
distance from the fount of all good things. Personally I think a training in 
France is apt to destroy initiative, but Macedonia will soon demand its pound of 
flesh.8 
 
The army’s decision to seek out civilian expertise highlights the multi-faceted and 
flexible nature of its learning network. By levering knowledge from the civilian sphere, the 
army sought to increase its competitive advantage. This chapter suggests that the permeability 
of military and civilian spheres was not a wartime phenomenon. The relationship was well-
established before the outbreak of the First World War. 
This chapter first considers how these spheres interacted before the war, examining 
three particular avenues: the relationship between the army and civilian advisory bodies, 
including the Institution of Civil Engineers [ICE] and the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps 
[ERSC]; training courses, including the London School of Economics’ [LSE] administration 
course, the Midland Railway’s mechanical engineering course, and the Royal Indian 
Engineering College [RIEC]; and the secondment of army officers to the Crown colonies. 
Secondly, it examines the army’s wartime use of civilian experts in the development of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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infrastructure projects. This section highlights some of the prejudices faced by these experts 
before turning its attention to the development of transport missions, the Suez Canal defences, 
water supply, and the EEF’s desert railway. Finally, the chapter explores both the government 
and army’s policy towards the identification and transfer of civilian experts within the army. It 
considers the US military’s view of this policy before outlining the various stages of the British 
process during the war. 
 
In 1920, after listening to a paper on the work of civil engineers in the First World War, the 
President of the ICE hoped that: 
 
… the bond which has been established in these strenuous years between the 
Civil Engineers of Great Britain, the Dominions and Colonies, and the Royal 
Engineers of the Regular Army, may ever remain a close one, to our mutual 
advantage, professionally and socially, but above all with a view to the most 
efficient use being made of our vast engineer resources.9 
 
Although emphasis was placed on maintaining this close bond, an established relationship 
between the two groups already existed before the outbreak of war. Founded in 1818, the ICE 
proved a milestone in the history of both the British and the wider Western engineering 
profession. It was a learned society, formed for ‘facilitating the acquirement of professional 
knowledge, and for promoting mechanical philosophy’.10 The ICE considered the passing of 
engineering knowledge between peers of paramount importance.11 As a result, members of the 
ICE often gave lectures at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham, or provided articles 
for the Royal Engineers’ Journal or the RUSI Journal.12 RE officers of all ranks reciprocated by 
giving lectures at the ICE. In 1913, for instance, Captain Crofton Sankey delivered a paper on 
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bridging operations conducted under military conditions. He prefaced his talk with the 
following apologia: 
 
 The Author would not have ventured to submit this Paper to the Institution of 
Civil Engineers had he not thought that it might be acceptable in view of the 
close connection of The Institution with the Special Reserve Officer Corps of 
Royal Engineers, who, during their preliminary training… at Chatham, go 
through a course of instruction in the subject dealt with in the following pages.13 
 
Sankey’s paper generated considerable discussion from both the civil engineers and senior RE 
officers in attendance. Scott-Moncrieff, an associate member of the ICE with a diverse career in 
civil and military engineering, declared that it was ‘impossible for him to say how much the 
engineering branch of the Army owed to The Institution’, and that ‘there was hardly a volume 
of its Proceedings in which there was not some valuable instruction bearing upon their [RE] 
daily work’.14 With his considerable experience in the Indian Public Works Department [PWD] 
and on the Guaranteed Railway, Lucknow, he well placed to make such an observation. 
Commenting on Scott-Moncrieff’s wartime service, one contemporary noted that ‘his 
connection with the ICE was one of great avail at this crisis, and he was able to draw in the 
power of a number of civil engineers and to secure the services of many of the leading 
contractors’.15 Similarly, Sir John Griffith, a civil engineer and member of the ICE, noted that 
‘his own experience had taught him that civil engineers had a great deal to learn from their 
Royal Engineer brethren’.16 There was a tacit acknowledgement that the two branches, although 
distinct, were closely bound together.  
Armed forces membership of the ICE was limited, yet a small number of associate 
members and student members had been granted a commission in the Special Reserve in 1908. 
Officers commissioned into the Special Reserve had to be recommended to the Army Council 
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by the ICE, or by the Professor of Engineering at any British university.17 This process ensured 
that a highly qualified reserve of officers was available to the RE. It also added another layer to 
the army’s long-standing relationship with the ICE. As well as acknowledging the need for 
highly qualified ‘civils’, the army also recognised the importance of imperial assignments. 
Evidence from the War Office’s 1908 Committee on the Provision of Officers recommended 
that: 
 
… in the case of junior officers of the Royal Engineer Special Reserve who 
have the opportunity of taking up civil posts, especially abroad, as much latitude 
as possible should be allowed in exempting them from annual training, if such 
civil work be of a nature calculated to render them more fit for the discharge of 
their military duties.18  
 
 
Given the nature of their field, a number of these Special Reserve officers were already 
employed in civil posts within the colonies, working in PWDs, or on colonial railways.19 On the 
outbreak of war, there were approximately seventy members of the ICE in the Special Reserve; 
of whom thirty-four were in the Royal Reserve of Engineers.20 This figure represented a very 
small percentage of both the ICE (less than 1 per cent) and Royal Reserve of Engineers (2.7 per 
cent).21 However, comments on the impact of these officers during the war suggested they were 
punching above their weight. With a wealth of experience to bring to their commissions, 
General Sir Herbert Lawrence remarked that it would not have been possible for ‘the war to 
have been carried to a successful conclusion if the Royal Engineers had not had the assistance 
of these gentlemen, many of them of the highest eminence in their profession’.22 
 The relationship between the ICE and the military was multi-layered and went back 
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further than the Special Reserve. The ICE had been the driving force behind the establishment 
of the ERSC in 1865. Formed amidst the French invasion scares of the 1860s, the ERSC was 
the brainchild of Charles Manby, Secretary to the ICE, and constituted for ‘the purpose of 
directing the application of skilled labour; and of railway transport to the purposes of national 
defence, and for preparing, in time of peace, a system of which such duties should be 
conducted’.23 The corps consisted of officers only, its membership drawn from civil engineers 
and contractors, as well as officers of railway and dock companies. However, only ‘civil 
engineers of standing and experience, who have directed the construction of the chief railways 
and other important works of the country, and the General Managers of the leading lines of 
railway, and of the leading Commercial Docks’ were eligible for the rank of lieutenant-colonel 
in the ERSC.24  
 The ERSC was an elite organisation, comprising some of the leading engineers of the 
time. On the outbreak of the First World War, it totalled sixty members.25 In many respects, it 
was one of the first expert advisory bodies to the British and, later, the Australian armed forces. 
The establishment of the Australian ERSC was authorised in 1911, fulfilling a similar role to its 
British counterpart. It was instituted to ‘furnish advice’ on matters relating to the movement of 
troops, and originally totalled forty-eight members from the Commonwealth and State 
Government railways.26 It was expected that these bodies would be consulted by their country’s 
respective governments. However, in practice, their members were usually consulted in their 
individual capacities. The primary object of the British ERSC was to ‘afford to the Government 
information on subjects connected with the Railway Transport of Troops’. 27 It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that the ERSC counted individuals such as Sir William Forbes (General Manager, 
London, Brighton and South Coast Railways), Eric Geddes (Deputy General Manager, North !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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26 G. H. Knibbs, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1911, No. 5 (Melbourne, 
VIC: McCarron, Bird and Co, 1912), pp. 1094-1095; ‘War Railway Council. Engineer and Railway Staff 
Corps’, The Mercury, 19 December 1911, p. 5. 
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Eastern Railways), and Sir Sam Fay (General Manager, Great Central Railways) as members. 
 
     
Figure 2: Breakdown of ERSC membership by occupation on the outbreak of war28 
 
Following the enactment of the 1907 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, the ERSC 
became an official part of the Territorial Force and remains so to this day.29 It provided a direct 
link between the ICE and the army, yet some of its pre-war members saw its role as far from the 
expert resource that it is regarded as today. Sam Fay recalled that, although the ERSC was 
‘established for the purpose of rendering expert assistance in time of war’, its regular function 
was ‘that of having dinner, with members of the War Office staff as guests’.30 Though the 
ERSC could be dismissed as a mere luncheon club, the guest list of the 1913 dinner suggests 
otherwise. It emphasises the perceived importance of the ERSC to the military, as well as the 
importance of social links between the two spheres.31 The military guests at the dinner included 
Sir John French; Sir Charles Douglas, the CIGS in August 1914; Sir John Cowans; Sir Horatio 
Yorke, Chief Inspector of Railways; and Osborne Mance, a Staff Captain who acted as liaison 
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between the army and the railway companies prior to August 1914.32 Fay was quick to 
acknowledge the ERSC’s wartime role: ‘all its members in one form or another rendered service 
to the State throughout the great struggle’.33 The role of certain ERSC members, particularly 
railway managers, was most notable during Britain’s mobilisation preparations. According to 
Edwin Pratt, so far as the British railway managers were concerned, their part in mobilisation 
was simply the ‘practical outcome of… peace-time preparations…’34  
Some of the railway members of the ERSC were also members of the REC. Established 
by the government in 1912, the REC consisted entirely of the railway industry’s leading general 
managers.35 Its role was to contribute to the establishment of a mobilisation scheme for time of 
war, to act as a forum for the dissemination of ideas, and to act as a conduit for information 
between the railways and the War Office. Its most significant contribution would be the 
production of the ‘secret timetable’ that guided the BEF’s mobilisation in August 1914.36 
Indeed, upon mobilisation, it was expected to:  
 
… co-ordinate the railway transport requirements in connection with the 
mobilisation of the naval and military forces… to ensure the transit of war 
material and the maintenance of food supplies of the civil population; to 
apportion the traffic… to secure the best results, and to arrange programmes 
with a view to avoiding any clashing of interests…37 
 
With the establishment of both the ERSC and the REC, the civilian and military professions had 
been engaged in a mutually beneficial, cooperative process for over half a century.  
Through bodies such as the ERSC and the REC, the government and the British 
military had ready access to civilian experts with ‘experience of coherent large scale !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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organisation’.38 However, they recognised that soldiers, particularly those in the technical 
branches of the army, could derive further benefits from training in, and exposure to, civilian 
skills. One of the best known examples of this is the LSE’s ‘Course for the Training of Officers 
for the Higher Appointments in the Administrative Staff of the Army’.39 The brainchild of 
Richard Haldane, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Edward Ward, the course was geared to produce 
‘a thinking school of officers who desire to see the full efficiency which comes from new 
organisation’.40 In his address to the first cohort in 1907, Mackinder believed that it was 
advisable for officers to make themselves businessmen: 
 
… we here can only put before you the ordinary civilian methods. Business 
men, you must remember, are not merely business men, but bankers, or brokers, 
or merchants. What you have to form is another special kind of business man, 
the soldier… You may at a time come into contact, as many of you did in South 
Africa, with a civilian population characterized by deeply engrained business 
prejudices and methods of its own, and it will be of the utmost importance to 
you to know civilian business…41 
 
The course sought to draw on the lessons of previous campaigns, such as the Boer War, which 
had demonstrated the ‘need for specialised administrative officers whose training should 
include financial, commercial and legal qualifications’.42 The course included subjects such as 
accounting and business methods, statistics, and railway management in war and peace.43 
Leading authorities from both academia and commerce delivered these subjects; Wilfred Tetley 
Stephenson, a former member of the North Eastern Railway, for example, ran the module on 
railway management and organisation. However, the syllabus was not static. Conscious efforts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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were made to ensure that the material taught to army officers was both current and relevant. In 
1910, for example, it was felt that certain modules had ‘less immediate practical bearing’. 
Accordingly, modules relating to banking, statistics, public administration, and geography were 
omitted, while lectures on ‘Business Organisation’ were introduced instead.44 These particular 
lectures were concerned with manufacturing industries, the organisation of a commercial office, 
legal restrictions on industry, and the impact of government departments, such as the Boards of 
Trade and Agriculture.45 In addition to these formal modules, Mackinder established ‘smoking 
meetings’, which took place once a week in the evening. The guest speakers at these meetings 
were often businessmen. This allowed officers to ‘accumulate the experience of practical men’ 
in a highly social setting. 46 This echoed the club culture of the time and resonated with the 
army’s own attitude towards socialising.  
 The LSE course was unique in its conception. However, its reach was limited with only 
245 officers completing the course between January 1907 and March 1914. The majority of 
these officers were captains (67 per cent) and, although the infantry and other corps were 
represented, ASC officers made up the largest share of the overall intake (eighty-five officers). 
A number of these ASC officers would go on to hold significant appointments during the war, 
notably Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Striedinger (Class of 1909 and DST BSF, 1915); his 
successor as DST BSF, Colonel Philip Scott (Class of 1909); and Brigadier-General Wilfred 
Swabey (Class of 1908 and DST IEF, 1917-1918). The willingness of the War Office and the 
Army Council to work with an institution like the LSE speaks to the importance of rounding out 
the education of the officer corps.  
 In addition to the LSE course, there were other civilian-influenced army courses 
developed in conjunction with Midland Railway and HM Dockyard, Chatham, as well as the 
RIEC at Cooper’s Hill. These courses aimed to equip officers with experience of civilian 
railway work. The importance of railways at home and abroad was well known to the military. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As Gourvish argues, the development of railways coincided with the creation of accountancy in 
its modern sense with the rise of companies such as Price, Holyhead and Waterhouse, and 
Deloitte.47 The railways were of crucial significance to the development of industrialisation in 
nineteenth century Britain, converting engineering from the profession of a handful of talented 
individuals into a large and diverse organisation covering a wide range of skills.48 
Established in 1894, the Midland Railway’s ‘Course of Instruction in Mechanical 
Engineering’ gave those RE officers who had decided to specialise in railways a ‘thorough, 
practical knowledge of machine design, the fitting, erection and repair of machinery, and the 
care and working of boilers’.49 The course was intensive: a year in length with nine months 
spent in the railway shops and three months in the drawing rooms. Officers were to conform to 
the working patterns of Midland Railway and were actively encouraged to put in extra hours so 
as to ‘be of real assistance to the men with whom they are working, and to win their 
confidence’.50 In this respect, RE officers were given a real taste of work in a civilian firm and a 
first hand appreciation of civilian man management. Brigadier-General Ralph Micklem 
undertook the Midland Railway course as a young subaltern in September 1904. After spending 
a fortnight at Brecon on a single line, he then spent ‘two or three months in London on goods 
working, then to Derby, where I did a month as a fireman, and then to various other places on 
Civil Engineering jobs’.51 Although Micklem found the year enjoyable, he confessed that he did 
not think he had ‘learnt a great deal’. Whether this is true or not, Micklem’s post-course career 
saw him seconded to the Egyptian army where he worked with the Sudan Military Railway, 
surveying for new lines, and he was later appointed Resident Engineer at Port Sudan. On the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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outbreak of war, Micklem was serving as assistant to the General Manager of the Atbara-Port 
Sudan railway. As a trained railway officer, Micklem’s wartime service was largely spent in the 
Movements Directorate at the War Office where he was responsible for ‘all the railway 
arrangements in connection with Home Defence’.52  
The Midland Railway course also provided the template for the RE course at HM 
Dockyard, Chatham. Though not aligned to a civilian firm, the aims of the Chatham course 
were identical to those of the Midland Railway course.53 Established in 1901, it was initially 
open to three officers per year. Unlike the Midland Railway course, attendance was not 
voluntary.54 No officer would be deemed competent to undertake the duties of an inspecting 
officer for machinery if he had not first completed the Chatham course. Drawing on the lessons 
of the Midland Railway course, the reports and notes made by officers at Chatham were to be 
submitted to the Inspector of Iron Structures, rather than the commandant at the School of 
Military Engineering. It was felt that the former would be ‘better able to say… what class of 
work is likely to prove of general use to machinery officers in the future’.55 
While the Midland Railway and Chatham courses were useful for officers hoping to 
serve in the Crown colonies, the founding of the RIEC in 1870 provided formal training for 
those officers or, more often, civil servants destined for employment in PWDs. The RIEC was 
established in response to an initial failure to recruit suitably qualified engineers for the Indian 
PWD.56 Much like the LSE administration course, the RIEC was devised and developed at the 
highest levels of government. During its development, it had the support of George Campbell, 
eighth Duke of Argyll and Secretary of State for India, who convinced colleagues on the 
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Council of India and later in the House of Commons of its value.57 Lectures and modules at the 
RIEC were delivered by leading experts in the field. In 1873, for example, W. C. Unwin – an 
associate member of the ICE and author of the influential The Elements of Machine Design - 
delivered the module in hydraulic engineering and mechanisms.58 Other modules included 
construction, architectural drawing, surveying, natural science, and instruction in languages 
such as Hindustani, French, and German.59 The faculty of the RIEC also represented the coming 
together of civilian professionals and military experts. Heavily modelled on the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich, all four presidents of the RIEC were former RE officers, while the 
instructors in surveying were made up of both RE officers and members of the ICE.60 Students 
at the RIEC were also expected to go through military exercises, which included the use of the 
rifle.61 Owing to competition from the emerging ‘red brick’ universities, the RIEC closed in 
1906. During its heyday between 1871-1884, approximately 75 per cent of RIEC graduates 
were appointed to positions within the Indian PWD.62 
These courses of instruction, encouraging closer working between the civil and military 
spheres, aligned with the so-called ‘Rise of the Professions’ of the mid-nineteenth century.63 For 
officers in the army’s technical branches, these courses provided up to date knowledge on civil 
and mechanical engineering practice. To deploy this knowledge, the army recognised that a 
number of its officers, particularly those in the RE, could be usefully seconded to the Egyptian 
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army or to PWDs across the Empire.64 From the mid-1890s onwards, the British government 
devised a series of development schemes to promote the economies of its Crown colonies.65 
Joseph Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, instigated these schemes, which 
required the issue of colonial loans and the contracting of engineers.66 The secondment of 
military engineers was not a new nineteenth century development; it was woven into the fabric 
of colonial administration. British military engineers, drawn mainly from the RE, had been 
seconded to the army of the East India Company since the eighteenth century. This trend 
continued after Crown rule in 1858, with RE officers making up a high proportion of military 
engineers seconded to the Indian army.67  
Casper Andersen has argued that experience of imperial engineering acted as a social 
lever for British engineering elites. The Empire provided ‘a path to affluence and wealth as well 
as to high positions in accredited institutions’.68 Andersen’s argument can also be applied to the 
RE. Although imperial engineering did not bring about the same wealth and affluence, it often 
led to influential positions within the military. The experience of imperial civil engineering was 
highly prized. In his evidence to the 1919 Rawlinson Committee on Engineer Organisation, 
Major-General Alain Joly de Lotbinière, formerly Chief Engineer to the Australian Corps, 
remarked that: 
 
… RE Officers who had a considerable experience of foreign service were as a 
rule far more useful in the field than those who had spent their service in the 
British Isles… An RE officer who has had no engineering experience… cannot 
for a moment be compared with a ‘free lance’ engineer, who has had training on 
large works such as construction of Railways, bridges, docks, water supplies 
etc, in various parts of the world. These are the men who on active service one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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selects for important undertakings.69 
 
Before joining the RE, Joly de Lotbinière had served as a journeyman fitter in various US and 
Canadian railway shops. His decision to pursue this diversion into mechanical engineering 
allowed him to gain ‘practical knowledge and experience’ and to familiarise himself with ‘the 
details of railway work’.70 He also had extensive experience of civil engineering in India. On 
the outbreak of war, he was Engineer-in-Chief to the Bengal PWD.71 His evidence to the 
Rawlinson Committee found support from Major-General Sir Philip Twining (DFW, 1918-
1920) who had served alongside Joly de Lotbinière as a journeyman. Twining went on to serve 
in India with the Bombay Sappers and Miners, and was involved in surveying the railway 
through the Khyber Pass. His work on this survey led to his involvement on the Uganda 
Railway with individuals such as George Whitehouse, the railway’s Chief Engineer. 72 
Commenting on the future training of the RE, Twining recalled that, during the First World 
War, the army was ‘largely… dependent upon India and the British railways for the heads of the 
Transportation Directorate. Such British Royal Engineers as there were employed in 
Transportation were all of very junior rank’.73 This assertion is borne out by a schematic 
provided by Twining to the Rawlinson Committee, summarised in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: Pre-war background of officers serving as directorate heads in DGT74 
  
The ‘scramble for Africa’ also resulted in a number of opportunities for RE officers to 
gain experience of survey, expedition, and railway work. Secondments to the Egyptian army 
offered one such route. As we have seen, Percy Girouard was assigned to the Egyptian army in 
1896, marking the beginning of a notable military career. Like Girouard, Sir George Macauley, 
who later rendered considerable service to both Murray and Allenby as General Manager of the 
Egyptian State Railways [ESR], was an RE officer transferred to the Egyptian army in 1896. 
Initially appointed Chief Engineer of the Sudan Military Railway, Macauley also took part in 
the 1897 Sudan expedition and Kitchener’s subsequent expedition in 1898. After resigning his 
RE commission, Macauley served as General Manager of the Sudan Railway (1898-1906) 
before transferring to the ESR.75 Other notable individuals seconded to the Egyptian army 
included Brigadier-General Henri Joly de Lotbinière (a contemporary of Girouard and 
Macauley, and relation to Alain Joly de Lotbinière) who was employed by the Survey 
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Department of the Egyptian government in 1906.76 He served as Girouard’s staff officer during 
the Boer War before rising to become Chief Engineer to the XVIII Corps during the First World 
War.  
 Much of the surveying, construction, and operation of the railways, particularly in 
Africa, had been under the direction of RE officers.77 The opportunity to work on railways in 
the Crown colonies brought RE officers into contact with civilian counterparts, while 
simultaneously enhancing the former’s opportunity for higher appointment. For example, 
Geddes and Major-General Henry Freeland had both worked for railway companies that served 
northern India.78 This relationship was instrumental to Freeland’s involvement in Geddes’ 
transportation mission in 1916 and appointment as a Deputy DGT in 1917. 
 
Having considered the civil-military relationship pre-war, we shall now examine how these 
existing formal ties were exploited and developed by the army during the First World War. 
Before considering the development of transport missions, the Suez Canal defences, water 
supply, and the EEF’s desert railway, it is necessary to look at some of the suspicions faced by 
these civilian experts. 
 As we have seen, Girouard and Geddes’ transport missions provided clear examples of 
civilian involvement in France. Geddes’ mission in August 1916 included individuals such as 
Philip Nash, formerly of the Great Northern Railway and the East Indian Railways; George 
Beharrell, formerly Assistant Goods Manager and Commercial Agent to the North Eastern 
Railway; Brigadier-General Osborne Mance, then Assistant Director Railway Transport at the 
War Office; and Freeland. According to Grieves, both Mance and Freeland were 
‘uncomfortable’ about their membership of a civilian mission designed to scrutinise existing 
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procedures.79 The rapid expansion of the army led to a considerable change in the balance of 
civil-military relations. For Haig, the fundamental principle was to: 
 
… employ men on the same work in war as they are accustomed to do in peace. 
Acting on this principle I have got Geddes at the head of all railways and 
transportation, with the best practical civil and military engineers under him. At 
the head of the road directorate is Dr Maybury, head of the road board in 
England… To put soldiers who have no practical experience of these matters 
into such positions merely because they are generals and colonels, must result 
in utter failure.80  
 
 The establishment and staffing of the new Transportation Directorate led Lord 
Northcliffe to remark that ‘we have brought to France a considerable portion of industrial 
England’. 81  Although civilian experts staffed the highest echelons of the Transportation 
Directorate, it is impossible to disregard suspicion felt by some senior military figures. Both 
Cowans and Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall (CinC, Mesopotamian Expeditionary 
Force) expressed reservations over the use of civilian experts, particularly when these experts 
took over traditionally military roles. Initially, Cowans viewed the appointment of Andrew 
Weir, later Lord Inverforth, as Surveyor-General of Supply ‘unfavourably’; while Marshall, a 
prominent sceptic of civilian experts, recalled how there were ‘altogether too many conferences 
and commissions and, I may add, too many so-called ‘super-men’ during the war’.82 Lieutenant-
General Sir Frederick Clayton (IGC, BEF) expressed similar remarks in his rejoinder to the 
1916 Royden Commission. This commission, led by Sir Thomas Royden, chairman of the 
Cunard Line, was established for the purpose of investigating delayed shipping at French ports 
used to supply the British army. Having advised the War Office in 1912 on the potential 
problems of disembarking the BEF upon the European mainland, Royden was used to working 
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with military personnel.83 However, Clayton’s rejoinder declared that:  
 
… it is impossible for the ordinary business civilian to understand [what are] the 
conditions under which we have to work and that it is a mistake to allow them 
to interfere with an Army business that most of us have studied all our lives […] 
for that reason we should not allow in future any civilian Commission to come 
out here and criticize our work.84 
 
Initial suspicions aside, transport and supply considerations were coordinated at the 
highest levels of the army. This coordination served to have a positive effect on the subsidiary 
theatres with the organisation of several high level transport missions. In a letter to the British 
forces in Egypt and Salonika, the Army Council outlined plans for a ‘complete survey of the 
requirements of the various theatres of war for transportation material… made by experts… in 
consultation with the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief’.85 Sir Francis Dent, General 
Manager of the South Eastern and Chatham Railway and a member of the REC, led the 
transport mission to Salonika and Egypt in late 1916. Modelled on Geddes’ mission and 
supported by a series of ‘technical experts’, Dent’s investigation would similarly examine rail, 
light railway, road, docks, wharves, and inland waterways.86 
Dent’s undertaking was the first of several ‘troubleshooting’ exercises to the subsidiary 
theatres. Experts drawn from both civilian and military spheres led these subsequent missions. 
John W. Stewart, for example, led a follow up mission to Egypt and Palestine in July 1917.87 
Stewart was a Canadian railway magnate who had helped build the Pacific Great Eastern and 
Canadian Northern railways before the war. Given a military rank and initially tasked with 
reorganising light railways on the Western Front, Stewart was soon promoted to Deputy DGT 
and despatched to Egypt. His mission was predicated on the success of Geddes’ reorganisation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In a letter to Murray, Robertson offered a glowing recommendation of Stewart and his mission: 
 
Six months ago the railways in France were in a bad way. Today they are 
splendid, and this is due entirely to the fine railway work put in by people like 
Stewart. It is extraordinary what improvements can be made and how greatly 
the capacity of the line can be increased by men who really understand the 
job… Hear what Stewart and his people have to say and back them for all they 
are worth. I am sure you will be pleased afterwards. At any rate this was Haig’s 
experience, and this is why I am sending Stewart to you.88 
 
Stewart was able to draw on both his civilian expertise and his experience of military transport 
as Director of Light Railways and as a Deputy DGT. One of his recommendations advised that, 
if further construction was required, the ‘policy adopted in France should be applied to Egypt’. 
This would require the provision of suitable equipment and a plant for ‘modern railway 
construction’.89 
 The need for an overland supply route and the army’s subsequent involvement in the 
Italian theatre led to the organisation of two transport missions to Italy. The first was under Sir 
Guy Calthrop, General Manager of the London and North Western Railway. Consisting of 
railway, naval, and army personnel, the delegation left London on 14 January 1917 to 
investigate the feasibility of a Cherbourg-Taranto overland supply route. 90 The mission was 
ultimately successful with the first passenger train leaving Cherbourg on 28 June 1917.91 The 
second Italian mission was in response to reports of delayed shipping and congestion on the 
railways and at the ports.92 Brodie Henderson, a well-known consulting civil engineer with a 
particular focus on railways, docks, and harbour construction, was in charge of the mission.93 
He was closely involved with work commissioned by British-owned Argentinian railway !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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companies, such as the Buenos Ayres Great Southern and the Central Argentine. Commissioned 
into the RE in 1914, he rose to become a Deputy DGT. Like Stewart, Henderson’s civilian and 
military experience were used to great effect during his mission to Italy in December 1917. His 
observations highlighted future areas for concern, notably that the base depot at Arquata was 
too far back, which would cause a problem if a larger force deployed to Italy. He also advised 
that, ‘from experience in France’, additional railway sidings would be required to cope with 
increased traffic, thus necessitating the procurement of suitable material outside of Italy.94  
Conducted on similar lines to Stewart’s mission, Freeland’s investigation in 
Mesopotamia in November 1917 raised a number of fundamental questions around the 
suitability of transport arrangements, notably the disconnect between India and the authorities in 
theatre.95 Robertson requested Freeland personally in a letter to Haig: 
 
We must have a man of some kind from you as no one else knows the question, 
and there is a certain amount of opposition in Mesopotamia and India against 
tackling the transportation question and introducing something like the system 
which has been found to work so admirably with you in France’.96  
 
Maude welcomed Freeland’s appointment admitting that ‘good as our communications are 
considering the local conditions there is no doubt that they can be still further improved and 
developed, and obviously the more this is done on sound lines and with expert advice the better 
for the future of the Force’.97  
Freeland was well suited to this appointment given his pre-war work with the Indian 
railways, coupled with his wartime experience of transport in France. It was his experience of 
the latter that led him to recommend the amalgamation of the Mesopotamian transportation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 TNA, WO 158/853, Director General of Transport: Transportation questions from France to Italy and 
in Italy: Henderson Report, December 1917, pp. 1-4. 
95 TNA, WO 32/5209, Report of Commission appointed by Government of India to investigate Railway 
and River Transport Administration in Mesopotamia (Freeland Mission), Mance to Fay, 15 May 1918. 
96 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, 7/7/55, Robertson to Haig, 3 October 1917. 
97 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, 7/5/73, Maude to Robertson, 6 October 1917. 
! 158 
services under a single DGT.98 This would reduce the pressure on the IGC, while providing a 
single technical head for all transport matters. Freeland’s recommendations were well founded 
and influenced by best practice gathered from the Western Front. They also found support from 
Mance, then Director of Roads and Railways at the War Office, who agreed that ‘a technical 
organisation’ should be established to streamline the transport situation.99 However, as Fay 
recalled, there was resistance to the appointment of a DGT by Lieutenant-General Sir William 
Marshall, and the QMG, India.100 According to Lynden-Bell, acting as Deputy CIGS at the War 
Office, ‘the DGT idea has been blown upon from France, and Haig says if he had his time again 
he would not have tried it’.101 In spite of initial opposition, Major-General Raymond de 
Candolle was appointed DGT in Mesopotamia. To support him, Freeland was appointed to the 
Indian Railway Board to help streamline transport issues at the very top of the Indian army.102 
Freeland’s appointment earned him ‘the gratitude of the army’ as a result of his ‘zealous and 
unremitting efforts in developing the capacity of the railways in respect of military 
requirements’.103 
In addition to these transport missions, the various expeditionary forces also used 
civilian experts for the construction and maintenance of canal defences, water pipelines, and 
railways.104 In the case of the EEF, these particular issues required the extensive use of the 
Egyptian and Cyprus PWDs, the Cairo Water Company, and the ESR, along with independent 
consultants from Britain. There was a ‘necessary dependence’ on the existing civil machinery, 
coupled with the need to mobilise all available resources, both matériel and personnel, for the 
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prosecution of war.105 
The increased permeability between the military and civilian spheres was vital to the 
army’s war effort in the east. This was notable with the construction of the Suez Canal defences 
in early 1916. As Murray remarked, the existing engineering staff of the British Force in Egypt 
was ‘inadequate’ to deal with the execution of extensive works relating to the defence of the 
Suez Canal.106 The army, therefore, called upon the Egyptian PWD to ‘provide a special staff to 
organise and carry out the work’.107 The PWD’s ‘intimate cooperation’ with the army made ‘an 
accurate definition of the separate spheres of each almost impossible’. 108  Sir Murdoch 
Macdonald, Under Secretary of the Egyptian PWD, was appointed DDW, with the rank of 
colonel in December 1915.109 Owing to the shortage of RE personnel at that time, Macdonald’s 
staff consisted of seconded PWD officers and civil engineers who were given local and 
temporary commissions.110 In all, seventy-eight technical and clerical members of the Egyptian 
PWD took part in the work on the canal defences.111 Macdonald and his staff took over 
responsibility for ‘the provision of landing stages and wharves on the Canal banks, roads, 
installation of water supply, and Engineer works at the Canal bases of supply’.112 
Prior to his appointment as DDW, Macdonald had provided informal consultancy to the 
MEF, notably over the proposed development of a stone pier at Mudros in September 1915. 
Brigadier-General Ernest Paul, then DDW Helles, remarked on the ‘friendly advice’ given by 
Macdonald and his colleagues in this respect, but his later comments underscored the perceived !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ignorance of civil engineers when faced with military problems:  
 
At any rate, what he [Macdonald] saw at Mudros, and what we were able to tell 
him, undoubtedly opened his eyes, and those of his friends, so that they, as Civil 
Engineers, can fully appreciate (which I am sure they never did before) the 
enormous obstacles and great difficulties that we have to overcome in this 
Campaign, from a Works point of view’.113 
 
Although Paul expressed certain reservations towards the civil engineering profession, 
Macdonald proved his worth during his seven months as DDW. His staff gave ‘valuable service 
and worked fast as a result of local experience, the ability to make the best use of contractors 
and the absence of financial restrictions’.114 In June 1916, responsibility for the Canal road and 
water supply system was eventually taken over by RE staff. Macdonald withdrew from the 
work associated with the Suez Canal zone, relinquishing his position as DDW. In spite of this, 
he continued to provide advice and consultancy to the British Force in Egypt under both Murray 
and Allenby. Drawing on his pre-war experience of large scale irrigation projects, including the 
Aswan Dam, Macdonald, in conjunction with a number of other local and British experts, 
advised on the practical issue of water supply for the advance across the Sinai into Palestine.115  
For the EEF, water supply was a considerable problem. In November 1915, Dr William 
Hume, Director of the Geological Survey of Egypt, had advised that fresh water might be 
obtained east of the Suez Canal.116 Boreholes were unsuccessfully sunk, which necessitated the 
use of Nile water from the Sweetwater Canal and involved ‘elaborate works’ to remove 
impurities and parasites.117 The Cairo and Alexandria Waterworks Companies and the Suez 
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Canal Company proved instrumental in this respect.118 Murray highlighted the ‘invaluable 
service’ and ‘expert advice’ of the Director of the Cairo Waterworks Company, while Paul 
praised the able direction and assistance of the Alexandria Waterworks Company.119 The Cairo 
Waterworks Company also undertook the design, construction, and erection on site 
of mechanical filters, settling tanks, and engines necessary for the purification of Nile water. 
 For the installation of its water supply system, the army subsumed civilian experts and 
elements of the local state apparatus into the military machine. However, like the transport 
missions, the army requested further independent expertise to examine and troubleshoot its 
work. The War Office despatched Sandeman to Egypt in November 1916 following Murray’s 
request for a technical expert of a ‘very high standard’ to advise on the quality and economy of 
the recently constructed pipeline.120 A member of the ICE and an Associate Professor of Water 
Supply and Irrigation at the University of Manchester, Sandeman had designed and constructed 
supply works for local authorities, water boards, and companies throughout Britain.121 His 
appointment showed that the civilian and military spheres could and, more importantly, did 
cross-fertilise. Sandeman’s report on the desert pipeline was largely favourable, noting that the 
work was ‘well carried out’ and that, given the rapidity of its construction, the results were 
‘admirable’.122 His recommendations included an examination of the effect of salt on the steel 
pipes, improvements to the intakes, and the amalgamation of all installations for the purification 
of water under one authority. The army took his recommendations seriously. Correspondence 
between GHQ EEF and its Engineer-in-Chief showed that Sandeman’s recommendations were 
put into effect as early as December 1916. These actions included the removal of vegetation and 
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the wiring off of intakes to prevent animals from entering or approaching the water.123 
 In addition to the canal defences and the installation of the Sinai water supply, civilian 
expertise was also harnessed for the construction of the desert railway. According to Ulrichsen, 
the assistance rendered by the ESR was the most important prop of the logistical network in 
both Egypt and Palestine.124 As early as 1914, the ESR was asked to act as ‘general agent and 
storekeepers’ for the railways in the Mediterranean theatre of war. This initial role expanded in 
December 1915 following Macauley’s appointment to Director of Railway Transport with the 
rank of colonel.125 Macauley’s dual appointment secured coordination between the civilian and 
military organisations. With his previous membership of the RE and his work on civilian 
railways, Macauley had the necessary experience to oversee railway construction in the desert. 
His two principal assistants, Major Robert Blakeney and Captain G. C. M. Hall, also had 
suitable pre-war experience. Blakeney had served with Macauley at Omdurman and had worked 
on the Sudan Military Railway under Girouard, while Hall had also seen service in the Sudan 
and had worked with Blakeney, Girouard, and Macauley on the 1896 Dongola Expedition.126  
 During the entire Egypt and Palestine campaign, 627 miles of standard gauge track 
were laid and eighty-six stations built under the direction of Macauley and the ESR.127 It is little 
wonder that the British official history lauded Macauley as ‘having provided a network of lines 
as efficient as those in the European theatres’.128 Allenby also singled out Macauley’s work for 
praise. In a letter to Lord Curzon, he wrote that Macauley ‘speedily proved that the 
responsibilities which had been entrusted to him by the War Office had not been misplaced’, 
and that he ‘proved himself more than equal to the task’.129 However, such praise was not 
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universal. Given his existing reservations towards civilian expertise, Paul believed Macauley’s 
dual role to be ‘the cause of much trouble’. He argued that ‘the Works Directorate was seriously 
handicapped at not infrequent intervals through the Manager of the ESR’, and that ‘increased 
military efficiency would have resulted had Egyptian State Railways been confined to transport 
of Military Stores’.130 
   
As the previous section has shown, the army made considerable use of external expertise. This 
next section will examine the army’s process for identifying and transferring skilled civilians 
from within its organisation. Perceptions of the army’s attitude towards personnel selection 
were not universally positive, while policies that involved ‘combing out’ men from industry 
were unpopular, particularly with the trade unions. 131  Much like its process for sharing 
knowledge, the army could not afford to pursue a wholly bureaucratic or, conversely, a wholly 
personalised approach. The shift to a war economy in Britain, coupled with the army’s 
expansion, required the development of a formal process for identifying and transferring skilled 
personnel. However, this process also had to be sensitive to operational requirements. 
The development of the army’s personnel selection process has drawn unfavourable 
comparisons with the US army’s forward thinking approach, particularly with the latter’s 
employment of psychologists and businessmen on its Classification of Personnel committee. 
Established in 1917, the committee provided ‘an instrument to increase the value of the army’s 
man-power through securing the most effective placement of each man’. 132  Original 
membership of the committee consisted almost wholly of psychologists, but a number of 
business specialists were appointed to ensure the ‘successful prosecution of the work’.133 These 
included representatives from Winchester Repeating Arms Company, Western Electric, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Southern Bell Telephone, and Pennsylvania Railroad.134 These individuals placed their ‘talent 
and experience’ of ‘putting skilled workers where they were most needed’ at the service of the 
War Department.135 Drawing on this scientific and business expertise, the committee designed a 
programme to help army trainers identify skilled men from the incoming masses of farmers and 
labourers. As Jennifer Keene argues, the US army welcomed the scheme due to ‘unexpected 
problems such as finding enough men with clerical skills to staff division headquarters’.136 The 
committee’s scheme was complex and included activities such as the compilation of an index of 
occupations, trade testing, personnel specifications, and the preparation of tables of 
occupational needs for each sort of platoon, company, or regiment. 
When developing its selection scheme, the US army conducted a detailed study of the 
British personnel organisation.137 Its findings suggested that the British organisation ‘in some 
respects is far superior to ours. Special reports… covered their [the British] whole program of 
recruitment, classification, trade-testing, assignment and transfer, industrial furloughs, weekly 
consolidation and analysis of strength reports’.138 American delegations were despatched to 
Britain to observe and report on its recruitment programme. The aim was to gather suggestions 
‘that looked toward the improvement of the personnel system in America, in order that it might 
function more effectively in France’.139 The US army’s findings suggest that the British had a 
centralised and well-defined policy for personnel selection.140  
The British army initially embarked on a highly personalised approach, while !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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simultaneously negotiating both industrial demands and an overtaxed army bureaucracy.141 
However, the process was far from effective at first. The army’s policy passed through three 
overlapping stages: ad hoc and personalised in 1914-1916, semi-formalised from 1916-1917, 
before the eventual establishment of formal departments and processes from 1917 onwards. 
 The early stage of this process mirrored the government’s broader manpower problem. 
As Grieves has argued, the ideal manpower planning machinery did not exist early in the war 
because ‘the relative priorities of aspects of the war effort had not been determined’.142 The 
government strove to meet GHQ’s manpower demands, ensuring that young fit men were 
released from industries for military service. Major-General Sir Robert Hutchison, future 
Director of Organisation, recalled that the government, ‘without knowledge of the difficulties of 
personnel, drew into the military net every man who would voluntarily come forward’.143 As a 
result, some men decided to enlist in local infantry units, denying the technical branches access 
to their skills. There were ‘skilled mechanics and apprentices… laborers, university graduates, 
politicians’ all serving in infantry formations.144 At this early stage of the war, there was no 
uniform policy towards the transfer or identification of skilled workers. This lack of uniformity 
not only began to have a deleterious effect on British industry, but it also caused problems for 
RE and railway units that were expanding to meet the army’s demands. According to Lyndall 
Urwick, a champion of scientific management, this ‘unbusiness like omission to select and sort 
candidates intelligently on the basis of their previous record’ led to chaos and inefficiency. The 
officering of the army could only be rescued if ‘ability (including well-proved ability in 
previous civil life) is diligently and continually searched for’.145 If not then the army would do 
worse than lose battles: it might lose the war. Though not as apocalyptic in his view as Urwick, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Monash lamented the haphazard nature of this selection process in AIF formations in April 
1915, arguing that: 
 
… if allowed a free hand in units, the numbers required could be raised. Many 
men have come to us who have applied for transfer and been refused. While 
fully recognising the reluctance of COs to part with good men trained by 
themselves, I would ask that in the interests of the whole Force, an appeal 
should be made to COs to allow suitable men to transfer.146 
 
 
The possibility for transferring was subject to the operational demands of the various 
forces. The army was disinclined to enforce hard and fast rules when it came to transferring men 
from infantry to technical branches. As Hutchison noted, ‘if you want to pull a man away from 
a fighting organization, it is charged that you are interfering with… a General’s winning this or 
that battle’.147 It was only when the situation was deemed critical that steps were taken and the 
General Staff forced to intervene. In the case of military railways, the possible extension of 
advanced railheads in early 1916 was contingent on additional railway troops, and that these 
could ‘only be formed by the transfer of skilled railway men from other arms, and by the raising 
of additional Pioneer or Labour Battalions for railway purposes’.148 According to an ICE report, 
this led to the transfer of 1,100 drivers and firemen who were serving in units in France to work 
on the military railways.149 At this stage of the war, the administrative infrastructure for 
checking previous experience and technical qualifications was in its infancy. The army had to 
contact employers in order to validate individual qualifications. 
This ‘needs must’ policy was also supported by the use of GROs as a way of identifying 
men with a particular trade. GROs contained information relating to all and sundry, including 
military publications and regimental dinners. As well as acting as a source of general 
information, they also contained transfer notices. With such a wide reach, the GROs were a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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useful mechanism for disseminating transfer requests. In October 1915, an MEF GRO requested 
a ‘lithographic draughtsman – preferably with a knowledge of map work’ for GHQ’s Printing 
Section. OCs of units were invited to submit names of any men ‘desirous of and are 
recommended for this employment’.150 A similar request can be found in an EEF GRO from 
September 1916: 
 
Blacksmiths, Wheelers, Coppersmiths, Tinsmiths, Electricians, Springsmiths 
and Vulcanisers are urgently required for transfer to the Mechanical Transport 
Branch of the Army Service Corps. Men who wish to transfer and are 
recommended will be sent… for trade test.151 
 
This continuing ad hoc approach added fuel to the fire in Whitehall, leading to calls for 
the formalisation of the selection process. Dr Christopher Addison, Parliamentary Secretary to 
the Ministry of Munitions, criticised the army’s ad hoc method, noting ‘there appears to be very 
little doubt that the War Office could get all the men they want if they combed the Armies 
thoroughly and systematically; and I think they ought to help themselves before coming down 
on us for men…’152 Concerns that skilled workers were not being used effectively by the army 
was a long-standing issue and one heightened by competition between the War Office and the 
Ministry of Munitions. As Grieves has argued, the ‘most contentious issues which had arisen 
between the two departments were the military requirement for skilled engineers and the release 
of men from the army for civil industries’.153 In July 1916, the two departments came to an 
agreement whereby the munitions industry would make up any deficit that might occur in the 
preliminary military demand for artificers for the army’s technical corps.  
Ongoing negotiations with the trade unions, notably the Amalgamated Society of 
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Engineers [ASE], further compounded competition between the two departments.154 After a 
series of deputations, the government and the ASE reached a formal agreement in November 
1916, which stated that the ‘provision of skilled mechanics for the army will in future be made 
by the Ministry of Munitions’.155 The government agreed not to apply compulsion to skilled 
men, but hoped instead to obtain the required men for service in the technical corps through 
voluntary means. The trade unions agreed to ‘do their utmost to provide the Ministry of 
Munitions with skilled men, who will undertake to serve… either in the Artificers’ Corps of the 
Army or as War Munitions Volunteers’.156 The army was forced to rely on employers and lists 
of skilled men provided by trade unions as they endeavoured to comb out men for the technical 
corps. According to Grieves, only 9,600 men were reallocated to skilled work in the army in 
November and December 1916.157  
Pressure from the ASE, other trade unions, and voices within the army itself suggested 
a process far removed from the systematic one lauded by the US army. In the first years of the 
war, the army relied considerably on informal transfers either by volunteering or through an 
individual’s own personal connections. This was particularly true for individuals who were not 
members of trade unions. Often the expertise of these individuals was discovered through 
interpersonal relationships or direct petitions to higher formations and senior generals. The EEF, 
for example, received a number of requests for skilled personnel. In March 1916, the BSF 
requested from the EEF ‘a wheeler with a knowledge of ships carpentering’ to work on its 
motor boats; while in July of the same year, the EEF received a request from the Western 
Frontier Force asking for ‘2 vulcanisers, 1 MT Fitter and a Private with a knowledge of 
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storekeeping to be sent to the Advanced MT depot’.158 These ad hoc requests were usually dealt 
with by GHQ’s third echelon, which had responsibility for personnel. 
 In a number of cases, individual generals intervened. Cowans, for example, was aware 
that the army needed to identify and utilise men with the appropriate skills for the task in hand. 
He was ‘not hide-bound by any War Office red tape’ and he realised, particularly where supply 
depots were concerned, that ‘they must have men with business, rather than military, 
experience’.159 Although, as we saw earlier, Cowans expressed some reservation over civilian 
expertise, he was still keen to secure ‘men of business’. Writing to General Sir Edward Altham 
(IGC MEF) in November 1915, Cowans mentioned two territorial officers in the MEF who 
would be useful for labour and supply. The first officer, Pearson, was ‘accustomed to dealing 
with large questions in regard to navvies’. According to Cowans, he had ‘managed all kinds of 
arrangements – the organisation of 50,000 men etc – so anything we [the Army] do ought to be 
child’s play’.160 Altham heeded his advice, requesting Pearson to help with labour organisation 
in the MEF. The second officer mentioned by Cowans was Major Vernon Willey, later 2nd 
Baron Barnby, an officer in the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry. Willey had ‘managed a very big 
business in America, and was manager of that Business at 25’, and ‘absolutely wasted as a 
would be soldier’.161 Cowans was keen to impress on senior generals in both the MEF and BSF 
that ‘more than ever I am sure you ought to get business men’. This was underscored by the fact 
that the French army had ‘elbowed us out considerably’ owing to its ‘enormous advantage of 
having civilianly trained specialists to draw on’.162 Cowans went on in stronger terms: 
 
This is exactly what we keep on rubbing into you, as I am sure, when we hear 
of a few exceptions, there must be scores more in the Territorials and Yeomanry 
that are with you, like Pearson, and that man Willey – who would do splendidly 
for the Ordnance Department for the Base Depot at Alexandria, with his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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business training in woollen manufactures, etc. These are the sort of men that 
we want to get hold of, there is no doubt about it...163 
 
Through Cowans and Altham’s efforts, Willey was transferred from the front line to become 
Assistant Director of Equipment and Ordnance, and then Controller of Wool Supplies at the 
War Office. Willey worked alongside other civilian soldiers who had been transferred from the 
front line, including Captain John Bland, a Kitchener army officer and partner of the wool 
company Bland and Moore of Bradford, and Major John Sexty, a territorial officer and partner 
in the currier firm Messrs Sexty Bros of Winchcomb.164  
In addition to individual recommendations from senior generals, some soldiers took it 
upon themselves to offer up their pre-war skills voluntarily. Adrian Hill, one of the official war 
artists, combined his drawing abilities with his work in a sniping and scouting section in the 
Honourable Artillery Company; while W. G. Newton, an officer in the Artists’ Rifles and a 
recently qualified architect, proposed that it was possible to teach a novice how to draw a battle 
landscape after just one hour’s lecture and two days drawing in the field. 165  Newton’s 
commercially published Military Landscape Sketching and Target Indication contained 
pragmatic advice, influenced by his own architectural experience of design principles and 
draughtsmanship. However, this pragmatic, individualised approach masked the reality of a 
failing personnel system. Addison had been right to criticise the War Office’s poor attempts at 
‘combing out’. It was neither thorough nor systematic. By late 1916, both the military and 
industry were suffering severely from its effects. Men were required for work in munitions 
factories and shipyards back in Britain, as well as in the army’s technical branches. These 
effects were also felt in the army’s subsidiary theatres. In a letter to Scott-Moncrieff, Paul !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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remarked that: 
 
… I frequently come across officers and other ranks serving in the infantry, who 
in civil life are engineers, contractors, clerks of works and foremen. In some 
cases they have been lent to us as a temporary measure by arrangement, and we 
have been very glad of their services; they have done excellent work. But 
invariably after a period their commanding officers request their return.166 
 
It was clear that a reorganisation of the army’s personnel machinery was long overdue. 
The formalisation of the personnel process came about in early 1917 with the 
establishment of the Department of Organisation at the War Office under Major-General Sir 
Robert Hutchison. Spearheaded by Robertson, this department was given a freehand to use 
whatever means necessary to ensure that personnel was placed on an even footing. It had a dual 
role in that it had to identify personnel to be transferred back to civilian industries, whilst also 
identifying individuals whose skills were not being put to good use in the army. At first, the 
department’s process appeared to be an extension of the ad hoc years of 1914-1916 with 
carefully worded letters written to commanders, asking that they cooperate by detailing the 
skilled tradesmen serving in their formations. However, it was found that commanders were 
often concealing the true number of tradesmen because they did not want to lose them to 
industry or the technical branches. This required Hutchison and his staff to gather that 
information in an independent way, leading to the establishment of a card index system in 
March 1917. 
 The department’s card index was stored in London and recorded each man’s physical 
location in the army, his civilian profession, who he was employed by, his previous two 
employers, and his home address.167 Whenever a man moved within Britain or overseas, his card 
was moved correspondingly to indicate where he went. This card index system was also trailed 
within each soldier’s Army Book. In March 1917, Army Order 93 demanded that each soldier’s 
‘Industrial Group’ and trade were to be recorded in his Army Book. There were forty-one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recognised industrial groups, including ‘boot and shoe makers’, ‘dock wharf and labourers’, and 
‘commercial and clerical occupations’.168 Much of this raw data, however, relied on accurate 
and timely returns from the various units both at home and abroad. The problem with returns 
was the sheer number. Some formations reported having to complete thirty to forty returns per 
week to different branches.169 This duplication of effort was eventually overhauled, leading to 
the development of a ‘consolidated return’. This return was ‘made as far as possible to give all 
the information that was required by the various branches and departments’.170 The return was 
perforated allowing different branches to tear off the portion that related to their needs. These 
administrative measures were routine in the business world. The use of pre-printed forms, card 
indexes, and vertical filing systems were designed to increase efficiency.171 They allowed for 
the combination of information on a single subject into a single, centralised storage system that 
was organised to suit the needs of those using them. 
 These administrative measures were not limited to the Department of Organisation 
either. As Beach has shown, GHQ was beginning to embrace information technology for 
intelligence analysis, utilising the expertise of the Prudential Assurance Company and its 
Powers Samas tabulating machines to process German casualty data. 172  The ‘science of 
statistics’ was also used to great effect, particularly for supply and transport purposes. Sir 
George Beharrell, a pre-war colleague of Geddes and statistician to the Transportation 
Directorate, emphasised the ‘impossibility of successfully directing large organisations’ if 
statistical information was not forthcoming. Statistics told ‘each responsible officer what he was 
doing, whether he was going back or going forward, and how he compared with his opposite !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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number in other places’.173 Such accurate information led to increased efficiency, particularly at 
the docks, on the railways, and on the inland waterways. This emphasis on efficiency was 
evident in other parts of the army both on and beyond the Western Front. In the EEF, the ASC’s 
Motor Transport branch transferred from a ledger-based accountancy system to a card index 
system in August 1916 for the ‘accurate working of receipts, demands, issues, and stock-
keeping’; while the army’s Labour Directorate, established in 1917 under Colonel Edward 
Wace, utilised principles of statistical forecasting and scientific management to understand 
labour requirements, and measure and improve output.174 
Although the army had developed a system for identifying the professions and numbers 
of its personnel, it also had to ensure that these men were proficient in their stated trade. The 
Trade Test Centre at Woolwich verified this proficiency.175 Orders were issued for skilled men 
of engineering trades, including new recruits and those serving in non-technical units, to be sent 
to Woolwich for practical testing. Specialist liaison officers were attached to the centre for the 
purpose of examining and selecting men suitable for technical work. Each man was tested and 
either passed as skilled or proficient and posted to a branch in which his qualifications could be 
most fully employed. For the military railways, large numbers of men were obtained through 
this measure, amounting to 2,550 in 1917 and 3,805 in 1918.176 If a soldier was rejected as 
unskilled, he was either returned to his unit or posted to a technical branch as a pioneer.177  
Though trade testing provided a useful way of confirming a soldier’s qualification, there 
were some instances where certain skills were not required. These episodes were highly 
contentious with the potential to foment unrest. This was particularly acute in late 1916 at the 
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height of the army’s personnel crisis. A number of MPs expressed consternation that ‘the 
services of a number of men who have passed a trade test and obtained a skilled certificate are 
not utilised at all on skilled work’.178 In response, Henry Forster, Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, outlined his department’s policy towards skilled volunteers: 
 
Men who have passed trade tests are posted to units in which their technical 
skill can be utilised so far as such tradesmen are required in the Army. If the 
number of tradesmen in any particular trade is in excess of the numbers of that 
trade required in the Army the surplus men are utilised in other ways for which 
they may be suited. This does not, of course, mean that there will not be at any 
given moment and in any given unit tradesmen who are not engaged in their 
trade… it is a matter of progressive adjustment.179 
 
The War Office’s policy on this matter was formalised in an Army Council order in August 
1917, which stated that no tradesman who possessed a skill required by a technical corps should 
be allowed to remain in a unit in which his skill was not being utilised.180 However, this did 
little to reduce concern. In early May 1918, one Private Harmer had voluntarily joined the RAF 
as a mechanic. He was ‘given to understand that he would be sent to Liverpool and from there 
to a trade centre to pass a test’. Instead, he was ‘put straight into the Infantry’.181 Harmer’s 
plight was debated in the House of Commons. The MP who raised the matter argued that there 
had been ‘hundreds of similar instances’. In response, James Macpherson, Under Secretary of 
State for War, replied that as Harmer was a ‘turner’, and that there were ‘no requirements for 
men of this trade at the present time’, he was placed in an infantry unit in accordance with his 
medical category.182 It would be easy to use Harmer’s case as a stick with which to beat the 
army’s personnel system. Instead, it suggested that the army was acutely aware of its 
occupational needs. 
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 The army’s operational requirements would remain a constant source of friction 
between the government and trade unions throughout the war. In its November 1916 agreement 
with the ASE, the government pledged that ‘every possible effort’ would be made to transfer 
skilled men to mechanical units.183 However, in September 1917, the ASE highlighted the 
‘serious position’ of skilled men being posted to line regiments, rather than technical branches. 
According to the ASE, the government and the army were reneging on publicly agreed 
assurances. It argued that it could place no confidence in the government, the Ministry of 
Munitions, or the employers themselves.184 Although there were measures in place to mitigate 
this problem, a representative of the War Office referenced ‘circumstances of a special kind’ 
that would prevent a commander from taking a man ‘out of a fighting unit and put[ting] him to 
his trade’.185 The army ‘actively pursued’ the transfer of skilled men, but this was at the whim 
of the ‘prevalent military situation’. 
The eventual establishment of a systematic personnel policy within the army was a 
welcome event. It was necessary and long overdue. However, that is not to say that its initial ad 
hoc approach was a complete fiasco. The establishment of the IWT section on the Western 
Front, for example, owed its existence to a combination of both ad hoc and systematic methods. 
As we have seen, Commander Gerald Holland had highlighted the need for the IWT in late 
1914. Despite initial resistance, the IWT in France was inaugurated in January 1915 under the 
Director of Railways with an establishment of thirty-six officers and 654 ORs.186 As the newly 
appointed Deputy Director IWT, Holland was tasked with recruiting skilled personnel. His first 
appointments were highly personal, including three former Royal Indian Marine officers, and 
fifty marine and administrative personnel from the London and North Western Railway at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 TNA, MUN 5/57/320/16, Agreement between Government and ASE, 20 November 1916. 
184 TNA, MUN 5/57/320/38, Minutes of conference work Amalgamated Society of Engineers on skilled 
men for Army technical units, 11 September 1917, p. 4. 
185 Ibid. 
186 TNA, WO 158/851, History of the Inland Water Transport Directorate, pp. 8-9, 14. By December 
1918, the IWT in France totaled 187 officers and 7469 ORs. 
! 176 
Holyhead.187 Throughout January 1915, Holland interviewed a number of individuals – both 
civilian and military – for employment in the IWT. These men included a civil engineer, a 
railway rolling stock engineer on the Dublin and South East Railway, as well as individuals 
with experience of river and railway transport on the Gold Coast and in Nigeria respectively.188 
Out of the original thirty-six officers, twenty-one were civilians with the rest drawn from a mix 
of infantry, ASC, RE, Royal Indian Marines, and the Officers’ Training Corps.189 For Holland, 
his priority was ensuring the best man for the job irrespective of background. The variety of 
professions that made up the IWT officer corps was mirrored in the trades of the ORs. There 
was an ‘active campaign’ for the enlistment of skilled workers from the Thames and the various 
British sea ports. Among the ORs enlisted were:  
 
… seamen, lightermen and watermen, marine and motor engineers and firemen 
for manning the various types of craft; steel work erectors, divers, masons, 
blacksmiths, carpenters, shipwrights, and the numerous other trades required in 
connection with the construction work on the waterways themselves… 
electricians, telephone linesmen and instrument makers for dealing with the 
electrical and telephone equipment, and clerical staff for the officers at HQ and 
elsewhere.190 
 
As the IWT required men with ‘special qualifications not possessed by the ordinary Royal 
Engineer’, these individuals received the highest rates of engineer pay (2/- a day) instead of the 
rates usually given to an RE recruit.191  
Although Holland continued to direct IWT operations on the Western Front, the 
responsibility for transport requirements at the War Office needed to be streamlined. As a result, 
the Railway Section at the War Office was subdivided into two separate Assistant Directorates 
for Railways and IWT in spring 1916.192 The latter was run by Brigadier-General Albert 
Collard, formerly senior executive engineer on the Baro-Kano Railway (1908-1912) and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Director of Surveys (1912-1914) in Northern Nigeria.193 The Assistant Directorate IWT was 
subsequently expanded into a full directorate under Geddes’ reorganisation. Initially, the 
directorate dealt with the provision of materials and supplies for IWT on the Western Front. 
However, in summer 1916, all non-transport work in Mesopotamia came under the directorate’s 
purview with Egypt, Salonika, and the other theatres following suit from 1917 onwards.194 This 
allowed for the coordination of matériel and personnel across the various operational theatres. 
Mesopotamia benefitted from this coordination and from the War Office’s decision to despatch 
Brigadier-General W. H. Grey to overhaul its river transport in July 1916.195 Grey was a civilian 
who had run a large commercial firm in West Africa before the war. He was granted a 
temporary commission in the RE and directed to advise on the quality of river transport in 
Mesopotamia. Grey put together a talented staff drawn from a variety of professions and trades 
connected with the river services and, by December 1917, the IWT was operating a fleet of 
1,266 vessels.196 His value did not go unnoticed by the army. Recalled for service in Europe in 
May 1917, he played a substantial role as a Deputy DGT, organising the Lines of 
Communication of the British forces sent to Italy. This role led to his subsequent appointment 
as DGT in November 1917 where he worked closely with Brodie Henderson on the latter’s 
transport mission to the Italian front. 
 
The army recognised the importance of civilian expertise to the efficient running of the military 
machine. It was not exclusively a wartime phenomenon, but based on a mutually beneficial, 
cooperative process that had been in existence for over fifty years. However, as Heather Jones 
has argued, ‘the soldier-civilian relationship in warfare had never been so intermeshed as during !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1914-1918 – nor the combatant-civilian distinction so blurred’.197 
 The army’s decision to look beyond its boundaries and learn from non-traditional 
sources suggests an adaptive organisation. The successful use of civilian expertise was, in part, 
due to the continuing importance of personal connections and patronage within the army. As 
Foley has argued, this meant that ‘radical ideas and far-reaching changes would be considered, 
if not always welcomed’.198 Unsurprisingly, there were pockets of resistance to, and suspicion 
of, civilian expertise. This was a natural response to knowledge that came from outside the 
immediate organisation. However, on the whole, civilian advice was positively received and 
was promoted at the highest levels, notably by Cowans, Haig, and Robertson. The process for 
identifying and transferring individuals, however, was far more fraught. Such a process had to 
look to future needs, while attempting to rectify past mistakes. Similar to its process for sharing 
knowledge, the army could not prioritise a wholly bureaucratic or, conversely, a wholly 
personalised process. The eventual establishment of the Department of Organisation – though a 
formal department – typified this approach. The department’s director, Major-General Sir 
Robert Hutchison, summed up its importance, noting that ‘it depends on the personnel branch… 
whether a country is going to be successful in war or unsuccessful. It’s a long, long way the 
most important thing we have in our country’.199 
 The relationship between civil and military professions offers a number of insights into 
the army as an organisation. First, that it was capable of recognising and implementing change, 
despite inevitable pockets of resistance and organisational inertia. Secondly, that its desire to 
seek out civilian expertise, both inside and outside its organisation, highlights its multi-faceted 
learning process. With the wider use of civilian expertise came the adoption of administrative 
innovations, such as card index systems and pre-printed forms. The adoption of such methods 
revealed an organisation that was ready and willing to employ efficiency measures that were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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standard practice in the business world. Finally, that it still valued pragmatic solutions to its 
problems. Despite establishing formal departments and processes, particularly for personnel 
selection, the army still needed to be adaptable. Fighting across different terrain, often with 
insufficient infrastructure, the army required customised solutions to respond to these 
difficulties. The use of civilian expertise played a significant part in the development of these 
solutions.!
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CHAPTER'5 
LEARNING'AND'UNLEARNING'
 
In his history of the 74th Division, Major Charles Dudley Ward recounted the division’s arrival 
on the Western Front in May 1918. He wrote how ‘lectures were given to these “green” troops 
from Palestine on bayonet fighting – any one platoon of the 74th Division had probably made 
more use of the bayonet than any battalion in France’.1 Although the majority of the army’s 
manpower remained on the Western Front, over a third of its formations saw service in another 
theatre.2 The army shared more than just knowledge and matériel between theatres. It also 
shared personnel. The tactical and geographic environments of each theatre varied greatly and 
often necessitated a change in a formation’s physical establishment along with its tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. In addition to these physical changes, formations also had to 
negotiate certain cultural changes. As Chapter 1 suggests, the military is a ‘culture of sub-
cultures’. Although the army promoted a shared, unifying ethos, each expeditionary force and 
its various corps had their own idiosyncrasies and different ways of working. Formations that 
moved between expeditionary forces had to negotiate these peculiarities with the help of a series 
of integration methods.  
 Integration or ‘socialisation’ can be understood as ‘the process by which organisations 
help newcomers learn about their work and adjust to the workplace’.3 Colloquially, it is the 
process of ‘learning the ropes’ or ‘getting up to speed’.4 As well as transferring relevant job 
information, it also requires the relinquishing of pre-existing attitudes, values, and behaviours. 
Although the army was receptive to innovation and change in wartime, adjusting to a new 
expeditionary force was not without its difficulties. According to Liddell Hart’s famous adage, 
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‘the only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is to get an old idea out’.5 
There is some truth to this when considering the integration of formations into a new force. 
However, militaries are significant practitioners of socialisation. Organisations such as the 
British army have preserved their organisational memory and, indeed, their ethos over time 
through the continuous integration of newcomers. This has led to these organisations remaining 
‘the same’ in terms of their identities, even though their strategies, processes, and employees 
have changed.6  
 This chapter examines how the army integrated combat formations into its individual 
expeditionary forces and the methods it used to do this. Through this examination, it also 
reflects on the army’s ethos and asks whether the army bears out its reputation as a flexible 
organisation. To determine its flexibility, the chapter will consider whether the army dictated 
the methods for integration, or whether formations were given the opportunity to determine 
their own way of integrating into a new expeditionary force. In this respect, it engages with 
Foley’s work on horizontal learning, with its consideration of how units learned from one 
another, how they shared knowledge and experience, and the extent to which they developed 
their own individual ways of integrating, rather than simply waiting for top-down instruction.7 
The chapter focuses on the movement of combat formations between active operational theatres 
and will not cover the movement of formations from Britain to the Western Front, which has 
been considered by Peter Simkins and Charles Messenger.8  
 The chapter first considers formations’ initial perceptions of the new theatre and 
includes discussion of any preparation received, such as pre-deployment training. Secondly, it 
examines formations’ encounters with their new expeditionary force, outlining some of the 
initial difficulties and prejudices faced, relating to theatre snobbery, ‘class’, and service history. 
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Thirdly, it outlines the army’s integration methods, including attachments, training schools, 
lectures, and tactical exercises, before briefly identifying individualised, formation-driven 
methods, such as socialising. Fourthly, it considers formations’ adjustment to, and acceptance 
of, the new expeditionary force, using the EEF’s ‘Indianisation’ process as a case study. Finally, 
it considers some of the benefits that formations brought to their new forces.  
 
Writing to his family in April 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Darlington, commander of 
the 1/5th Battalion Manchester Regiment, declared how ‘fearfully pleased’ he was at the 
prospect of his battalion’s ‘show’ at Gallipoli. He was ‘quite glad to go and give them their 
chance’.9  Darlington’s perception of service at Gallipoli was positive. His battalion was 
unblooded and, for Darlington, the ‘thought of scrapping does not spoil my sleep or appetite’. 
For Major Edmund Hody in 1917, the prospect of moving from the Western Front to Italy was a 
welcome one: 
 
 There was not an Officer, NCO or man whose spirits were not rapidly rising as 
the rumour spread… From Flanders to Italy. What a contrast indeed! From a 
country seething slosh and mud, with dark skies and continual dampness, rain 
and depression, to a land of warmth, sunshine, and blue skies.10 
 
 For some individuals, it was the prospect of change that coloured their initial 
perceptions. This was particularly true for those leaving Salonika. Negative perceptions of 
Salonika were common. For Sergeant Charles Jones, an NCO in the 2/15th Battalion London 
Regiment, ‘any change was good’, as there was a ‘general air of futility and neglect about the 
[Salonika] front’.11 Generals shared such views too. In a letter to his wife, Brigadier-General 
Hugh Simpson-Baikie, artillery commander to the 60th Division, wrote ‘I heartily wish we were 
back in France. The town itself [Salonika] is a beastly place… It is an awful nuisance they sent 
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us here from France’.12 Brigadier-General Philip Howell’s own disappointment resulted in him 
taking matters into his own hands, capitalising on his close relationship with Lady Dorothy 
Haig. In early 1916, Howell petitioned her directly over his ‘inactive part’ in Salonika.13 
Howell’s use of this pre-existing social network resulted in Lady Haig passing his letter on to 
Sir Douglas Haig. By coincidence or design, Howell eventually returned to the Western Front in 
May 1916, albeit in a lesser appointment, as GSO1 to the II Corps. 
 To help prepare for service in a new theatre, certain formations undertook pre-
deployment training. However, this was not the case for all expeditionary forces or formations. 
The amount of training received was determined by the formation itself. In some cases, pre-
deployment training involved practising certain tactics, accompanied by the distribution of 
training pamphlets, while for others it was non-existent. For those formations moving from the 
Western Front to one of the subsidiary theatres, there is little evidence to suggest that pre-
deployment training took place. In some cases, this was due to the limited time between 
notification of deployment and embarkation. The 27th Division, for example, had little more 
than two weeks between notification and embarkation for Salonika. It was told on 31 October 
1915 that it was ‘to follow the 26th Div to the East’ and began its embarkation on 17 November 
1915.14 It was therefore obliged to carry out its pre-deployment training on board transport 
ships. Private Charles Carter, a soldier in the 2/15th Battalion London Regiment, noted how, in 
late October 1915, ‘his battalion marched away in the early morning for an unknown 
destination, but everybody knew it was the Somme’.15 However, rather than the Somme, the 
battalion was on its way to Salonika where it arrived on 29 November 1915. Colonel Roderick 
Macleod recalled that ‘we guessed we were going to Italy when we heard that the staff were 
buying Italian dictionaries’.16 The 7th Division, also destined for Italy, received preliminary 
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orders to proceed there on 10 November 1917. The historian of the Honourable Artillery 
Company recalled how ‘an old lady on whom one of the officers was billeted remarked, 
“Seventh Division; Oh, you are for Italy”. This was about the first of the rumours of a possible 
change of front’.17 The division arrived in Genoa on 24 November 1917. The extent of its pre-
deployment training was encapsulated in its divisional conference notes: ‘Do what you can in 
the train. Normal attack formation first opportunity’.18 As a rule, this was not unusual among 
combat formations moving to subsidiary theatres, particularly if they had already spent 
considerable time in France and Flanders. This appears to reinforce the primacy of the Western 
Front and the belief that operations in subsidiary theatres would require little adaptation of 
current tactical methods.  
For combat formations moving to the Western Front from the subsidiary theatres, there 
was evidence of some pre-deployment training. For those formations moving from Gallipoli 
back to the Western Front often via Egypt, these opportunities were patchy and varied between 
formations. During the six months it spent in Egypt, the 11th Division carried out intermittent 
training in field firing, simple tactical exercises, and specialist training in the use of trench 
warfare munitions, such as grenades and Stokes mortars.19 Conversely, despite the focus on the 
expansion and reorganisation of new units, the AIF’s divisions invested considerable time in 
pre-deployment training. In December 1915, Chauvel, then commanding the 1st Australian 
Division, informed his troops that ‘Captain Blackshaw RE has been temporarily attached… to 
lecture on the steps to be taken to meet gas attacks, and to give instruction as to the use and care 
of a new pattern gas helmet’.20 The 1st Australian Division also prioritised the formation and 
training of snipers ‘immediately preceding departure to France’, while the 5th Australian 
Division ordered its brigades to ‘construct a set of instructional trenches in their own training 
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areas’ for progressive training in ‘rear and flank guards; outposts, bayonet fighting; the 
construction of trenches and obstacles’.21 
The situation in the EEF was somewhat different. For those formations sent back to the 
Western Front in 1918, including the 74th Division, 52nd Division, and battalions from the 10th 
and 60th Divisions, the systematic dissemination of Western Front literature had formed the 
bedrock of their training while in Palestine. EEF GHQ regularly issued excerpts from SS 
pamphlets in order to keep formations up to date with the latest Western Front innovations and 
operational experiences. In April 1917, for example, SS126 Training and Employment of 
Bombers was issued to divisions with an accompanying memo requesting that ‘special attention 
[be] paid to the organisation and training of bombers and… ensuring that their duties in defence 
and counter attack are thoroughly understood’.22 This practice was given greater impetus with 
Allenby’s arrival. In September 1917, divisions were provided with extracts from Notes on 
Recent Operations on the front of First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies for ‘application where 
necessary during Training period’.23 Although a minor feature of warfare in Palestine, soldiers 
were also drilled in the latest gas tactics. Writing to GOC Eastern Force, Lynden-Bell advised 
that ‘Courses of Instruction (as laid down in pamphlet SS125) should be arranged’, but they 
‘must not be regarded as an alternative to the Gas Course for Officers and NCOs mentioned in 
Pamphlet SS534’.24 
However, with the recall of these particular formations, pre-deployment training that 
focused on Western Front technology was intensified. The War Office requested that ‘special 
attention be paid to anti-gas training of troops proceeding to France’.25 Officers and men in the 
74th Division were ‘persistently exercised’ in the use of the small box respirator and lectures 
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were ‘given daily’ with a view to preparing the formation for operations on the Western Front.26 
One soldier in the 52nd Division recalled being ‘regularly supplied in the East with all the 
military publications, including books of plans of beautiful trenches’ in preparation of the 
division’s move to the Western Front.27 Although this training did little to lessen suspicion 
around their combat effectiveness and ability, it did serve to prepare them for operations on the 
Western Front. As Christopher Forrest argues, the principles of effective employment did not 
alter from one theatre to another. In the case of the 52nd Division, much of the training it 
carried out upon its arrival on the Western Front was based upon the same principles that guided 
its training in Palestine.28 Pre-deployment training and pamphlets could provide some idea of 
the type of warfare expected in a new expeditionary force. However, as we shall see in the next 
section, encounters with a new force were marked by difficulties and prejudice.  
 
For those formations moving from the subsidiary theatres to the Western Front, it was the 
change in scale that was most remarkable. On his return from Salonika to France, for example, 
Howell wrote that ‘it’s dull being a person of no importance and with no responsibility after 
months of running a show with absolute powers’.29 He also bemoaned the II Corps’ ‘very green’ 
divisions and wished ‘we had our Salonica ones here – they’re miles ahead of any of these’.30 
Captain Noel Drury remarked that service in a theatre like Palestine or Salonika gave 
individuals and formations a ‘chance to work out your own little show’.31 However, this was not 
the case on the Western Front. This echoed the sentiments of both the 29th and 42nd Divisions. 
Though a regular division, the 29th Division ‘would not be the cynosure of every eye, “the 
backbone” of any enterprise’. Instead, it would be ‘a novice among old hands’.32 The 42nd 
Division thought itself ‘a new boy at a strange school’. Although it had ‘learnt much in the old !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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school and the experience would be useful’, it still had much to learn and, perhaps most 
tellingly, much to unlearn.33 Following his battalion’s move from Palestine to the Western Front 
in 1918, Jones noted that, although his battalion took ‘about ten minutes to settle down to life in 
France’, the ‘general atmosphere was very different from that of the Palestine front. The air of 
cheerful confidence to which we were accustomed, the feeling that everyone was on the same 
side… was not found in France’.34 
 The reality of service in a new theatre was often accompanied by anxiety and prejudice. 
This was particularly the case for formations that were serving in the subsidiary theatres, or 
moving to the Western Front. The primacy of the Western Front loomed large, encouraging 
theatre snobbery. Chauvel, for example, recalled that: 
 
… unfortunately neither the Australian government or the Australian people 
seem to take the slightest interest in my command! They can’t even send me a 
congratulating telegram without discounting its value by bringing in something 
about the Australians in France!35 
 
Perhaps, for families and the press back home, the view of these subsidiary theatres was 
coloured by romantic and exotic ideals. They were places of relative safety when compared with 
the high tempo, mechanised warfare found on the Western Front. Echoing Chauvel’s remarks 
above, Jean Bou has argued that ‘invidious comparisons’ of Australians fighting in Palestine 
with those on the Western Front were ‘apparently part of the light-horsemen’s experience’.36 
Recounting his service in Palestine, Ion Idriess recalled how one Australian Light Horseman: 
 
 … got a parcel addressed to “a lonely soldier”. Enclosed was a note from the 
lady expressing the pious wish that a brave soldier in France should get the 
parcel and not some cold-footed squib in Egypt. The chap who received the 
parcel sent the lady some photos of our desert graves, with compliments from a 
cold-footed squib in Egypt.37 
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Such views were not limited to Palestine. Jones, for example, recalled a rumour that a song 
entitled ‘If you don’t want to fight go to Salonica’ was increasingly popular in the music dance 
halls back in England. Although he found the rumour difficult to take seriously, he expressed 
consternation that ‘people in England were getting restive because while men were dying in 
France, not enough were dying in Macedonia’.38 This perception was reinforced by high 
manpower wastage as a result of malaria and dysentery, along with the slow tempo of 
operations. Jones also mused that ‘there was an unsatisfactory feeling about the Salonica front. 
There was apparently no hope of any successful advance and one stood an excellent chance of 
getting killed quite uselessly, on some futile errand without hope of result’. 39 
 In addition to certain prejudices emanating from the home front, formations also had to 
negotiate both higher command and neighbouring formations’ perceptions of their ‘class’ 
(regular, territorial, Kitchener army, or Indian army), or previous service. Despite being a 
regular army formation, the 7th Division experienced negative perceptions of its ability from 
Italian troops. Lance-Corporal D. G. Dobney recalled that the ‘first time British troops went into 
the Italian trenches a funny coincidence came about’. As a result of the 7th Division’s recent 
arrival and unfamiliarity with the theatre, the Italian troops who held the position ‘did not want 
to leave, thinking we should not be able to manage’.40 On rare occasions, initial perceptions 
could be positive. Major Lionel Collins, an officer in the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles, recalled a 
conversation with an Australian soldier who had been through the initial landings at Gallipoli. 
The Australian remarked that ‘“There are only 3 kinds of men who are any use out here. The 
Australians, New Zealanders and Gurkhas. As for Kitchener’s Army, they know as much about 
fighting as a goose about God”’.41  
 Although, as Edward Erickson has argued, the ‘class barriers’ between formations 
broke down as the war progressed, a distinct prejudice remained against Kitchener army !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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divisions, particularly during the early years of the war.42 Darlington expressed reservations 
over the attachment of Kitchener army officers to his battalion, writing ‘I hope these K’s lot are 
good. They look pretty mixed’.43 Recalling the experience of the August offensive at Gallipoli, 
Beauvoir De Lisle commented unfavourably on the performance of the 10th Division, along 
with that of the territorial 53rd and 54th Divisions. He noted that ‘none of these, nor their 
commanders, had had any previous experience of modern warfare, and to this, and this only, can 
I attribute their failure’.44 In a letter to Kitchener, Hamilton was less damning of the Kitchener 
army officers. He wrote how they were ‘perfectly splendid’, but they had suffered ‘without any 
regulars to stiffen them’.45 
These ‘class barriers’ were still in place by 1917, particularly in the subsidiary theatres. 
Upon hearing of the 10th Division’s move to Palestine in August 1917, Lynden-Bell wrote to 
Major-General Frederick Maurice to say that he was ‘glad to see that there are three regular 
battalions in it’.46 This was, in large part, due to the perception that formations arriving from 
Salonika had ‘little fighting experience’ and the belief, in some quarters, that their fighting 
value was ‘greatly reduced’ as a result.47 Brigadier-General Arthur Clarke, a former officer in 
the 54th Division, recalled how his division was ‘kept in the line so long as General Allenby 
insisted that… those from Salonica were in need of intensive training in open warfare. His view 
was that the old divisions did not need any special training’.48 The need for this ‘intensive 
training’ was unsurprising as formations serving in Salonika were expected to prepare for ‘both 
of the two most probable types of warfare (a) offensive operations in Macedonia and (b) return !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to trench work in France’.49 As a result, formations were actively encouraged to include 
‘instruction methods to be employed in trench warfare’ in their weekly training programmes.50 
 In addition to its ‘class’, a formation’s previous service and operational experience also 
came under considerable scrutiny, particularly for formations moving to the Western Front. This 
snobbery was expressed at the very highest levels of the army. Writing to his wife in July 1916, 
Haig commented on the poor performance of Hunter-Weston’s VIII Corps, noting that ‘the 
majority of his officers are amateurs in hard fighting and some think they know much more than 
they do of this kind of warfare, simply, because they had been at Gallipoli’.51 This snobbery 
resulted in a marked preference for commanders with experience of France and Flanders. At 
Gallipoli, for example, Hamilton was desirous of officers with Western Front experience – men 
like Simpson-Baikie. In a letter to Wolfe Murray in April 1915, Hamilton wrote: 
 
I think you were in the room when Lord K[itchener] said I was to have 
Simpson-Baikie, a very thoughtful capable officer with recent French 
experience as Artillery Commander. Lord K said he was far too good for liaison 
officer which was what he was doing at the moment… I, as you know, have got 
Fuller... he has not that recent knowledge of artillery work in France which I 
should have thought quite indispensable to a newly constituted force such as 
this.52 
 
Although Hamilton secured Simpson-Baikie for the 29th Division, he was not always so 
fortunate in his requests for officers with ‘French experience’. Writing to Kitchener in June 
1915, Hamilton requested a new corps commander. The two men he suggested were Byng and 
Rawlinson, as ‘both possess the requisite qualities and seniority; the latter does not seem very 
happy where he is, and the former would have more scope than a Cavalry Corps can give him in 
France’.53 Though Byng eventually commanded a corps in the MEF, Kitchener initially declined 
Hamilton’s request. He felt that Sir John French could not spare the services of these two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 TNA, WO 95/4756, BSF GHQ War Diary, Howell to GOCs XII and XVI Corps, 26 February 1916. 
Original emphasis. 
50 Ibid., Gillman to GOCs XII and XVI Corps, 6 July 1916.  
51 TNA, WO 256/10, Haig Diaries, 29 June 1916. 
52 LHCMA, Hamilton Papers, 7/1/11, Hamilton to Wolfe Murray, 7 April 1915. 
53 LHCMA, Hamilton Papers, 7/2/4, Hamilton to Kitchener, 15 June 1915. 
! 191 
generals. This was not unusual. In a letter to Hunter-Weston, Beauvoir De Lisle expressed 
frustration at not being able to find a suitable officer locally to appoint to GSO3 in the 29th 
Division. For Beauvoir De Lisle, his preferred action would be to transfer a proven staff officer 
from the BEF. He had even gone to the effort of compiling a list of favoured officers: 
 
 … I send you the following names in order of merit: 
 
1. Capt H. Tomkinson, Royal Dragoons, Provost Marshall 1st Cav Div BEF 
2. Capt C. Heydeman, 2 Dragoon Guards (Speaks French like a Frenchman also 
German) 1st Cav Bde BEF 
3. Capt R. Benson, 9th Lancers, 2nd Cav Bde, BEF. Now in England wounded. 
4. Capt Bullock-Marsham, 19th Hussars, Staff Captain, 9th Cav Bde BEF.54 
  
Unfortunately, Captain Stephen Pollen, Hamilton’s military secretary, wrote that ‘it is little use 
applying for anyone now actually employed in France’.55 
 These dismissive attitudes continued throughout the war. Arriving in France in April 
1918, an officer in the 52nd Division later wrote that ‘the authorities in France, I imagine, were 
wholly confident that troops coming from Palestine were bound to be deficient in the most 
elementary military knowledge’.56 Albert Phillips, an NCO in the 74th Division, recalled how 
his division had ‘more experience of hand to hand fighting than those who had only seen service 
on the Western Front’, but they were ‘constantly reminded that they were not in the “real war” 
and their achievements in Palestine belittled’.57 In 1918, Jones bitterly recalled his battalion’s 
first encounter with a Western Front ‘brass-hat’ during a training exercise in which his battalion 
was to ‘advance across a piece of open country’. He wrote how ‘we took a certain pride in the 
job; we thought we could show these trench-bound soldiers a thing or two…’58 However, the 
general’s response was far from complimentary: 
 
“What the hell do you mean by lining up like this? Where are your sections? 
What's the sergeant think he’s doing in the rear?” And so it flowed on, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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would-be strong language that seemed mild to us, while we “looked at each 
other with a wild surmise”… We marched home with an uneasy feeling that the 
powers that be, although they now wished the troops trained in open-order 
warfare, had forgotten the elements of it themselves… Our new commanders 
did not find our methods to their taste; in fact they probably considered us 
inefficient. It is not surprising that the feeling was reciprocated.59 
 
Despite the dissemination of Western Front methods in the subsidiary theatres, the 
perceived primacy of that theatre permeated all levels of the army.60 Formations had to prove to 
new higher commanders and neighbouring formations that they had the ability to conduct 
operations. Invariably, this prejudice led to frustration and resentment. Soldiers’ accounts reveal 
anxiety over perceptions of their previous experience. In some cases, there was a palpable 
hardening towards a new theatre of operations, which resulted in certain formations believing 
that they had to prove they were better than those who had been in theatre longer. Drury wrote 
how his battalion was glad to serve on the Western Front, as ‘everyone tells us we have seen no 
proper fighting up to this… Well, that’s as may be, but I bet our hardy lads will give a good 
account of themselves, and… will be called on when someone wants to be helped out of a 
mess’.61 Even after three months on the Western Front, Drury’s attitude towards operations in 
France was still couched in terms of his experience in Palestine. During the Pursuit to the Selle 
in October 1918, he recalled how ‘this most leisurely battle would not have suited Allenby if he 
were here. The Bosch are given plenty of time to clear off and take all their gear with them’.62 
Drury continued with an air of exasperation when comparing his battalion’s tactics to those of 
neighbouring battalions in the 66th Division: 
 
It seems we have been getting too far out in front of the general line, as the 
other troops don’t know anything about a running battle and they feel lost if 
they get the least gap between sections and platoons. Our men on the other hand 
are quite happy with a hundred yards between sections of machine guns and 
give each other cross fire along their front to help them forward, as a matter of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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course.63 
 
 For Drury, his battalion’s experience of open warfare stood it in good stead for 
operations on the now-mobile Western Front. Drury’s was a common complaint. His 
description of the Pursuit to the Selle also implied that this previous experience trumped that of 
long serving Western Front formations. As the sociologist Meryl Louis has suggested, when 
experiences of ‘old roles’ are recalled, contrasts are naturally generated.64 The newcomer, for 
example, may evaluate aspects of the new role using old role experiences as ‘anchors’. 
Newcomers might also resist their new role in favour of the old. In an account of his battalion’s 
operations near Messines in late 1918, for example, Jones recalled how ‘the formation in 
fashion at the moment demanded one section out in front as a screen’. However, as a result of 
his battalion’s previous experience of semi-mobile operations, it was decided to dispense with 
the screen as ‘it served no useful purpose’.65 The experience of contrast and change is a natural 
phase in the process of ‘leavetaking’ from an old role and adjusting to a new one. Jones’ 
account provides a useful example of how memories of the experience of an old role were 
carried into the new.66 As the next section reveals, both the army and individual formations 
employed a series of integration methods to aid the leavetaking process. 
 
Integration and the concept of ‘acclimatising’ were familiar to the army of the time. Generally 
speaking, this acclimatising period allowed soldiers to adjust to changes in temperature and 
terrain. Drury recalled his battalion’s arrival in Egypt and described how ‘the arrangement is 
that we stay here acclimatising for a short while and get the men accustomed to marching in the 
sand…’67 Similarly, Jones recounted his battalion’s acclimatisation in Egypt where he ‘learned 
what heat meant’. His battalion soon improved and ‘learned much in the art of keeping cool !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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from the experience of our forerunners’.68 However, there was more to acclimatising than 
adjusting to changes in temperature and terrain. The army and its formations employed a series 
of methods to integrate newcomers as quickly as possible. Similar to the methods used by the 
army to share knowledge, these included attachments, high level courses of instruction, unit 
training, tactical exercises such as raiding, and lectures and demonstrations. This holistic 
approach to integration ensured that formations were exposed to both the organisational and 
tactical mores of their new force.   
 The most appropriate methods for acclimatising formations were subject to discussion. 
Although there were similarities in practice, there was no standardised approach to 
acclimatisation across all theatres. For example, the lack of large scale offensive operations in 
Salonika often gave formations considerable time to adjust to the new conditions.69 This 
included ‘practising mountain warfare’, along with the construction of defences and roads.70 In 
rare cases, some combat formations, such as the 11th Division at Gallipoli, were committed to 
operations with little opportunity to acclimatise to the new tactical and geographic conditions.71 
Each force had its own way of doing things and, in some cases, so did each formation within 
that force. Writing to Chetwode in May 1917, Lynden-Bell instructed him on EEF GHQ’s 
preference for acclimatising new units. In contrast to Chetwode’s belief that ‘young and untried 
troops’ should be trained ‘in the field with more experienced troops’, GHQ believed that 
‘theoretical training’ was paramount in the first instance.72 Such training was to be carried out in 
units’ own brigades prior to their attachment to front line formations. Localised training also 
allowed formations a ‘sufficient period of acclimatisation to ensure their physical fitness to bear 
the strain of operations…’73 GHQ was only willing to countenance the attachment of new units 
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to front line formations for training once their theoretical training was ‘sufficiently advanced’, 
and they were medically fit. For the EEF, the actual method of these attachments was highly 
prescriptive. Lynden-Bell advised Chetwode that ‘the Commander-in-Chief is extremely 
anxious that the procedure adopted in France… should be most closely adhered to’. This 
process required: 
 
… individual men, and subsequently sections, platoons, companies, and finally 
battalions, [to] undergo, in turn, periods of progressive attachment to 
corresponding units of the formation to which they are affiliated for 
instruction… on no account should a new unit be allowed to take over a section 
of the line independently until its fitness to do so has been thoroughly 
assured…74 
 
However, as Chetwode intimated, the use of attachments offered a unique benefit to new 
formations, as it allowed them to adjust quickly to a new theatre through the assimilation of 
practical hints and tips. The majority of these attachments were governed by higher formations, 
such as corps and GHQ, yet there were opportunities for localised attachments, organised by 
divisions themselves and individual unit commanders.75  
The use of attachments was widespread across all theatres and took place throughout 
the war. Though promoted by higher headquarters, such as Chetwode’s XX Corps, it was in 
most cases a common sense adoption of a tried and tested method. Brigades of the 13th 
Division, for example, were ‘attached to the 29th Division to learn trench duties’ when they 
arrived at Gallipoli. Hunter-Weston was under ‘strict order’ from Hamilton to ‘wrap them [13th 
Division] up in cotton wool for the present and not make use of them for attacks in the 
meantime’.76 As part of this general scheme of attachment, Beauvoir De Lisle ‘lectured to the 
battalion commanders’ of the 13th Division to help them ‘learn their business a little’.77 A 
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similar example can also be found in the experience of the 54th Division following its arrival at 
Gallipoli. Throughout September 1915, arrangements were made for ‘parties of 300 and 350 
New Zealanders and Australians to be exchanged’ for a corresponding number of men in the 
161st and 162nd Brigades.78 The purpose of this exchange was ‘to accustom the men of the 54th 
Division to their new surroundings, and to enable them to pick up hints from, and profit by, the 
experience gained by the troops, who were used to trench warfare’.79 To support this exchange, 
the 54th Division’s staff circulated a number of pamphlets and memoranda that had been issued 
by the ANZAC with the order that ‘the instructions therein contained should be made known to 
all the troops’.80  
Arriving in Palestine in July 1917, the 180th Brigade ensured that each of its battalions 
sent two officers to spend forty-eight hours with the 52nd Division ‘until all senior officers had 
visited the trenches’.81 Similarly, five officers from each battalion spent time visiting the 54th 
Division’s front in the coastal sector.82 In line with the EEF’s Western Front-inspired practice, it 
was common for whole companies to be attached to long serving formations in order to ‘learn 
the ropes’. This was the case with companies of the 5th Battalion Devonshire Regiment, part of 
the newly formed 75th Division, who were attached to battalions of the 54th Division for 
‘instruction in trench duties’ in July 1917.83 The practice was also evident in the last year of the 
war, particularly for formations arriving on the Western Front. The 74th Division, for example, 
used attachments to familiarise its officers with conditions in the front line. These officers, 
including battalion and company commanders, along with Lewis gun and trench mortar officers, 
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were attached to the New Zealand Division.84 By drawing on the experience of established 
divisions, new formations could begin to adjust their existing procedures to suit their new 
environment. 
Along with attachments, formations could also access formal training at schools of 
instruction at Army and corps levels. This formal training complemented the ‘on the job’ nature 
of attachments. It also provided a general foundation upon which formations could then develop 
their own local responses through ‘theoretical training’ at unit level. Upon arrival in a new 
theatre, it was standard practice for formations to ensure that a cadre of officers and NCOs was 
despatched to Army and corps schools for courses of instruction. This exposed formations to 
new and existing developments in theatre. Following its arrival in Egypt from Gallipoli, the 
54th Division spent much of February and March 1916 sending officers and NCOs for 
instruction in bombing, transport duties, and lectures on cooperation between aircraft and 
artillery at Zeitoun and Ismailia.85 These officers and NCOs could then disseminate these new 
methods through cascade training at unit level. These schools were dynamic establishments. 
They constantly adapted their syllabi in response to suggestions from the front line and up to 
date doctrine from the Western Front and other theatres. Instructional staff at the Imperial 
School of Instruction were often sent for ‘short periods of attachment’ to maintain close touch 
with units in the field and to study conditions in the front line.86 These measures ensured that 
the schools were responsive to the operational requirements of units and, therefore, able to 
provide up to date instruction. 
 High level instruction from Army and corps was complemented by individual and 
collective training at unit level. Although this training was ‘assisted, controlled and supervised’ 
by higher formations, it was carried out under the ‘personal guidance’ of the divisional 
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commander and his subordinates.87 The nature and extent of unit training largely depended on 
the tempo and operational demands in theatre. Following its time at Gallipoli and fully 
expecting to return to the Western Front, the 54th Division’s unit training in Egypt focused on 
trench construction, bombing, and musketry.88 For formations arriving on the Italian front, for 
example, there was a requirement to conduct training in hill, mountain, and open warfare.89 This 
represented an entirely different type of training from that conducted on the Western Front. The 
initial training of the 23rd Division in the Montello sector was to ‘fit all ranks for open warfare 
and fighting in the lower foothills’, along with the training of Lewis gunners in ‘judging 
distance with a view to their employment in open warfare’.90 The latter point, in particular, was 
an aspect that had been neglected owing to the flat nature of the ground on the Western Front.91 
 Formation training was also supplemented by the use of lectures and demonstrations. 
Although they were organised by individual formations, their use was widespread, offering a 
collective approach to acclimatising. Prior to joining the 11th Battalion Cheshire Regiment in 
August 1916, Major the Honourable Walter Guinness spent time at one of the base depots in 
Rouen, ‘attending lectures and getting the latest instruction as to gas, etc., which was of course 
entirely new to me after my Egyptian experience’. As a field officer, Guinness was not required 
to attend these lectures, but he ‘arranged with the Commandant to do so while I am here as a 
good many things… have been considerably improved since my experience at Anzac’.92  
The 11th Division also made use of lectures to educate its troops in the latest Western 
Front tactics. As part of its initial training syllabus, the 11th Division invited an officer from the 
21st Division to deliver a lecture on the battle of the Somme in an attempt to learn the lessons 
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from that campaign.93 Third Army’s chemical advisor was also invited to give ‘a demonstration 
with a captured German Flammenwerfer Machine’ to men of the 33rd and 34th Brigades.94 The 
11th Division utilised the expertise and knowledge of established formations and individuals to 
enable its troops to start adjusting to the experience of trench warfare. This offered a way of 
‘hot housing’ formations, particularly those who had recently transferred to the Western Front. 
Both the 42nd and 2nd Australian Divisions arranged something similar. The former organised 
for RFC officers to lecture on contact aeroplane work, and interpretation of air photos, while the 
latter ensured that each of its brigades witnessed ‘experiments with liquid fire’.95 
Due to the limited use of gas, ‘liquid fire’, and tank cooperation in the subsidiary 
theatres, there was greater need to expose formations to these aspects of warfare when they 
arrived in France. As mentioned previously, both the 52nd and 74th Divisions were instructed in 
the ‘unique aspects’ of anti-gas training before, and upon, their arrival in 1918. 96  A 
commentator in the 14th Battalion Royal Highlanders recalled how the unit spent ‘ten days, 
being fitted out with gas helmets, and passed through gas, a form of warfare of which we had 
had no practical experience out East…’97 Units from the 74th Division were also instructed in 
cooperation with tanks – a weapon that had very limited use in the desert conditions of 
Palestine.98 This instruction involved demonstrations, lectures, and individual battalion and 
brigade all-arms ‘tactical exercises’, involving both tanks and contact aeroplanes. 99  The 
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division’s formations were also lectured on the training of platoons for open warfare, along with 
the practice of trench raiding, by officers from the XI Corps and the 1st Australian Division.100 
 Once formations had reached a certain level of proficiency through demonstrations, 
theoretical training, and attachments, they were expected to carry out tactical exercises in the 
form of raiding and patrolling. Raiding was an exercise that elicited conflicting opinions. For 
some, it was a ‘foul, mean, bloody, murderous orgy’, but for others it was a means of trialling 
different tactics.101 Mark Connelly argues that raiding was often ‘the only way to test and 
sharpen infantry skills short of major offensive action’.102 In a letter to Birdwood, Hamilton 
noted how Beauvoir De Lisle believed ‘there is nothing like these small aggressive operations 
for keeping up the pecker of the troops’.103  Birdwood himself also believed raids to be 
‘excellent training for all’.104 Raiding allowed battalions to engage in ‘some activity to gain as 
much information about the enemy and familiarize its own troops with the ground’.105 It also 
offered a way of ‘“climatizing”… troops with the environment in which they were going to 
conduct the operation’.106 After arriving at Salonika in mid-December 1916, the 60th Division’s 
battalions were heavily engaged in patrols and raids from February 1917 onwards. Despite the 
slow operational tempo in Salonika, the 60th Division was able to maintain its esprit de corps, 
and ensure it was ready for offensive operations, by continual raiding. As the months passed, its 
raiding practices became more complex, sometimes involving up to three battalions at a time.107 
Upon its arrival in Palestine in July 1917, the 60th Division continued with patrolling as a form 
of training, including ‘patrol work by day and night’, along with ‘outpost work’ and specialist 
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training.108 The 74th Division utilised a similar approach during its early months on the Western 
Front. Small scale raids were conducted at first, usually consisting of one officer and a handful 
of ORs.109 In the following months, these increased in scale and intensity, involving artillery 
and machine gun barrages. 
 These methods, though developed at higher levels, were often dictated and determined 
by the formations themselves. There was commonality of method across the different theatres, 
but corps and divisions were expected to determine the type and duration of each based on their 
own situation. These institutional methods were also supported by informal, individualised 
efforts by formations themselves. Commanders made efforts to self-integrate their formations 
using their own initiative. Darlington, for example, wrote to his wife in June 1915 about Major 
Hutchinson, a regular officer, who ‘was all through the landing here and attached to us’. 
Darlington’s first action when arriving at Gallipoli was to apply for someone – in this case 
Hutchinson - to ‘be attached to give us the tips about trench warfare’.110  
 Sometimes these informal methods took the form of friendly conversations between 
individuals. Newly arrived at Gallipoli, Colonel Frederick Morrison recalled how an officer in 
the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers was ‘good enough to let us have a perusal of his Trench 
Standing Orders’. These standing orders were soon referred to as ‘Napoleon’s Maxims’, 
proving invaluable as ‘a record of practical experience in trench routine’.111 Similarly, Drury 
spent ‘a good while’ talking to both the colonel and the adjutant of the 1/4th Battalion Wiltshire 
Regiment who had recently arrived in Palestine from India, forming part of the 75th Division. 
Drury recalled:  
 
… explaining about the new organisation of which he [the colonel] had heard 
nothing, and telling him how we allot transport loads and arrange loading 
parties etc. When it came to the subject of baggage, I had to laugh… He didn’t 
seem to grasp that the bit of stuff piled at our Quarter Guard was our “all” and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 TNA, WO 95/4667, 179th Brigade War Diary, Programme of Training, 5-18 August 1917. 
109 TNA, WO 95/3148, 74th Division GS War Diary, 19-27 July 1918; TNA, WO 95/3153/1, 230th 
Brigade War Diary, 21 July 1918; TNA, WO 95/3154, 231st Brigade War Diary, 16-18 July 1918. 
110 LHCMA, Darlington Papers, 1/1, 22 June 1915, pp. 55-56. 
111 Morrison, Highland Light Infantry, p. 15. 
! 202 
asked what on earth he was going to do with all his stuff, and how he could do 
without this and that and the other.112 
 
Drury’s unit was camped next to this new battalion in September 1917, thus providing an ideal 
environment for the informal sharing of experience and information.  
 Individualised methods proved to be vital for those formations moving to theatres that 
lacked existing acclimatising infrastructure, such as the Italian front. Sent over to Italy in 
November 1917, the IEF was expected to establish its own integration processes. As a result, 
British units were attached to Italian formations in order to acclimatise to the very different 
conditions found in the mountains and plains of Italy. The 23rd Division, for example, sent 
‘parties of 1 officer and 40 OR’ from two of its brigades ‘to be attached to Italian units’.113 This 
attachment served two purposes; first, the XIV Corps (in which the 23rd Division served) was 
due to relieve the I Italian Corps at Montello and was, therefore, standard practice when 
conducting a relief; and secondly, as the 23rd Division was new to the area, it gave it the 
opportunity to familiarise itself with the line to be held. To ensure that the relief went smoothly, 
the 70th Italian Division left one officer and two NCOs at each unit headquarter for twenty-four 
hours after relief.114  
 This attachment scheme was an effective way of ensuring British divisions acclimatised 
to the new theatre as quickly as possible. However, it was not long before British formations 
were able to challenge and, in some cases, influence Italian methods. Following the relief of the 
I Italian Corps, the 23rd Division, for ‘greater convenience’, adopted the Italian defence plan, 
but it soon began to ‘reorganise the defence in accordance with the principles… adopted in 
France’.115 Drawing on his previous experience, Macleod also challenged the Italian defence 
systems. After a series of reconnaissances with his colonel, Macleod deemed the Italian system 
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to be ‘not altogether sound’. As the Italian trench system ran along the crests of the hills, there 
was considerable dead ground in which ‘the enemy could form up unseen in the valley, move 
up, and then rush the trenches in a short assault giving the defence no chance’.116 It is 
unsurprising then that a number of British formations in Italy began to revert back to the 
defensive systems utilised on the Western Front, thus reaffirming the primacy of Western Front 
methods in other theatres.117 
 
As we have seen, the intensive institutional and individual methods experienced by newly 
arrived formations brought them into contact with neighbouring formations and the existing 
training infrastructure, allowing them to experience new geographic and tactical conditions in a 
controlled way. This following section suggests that these methods were a necessary precursor 
to a formation’s understanding of its new role and its adjustment to the values and norms of the 
new expeditionary force. For formations, their own acceptance of the new force, along with the 
acceptance (and eventual commendation) by higher commanders and long serving formations, 
denotes a successful transition. Similarly, positive operational performance may also provide 
evidence of successful integration. If a formation is not successfully integrated then it is 
reasonable to suggest that its operational performance will suffer.  
Success in operations provided a good way of challenging initial perceptions of a 
formation’s ability and effectiveness. Despite its inauspicious performance at Suvla in August 
1915, the 53rd Division performed well during the First Battle of Gaza with its capture of Ali 
Muntar on 26 March 1917. It had ‘reached a high standard of training’, and its troops ‘were 
thoroughly fit and acclimatized’. For the Australian Light Horsemen watching on, they 
‘witnessed a good example of British infantry tradition’.118 Despite the overall failure of First 
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Gaza, Murray singled out the 53rd Division in his April 1917 despatch, expressing delight at the 
division’s ‘enterprise, endurance, skill and leading’.119 
Marred by its service in Salonika and its limited operational experience, the 60th 
Division was seen by some as a ‘lesser’ infantry division. 120  However, its successful 
performance during the battle of Jerusalem in November 1917 enabled it to overcome this initial 
prejudice. In a private letter to Shea, Allenby noted that ‘the fighting and marching of your 
Division has been beyond praise. The Turk has been out manoeuvred and out-fought…’121 For 
Shea, the division’s successful performance was, in part, due to the ‘value of previous training’, 
which was ‘thoroughly exemplified in getting the men to move quickly in small columns across 
broken ground, and wide extensions in open country’.122 
Similarly, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking highly praised the 74th Division in 
August 1918, despite initial scepticism after its arrival on the Western Front.123 In September 
1918, it also received Rawlinson’s praise. In his commendation, Rawlinson noted that the work 
of the division is ‘worthy of the best traditions of the yeomen stock of Great Britain’. The 
division was ‘brought to this country from a hot climate, where they took part in a very different 
method of warfare… it has quickly adapted itself to the altered conditions, and has fought with 
a determination and courage which is beyond praise’.124 The 74th Division’s performance on the 
Western Front also drew praise from neighbouring formations. Upon seeing the ‘broken spur’ at 
Faustine Quarry in September 1918, an Australian officer asked if it was the badge of the 74th 
Division: ‘“Well”, he added, “we call you ‘Allenby’s harriers’, because you’re the only division 
we can’t keep up with”. Coming from an Australian that was “some” praise’.125 
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example of socialisation and operational performance. 126  Although the German spring 
offensives on the Western Front in 1918 did not begin the process of ‘Indianisation’, they did 
alter the rate at which it was enacted.127 Allenby was forced to supply the BEF with infantry 
units to such an extent that he was left with only one trained ‘all white’ infantry division.128 The 
rotation of Indian army soldiers into Palestine began in earnest in April 1918 when the 3rd 
(Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions arrived from Mesopotamia. Later battalions arrived from 
France and India itself. By the summer of 1918, six of seven infantry divisions, and two of four 
cavalry or mounted divisions in the EEF, were essentially ‘Indian army’ formations.129  
As James Kitchen argues, the ‘Indianisation’ of the EEF did not take place in a cultural 
military vacuum. The army had previous experience organising and running imperial armies.130 
The EEF itself had mixed British and Indian formations to create the 75th Division in May 
1917.131 However, given the increased scale of this process, greater thought and preparation was 
required to integrate these new Indian formations. ‘Indianisation’ represented institutional 
socialisation in microcosm. In line with GHQ and corps instruction, Indianised divisions 
arranged for the systematic training and attachment of Indian officers and NCOs to 
neighbouring formations. The 60th Division, for example, operated a structured programme of 
attachment, arranging for ‘1 staff officer, 4 regimental officers and 1 machine gun officer’ to be 
attached to units of the 53rd Division, while ‘two parties of 10 Indian NCOs’ from the 7th 
Indian Brigade were attached to the 10th Division for two days. 132  Following localised 
attachments, a party of ‘2 British officers, 4 Indian officers and 8 Indian NCOs’ proceeded to 
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the XX Corps front for ‘four days instruction in the line’.133 The 53rd Division conducted a 
similar programme, sending platoons and companies of the 4/11th Gurkha Rifles and the 
3/153rd Indian Infantry to front line formations for instruction.134 Lectures and demonstrations 
were also used to great effect. In early August 1918, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel Clive 
Garsia, GSO1 to the 53rd Division, lectured on elementary topics such as ‘Issue of Orders’, 
‘The Use of the Lewis Gun’, ‘Cooperation with MGs’, and ‘Night Patrols’.135  
Although corps and division often dictated attachments, the problem of language and 
unfamiliarity with the workings of Indian formations required a certain degree of top-down 
involvement. EEF GHQ requested plans from its three corps for the ‘provision and training of 
officers for Indian regiments’ in order to supplement reinforcements arriving from India.136 In 
turn, each corps requested proposals from its own divisions for the creation of an Indian army 
Reserve of Officers – an emergency reserve of British officers for Indian battalions.137 The 
culmination of this consultative approach resulted in a GHQ proposal in mid-May 1918 for the 
provision of a reserve of ‘Hindustani speaking’ officers. This proposal recommended the 
training of six officers per British battalion in Hindustani, and duties with Indian troops for 
potential employment in an Indian battalion. As part of this training, officers were required to 
undergo an attachment to an Indian battalion for fourteen days, while receiving instruction in 
simple conversation, disposal of simple disciplinary cases and petitions, the customs of Indian 
troops, and the reading and writing of messages in Roman Urdu. 138  To facilitate this 
programme, GHQ requested munshis from India to help teach officers colloquial Hindustani so 
as to ensure ‘better co-operation between British and Indian units’.139 In keeping with its 
fondness for flexibility, GHQ was keen to point out that it did not intend to ‘lay down any 
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uniform standard’, providing that corps schemes aligned with its general proposal. This allowed 
each corps to respond to its own situation when determining the number of officers to be trained 
and the length of the attachment. Given the diverse classes of Indian battalions within their 
formations, corps were encouraged and empowered to determine the best course of action 
themselves.  
In addition to these measures, officers were also required to staff Indian formations. 
Conversations took place between the War Office, Simla, and BSF and EEF GHQs regarding 
staff appointments and liaison officers. However, flexibility remained the army’s maxim. In 
September 1918, a telegram from the War Office advised that each force’s ‘demands for Indian 
Staff and Departmental Officers should be made by them as found necessary’.140 As to the 
appointment of a liaison officer between Simla and the two expeditionary forces, the War 
Office recommended that an officer from ‘Indian Headquarters visit Egypt and Salonika 
occasionally to discuss questions of welfare of troops, provision of, and training of, 
reinforcements’. 141  It was undesirable to ‘lay down hard and fast rules’ in this respect, 
suggesting an ad hoc approach towards BSF and EEF personnel requirements.142  
Where possible, Indian army officers were appointed to divisional and brigade staffs. At 
a XX Corps conference in May 1918, Major-General Sir John Longley (GOC 10th Division) 
highlighted ‘the desirability of having Staff Officers of Indian experience on Brigade and 
Divisional staffs’.143 For some British officers, this would be the first time that they had 
commanded Indian army troops in operations.144 Those who did have experience were happy to 
share it with the rest of the force. Shea, for example, wrote a paper describing the 
‘characteristics, prejudices etc of Indian troops and the relations which should exist between 
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them and British troops’, which was circulated within the XX Corps and beyond.145 The 
presence of Indian army staff officers provided a guiding hand when administering these new 
formations. In the 53rd Division, Major Evelyn Willis, an officer in the 58th Rifles, assumed the 
position of GSO2 on 1 July 1918;146 while in the 60th Division, Captain Gerald Simson, an 
officer in the 34th Poona Horse, was appointed as Staff Captain to the 179th Brigade.147 
Familiar with the customs and languages of the Indian army battalions, both Willis and Simson 
were well placed to ensure that the administrative well-being of the Indian battalions was taken 
in hand.  
 Running alongside these institutional methods was the more informal act of socialising. 
In the 60th Division, Shea held a durbar for the newly arrived Indian army officers.148 An event 
associated with the British Empire in India, the durbar served to welcome new officers in a way 
that was instantly recognisable to them. Socialising was also practised further up the chain of 
command. On 4 September 1918, Chetwode, another Indian army officer, ‘entertained all Indian 
Officers to tea’ at corps HQ.149 According to Kitchen, this helped to ‘reinforce the personal 
leadership bonds’ between the senior commanders and the men who would lead the sepoys into 
action.150 These social and cultural events were also extended to NCOs and ORs through 
sporting events and training competitions. In August 1918, the 179th Brigade held a ‘brigade 
Lewis Gun competition’ to decide on representative British and Indian formations for the XX 
Corps competition, while the 4/11th Gurkha Rifles held its own sports event attended by senior 
generals.151 This fostered esprit de corps and inculcated a sense of unity within the newly 
reorganised divisions. 
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 The true test of the effective reorganisation and socialisation of Allenby’s EEF was the 
renewal of offensive operations in late 1918. Forced to postpone large scale operations due to 
the reorganisation, Allenby launched the battle of Megiddo on 19 September 1918. For the 60th 
Division, its part in the battle represented its first operation since the second Trans-Jordan raid 
in May 1918. Between May and September 1918, the division’s experience of operations came 
from a series of small scale raids in which its Indian battalions performed well.152  This 
experience was mirrored in the 10th Division. Troops from the 1/54th Sikhs and 1/101st 
Grenadiers raided an enemy position on 12 August 1918 alongside Indian battalions from the 
60th Division. In his after action report, Longley commented that, although the ‘Indian troops 
were new to the Division’, the operation ‘afforded a good illustration of their value. They 
showed that they could carry out movements in complete silence, that they could carry out a 
complicated operation in the dark with great speed and without confusion. They showed the 
greatest determination, dash and initiative’.153  
 Reports on the successful performance of the Indianised divisions during the Megiddo 
campaign referenced the impact of the reorganisation. Shea noted that ‘on the 19th September 
(48 days after the Division had been reorganised), the men closed with their enemy with 
eagerness and determination… on this day the new 60th Division “found itself”’.154 For Major-
General Stanley Mott (GOC 53rd Division), the fact that his division was ‘only a very few 
weeks before operations commenced… to all intents complete’ made ‘the fine performance of 
the Indian troops… all the more remarkable’.155 Upon reading Mott’s account, Chetwode 
commented that it was ‘a modest account of an excellent piece of work’.156 Although it is clear 
that the divisions performed well during the Megiddo campaign, it is important to consider the 
strength and nature of the enemy across from them. It begs the question as to whether Allenby 
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and his reorganised force were simply pushing against an open door. As Erickson comments, 
Megiddo was ‘the worst defeat suffered by the Ottoman Army… at the hands of the British 
army’ during the First World War.157 Yet the Ottoman army’s successful performance against 
Allenby’s earlier Trans-Jordan raids suggests it had retained much of its combat effectiveness 
and capability. However, as 1918 progressed, it grew gradually weaker in terms of morale and 
manpower as a result of disease and desertion.158 It had lost a number of its German advisors, its 
unit strengths diminished, and it was in the middle of a supply crisis. As David Stevenson notes, 
the Ottoman army was ‘rotting from within’.159 Despite continued training in German-style 
assault tactics, the Ottoman army at Megiddo lacked tactical mobility and the ability to wage 
effective counter-attacks.160 Although it was still a tenacious adversary, it was a decreasingly 
effective army. The EEF’s quantitative and qualitative superiority ensured that a likely British 
success at Megiddo turned into an Ottoman rout. In addition to this, the promotion of a 
systematic retraining and socialisation programme ensured that the most current tactics, 
weapons, and methods of command were embedded into the EEF. As Erickson persuasively 
argues, method, not men, was the key to Allenby’s success in the closing stages of the Palestine 
campaign.161 
 
Though the integration of formations was an important precursor for operational cohesion and 
effectiveness, it was not a one way process. There is much to be said for the impact and benefits 
that newcomers had on their expeditionary forces. As we have seen, this impact was obvious at 
the highest levels of command with generals like Allenby, Cavan, and Maude. Their position of 
authority and their considerable experience allowed them to challenge existing practice and 
initiate new ways of working. However, the ability to challenge existing practice was not just 
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limited to higher command. There are examples of newly arrived formations sharing their 
experience at a local level. The process of acclimatisation was not passive. It was influenced by 
factors such as culture, identity and, for the purposes of sharing experience, the appropriate 
environment and command structure. In some instances, formations were willing to share their 
recent experiences with others. Less easy to ascertain is whether the recipient assimilated or 
acted on this experience.  
 British formations in Italy, for example, were able to share their previous experience 
with Italian formations. IEF commanders and staff officers had been ‘well received’ by their 
Italian counterparts and had ‘seized opportunities of throwing out suggestions’ regarding 
defensive arrangements.162 In a report to Robertson, General Sir Herbert Plumer wrote that 
Italian officers frequently visited the British sector, resulting in the Italians thinning their lines 
and adopting the British system of machine-gun employment for both defence and offence.163 In 
addition to this, hints and tips on training, instructions on defence plans, and British SS 
pamphlets were translated into Italian in anticipation of their distribution to Italian formations. 
The sharing of experience required great sensitivity on the part of the British, however. The 
Italians were willing to learn from the experience of the British, but they were ‘proud and 
sensitive’, and would not respond well to ‘any appearance of superiority or of imparting 
instruction’.164 For Plumer, demonstration, illustration, and the dropping of hints were the most 
effective means of sharing British experience.165 Steps were also taken to establish inter-allied 
training schools as a further means of sharing knowledge. Plumer informed Robertson that: 
 
 … we have started our schools and are taking some French officers and have
 asked the Italians to send officers - as many as they like up to 100… I hoped the 
Italians would have accepted the offer and I think they eventually will, but they 
are very sensitive, especially as regards the French, and any attempt at pressure 
is fatal.166 
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These schools encouraged Italian officers to ‘come and witness demonstrations carried out by 
the NCOs and men’.167 As a result, the Italians began to organise their schools along similar 
lines with British, French, and Italian forces attending each other’s courses. According to 
Lieutenant-General Arthur Floyer-Acland, a former staff officer in the 7th Division, this led to a 
‘constant interchange of ideas’ between the three forces.168  
 Within the army, there was a culture of knowledge sharing, which underpinned the 
above example. Though new formations could influence those who had been in theatre longer, 
reliefs, conferences, and informal conversations between formations intra-theatre were far more 
common. The 69th Brigade’s adoption of a Western Front style defence in depth method in 
December 1917, for example, drew considerable praise from Cavan. In a note to his divisions, 
Cavan wrote how ‘everyone can learn’ from the 69th Brigade and that its work was ‘in advance 
of anything that is being carried out at the moment’. He requested ‘all units of the Corps to 
study, and where possible to initiate, the system which is to be seen in this Brigade sector’.169 
The 7th Division acted on Cavan’s request, despatching officers to visit the 69th Brigade’s 
defensive system in January 1918. Unfortunately, neither the 7th Division’s war diary nor its 
divisional history provides evidence as to whether the 69th Brigade’s system was adopted or 
not. However, given that British commanders and staffs were sharing defence in depth tips with 
Italian forces, there is a strong possibility that the 7th Division would have employed similar 
principles for the sake of uniformity. It is clear then that, rather than working in silos, 
formations were encouraged to learn from one another and adopt methods where appropriate.  
 Such examples are prominent on the Western Front. When the I ANZAC was sent to 
relieve the Canadian Corps in the Ypres sector in 1916, Brudenell White handed over a sheaf of 
papers to his counterpart, Brigadier-General Percy Radcliffe (BGGS, Canadian Corps). Both 
officers knew each other from Staff College and the War Office, so this represented a very 
personalised method of information exchange. Within this sheaf of papers was ‘some useful !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 IWM, Papers of Lieutenant-General A. N. Floyer-Acland, Memoirs, p. 74. 
168 Ibid., p. 78. 
169 TNA, WO 95/4237, 69th Brigade War Diary, Memo from XIV Corps, 27 December 1917. 
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notes by one of our best brigade commanders... his orders for certain operations... some training 
orders by the same brigade... [and] a sample of divisional orders, which are the best available, 
although they go into a great amount of detail’.170 Copies of these documents were passed down 
to all Canadian divisions. The Canadians reciprocated in kind, furnishing the I ANZAC with 
copies of maps and schemes for the sector to be taken over.171 The exchange of knowledge and 
best practice upon relief was not uncommon. During the 229th Brigade’s relief of the 230th 
Brigade on the 74th Division’s front in July 1918, some of the papers handed over included 
‘files from 61st Division, including… action in case of attack… raids, signalling, artillery, 
trench mortars’, along with other administrative aspects.172 Even though there was a systematic 
process for doctrine dissemination by 1918, horizontal learning ensured that localised 
knowledge was retained and passed on to incoming formations. 
 
The process of integrating combat formations went beyond the institutional methods developed 
by the army. Reinforcing its distaste for prescription, the army was unwilling to enforce a 
homogeneous approach to integration. Although there was commonality of method across the 
army’s operational theatres, the expeditionary forces themselves were not unitary. Instead, it 
was left to individual corps and divisions to decide the order and extent to which these 
institutional methods were utilised. The nuances in the army’s process had to reflect the 
operational and geographical demands in theatre, along with the number of formations to be 
integrated. Although it could have been doctrinaire in its approach, the army established flexible 
parameters within which its forces could operate. 
 This flexible approach gave formations the opportunity to self-integrate. Though 
functioning within a broader context, divisions and brigades arranged their own attachment 
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170 Quoted in K. Radley, We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918 (St Catherines, 
ON: Vanwell, 2006), p. 90. 
171  R. Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War, 1914-1918 
(Melbourne, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 157-158. 
172 TNA, WO 95/3153, 230th Brigade War Diary, ‘List of Papers handed over to 229th Infantry Brigade’, 
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schemes, along with lectures and demonstrations to suit their needs. This bears out the army’s 
reputation as a flexible organisation, whilst highlighting its willingness to learn. These 
individual methods were often supplemented by informal conversations or exchanges between 
neighbouring formations. This, coupled with a new formation’s willingness to share its previous 
experiences with its neighbours, demonstrates that horizontal learning was practiced within the 
British army. Through this, localised knowledge endured and could be passed on to others in a 
timely manner. Formations had the ability to propagate knowledge, carrying it with them like 
pollen on the legs of a bee. 
 Though the army’s integration process was holistic, it was by no means smooth. 
Formations did not instantly ‘get up to speed’ upon arrival, nor did they wholeheartedly 
embrace the culture and norms of their new expeditionary forces. Given the army’s culture of 
sub-cultures, it is unsurprising that integration took time, effort, and significant adjustment. 
Prejudice and snobbery did exist. However, by refusing to enforce a standardised integration 
policy, the army increased the likelihood that formations would develop their own personalised 
and, arguably, more effective way of acclimatising to their new force. 
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CHAPTER'6 
‘NEVER'AT'HEART'A'REGULAR'SOLDIER’'
 
From humble beginnings as largely irregular forces on the outbreak of war, the units of the AIF 
ended the war as one of the self-proclaimed ‘shock troops’ or corps d’élite of the British army. 
However, for official historian Charles Bean, the Australian soldier was not ‘a material to be 
treated according to pure British drill-book methods’. He was ‘never at heart a Regular 
soldier’.1 The soldiers of the AIF came from a culture that was independent, resourceful, and 
freer from class distinction than most. This trope, starting with Bean and reemerging in the 
1970s, aligns with an idea of Australian national identity. It portrays developing Australian 
identity during the First World War as independent of, and in conflict with, British identity.2 
Bean fostered this ‘Anzac Spirit’ within the Australian official histories, portraying the men of 
the AIF as egalitarian and classless.3 According to Bean, this ‘absence of social distinction 
encouraged the initiative which was the outstanding quality of Australian troops’.4  
 Historians such as Jeffrey Grey have taken issue with Bean’s eulogising, arguing that 
the AIF’s ‘volunteer nature [and] the influence of the bush’ does not explain its military quality, 
nor was the ‘often undefined quality of “mateship”’ a phenomenon unique to the AIF.5 
However, despite the best efforts of Australian historians, the popular perception of the 
Australian as a natural born warrior remains.6 This perception is underscored by the AIF’s 
homogeneity. Like the Canadian formations, Australian divisions on the Western Front were not 
split up among British corps. Instead, they were kept together wherever possible, first in I and II !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918: The Story of ANZAC from 
the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, I (12 vols, 
Sydney, NSW: Angus and Robertson, 1941), pp. 126-127. 
2 Connor, Anzac and Empire, pp. 1-2; N. Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: Some reflections’, Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 31 (2) (2003), p. 124. 
3 N. Wise, ‘The Lost Labour Force: Working-Class Approaches to Military Service during the Great 
War’, Labour History 93 (2007), p. 172. 
4 C. E. W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens (Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, 1983 [1946]), p. 537. 
5 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1999]), pp. 
106-108. 
6  See J. Brown, Anzac’s Long Shadow: The Cost of our National Obsession (Collingwood, VIC: 
Redback, 2014) for a recent critique of this popular perception. 
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ANZAC before their eventual grouping into the Australian Corps in November 1917. 
According to the British official history, this homogeneity played a key role in enhancing the 
AIF’s combat effectiveness and esprit de corps.7 However, it cannot be seen as the only reason 
for this effectiveness, particularly when one considers the experience of AIF units in the EEF. 
These units were mixed with other Imperial units, yet they still managed to maintain high levels 
of combat effectiveness. Homogeneity and national identity were not solely responsible for the 
transformation of a largely untrained, irregular force into a high performing instrument within 
the British military machine. This chapter suggests that this transformation was largely due to 
the integration mechanisms developed by the British army before and during the First World 
War. 
 The army was required to develop and, in some cases, refine a number of learning 
methods to integrate new formations into its organisation - whether they were national 
contingents like the Australians and Canadians, or territorial and Kitchener army divisions. 
With the influx of civilian soldiers, the army could have been doctrinaire in its attitude. Instead, 
it pursued a pragmatic approach, priding itself on its ability to adapt to changing environments 
and situations. Although it was prepared to coordinate at higher levels as with the EEF’s 
‘Indianisation’, it tolerated and, at times, encouraged the development of informal methods. As 
we shall see, this flexibility was important given the Australian government’s ultimate control 
over Australian forces serving in the British army. 
 This chapter examines whether the army was successful when integrating national 
contingents into its organisation. While acknowledging the importance of homogeneity and the 
amount of self-governance afforded to the AIF, this chapter examines the methods employed by 
the army to facilitate the AIF’s integration. It also argues that, in addition to these mechanisms, 
a certain amount of flexibility existed within the army’s organisation, enabling the AIF to ‘self-
integrate’. The chapter first considers the state of the Australian force on the outbreak of war, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 J. E. Edmonds, History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium 1918, V (5 vols., 
London: HMSO, 1947), pp. 179, 610-611. 
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including the establishment of the Commonwealth Military Forces [CMF], interoperability with 
the British army, and its experience of working as part of the British army during the Boer War. 
Secondly, it outlines the army’s institutional methods for integrating the AIF during the First 
World War. These include command appointments, particularly the role of Lieutenant-General 
Sir William Birdwood, mentoring and attachments, military publications, and training schools. 
Thirdly, it considers some of the methods used by the AIF to self-integrate into the expanded 
army, with particular focus on the efforts of the 3rd Australian Division. This division offers a 
useful case study: it was the last Australian division raised, it carried out the majority of its 
training on Salisbury Plain, and was commanded by an Australian, Major-General John 
Monash, from the outset. Finally, the chapter outlines some of the tensions that accompanied 
the Australians’ integration, notably British perceptions of these newcomers. 
 
Australia’s defence arrangements were shaped by her isolation. Following Australia’s federation 
in 1901, Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, a British regular officer, was appointed to 
command the newly formed CMF and charged with organising Australia’s disparate forces into 
a homogeneous federal force.8 The CMF’s sole purpose was that of home defence. The 1903 
Defence Act stipulated that members of the CMF could not be compelled to serve beyond 
Australia and its territories. Predominantly civilian in nature, the CMF only had a small cadre of 
permanent soldiers. Within the officer corps, the militia dominated, while a small number of 
professional officers were responsible for training, administration, and technical tasks.9 In 1912, 
for example, the strength of Australia’s military forces totalled 23,696. Of this number, 2,235 
were full-time soldiers, while 21,127 were citizen soldiers.10  
 Hutton, arguably driven by imperial rather than national objectives, called for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The establishment and evolution of Australia’s post-federation force has been covered in Grey, A 
Military History of Australia, pp. 63-79, and A. Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its 
Organisation 1901-2001 (Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
9 Connor, Anzac and Empire, p. 14. 
10 G. H. Knibbs, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-1912 No. 6 (Melbourne, 
VIC: McCarron, Bird and Co., 1913), p. 1047. The remaining 334 were made up of ‘Volunteers’ and 
‘Area Officers’. 
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creation of a professional mobile field force, which would number approximately 14,000 men in 
peacetime and increase to almost 29,000 in wartime. Unlike the CMF, this force was to be 
capable of serving wherever the Australian government desired. The Australian government, 
then in the middle of austerity measures and suspicious of Hutton’s imperial ambitions, quickly 
dismissed the idea of a field force. The development of the Australian forces from federation up 
to 1914 was dominated by the struggle between ‘Imperialists’ (men such as Hutton and his 
protégé Brudenell White) and ‘Australianists’ (officers such as John Hoad and James Legge). 
The latter group took an independent view of Australia and desired the promotion of her 
domestic interests over imperial priorities. Though the idea of a field force was initially 
dismissed, compulsory military training, including mandatory cadet training for schoolboys, 
was instituted in 1909, just before Kitchener’s arrival to inspect Australia’s defences and 
military organisation.11 However, it was not until 1912 that Australia, in partnership with New 
Zealand, turned her attentions to planning for the possibility of creating an expeditionary force 
for service overseas. 
 Much as there was a struggle between the ‘Imperialists’ and ‘Australianists’, there was 
also rivalry between the CMF’s permanent and militia officers. Often viewed as a product of the 
interwar years, reaching its zenith during the Second World War, this rivalry was in fact evident 
from the creation of the militia.12 Lieutenant-General Sir James McCay’s biographer, for 
example, notes that in the ‘hot-house world’ of the Australian military, McCay’s 1907 
appointment to the role of Director of the Australian Intelligence Corps led to conflict with 
permanent officers ‘who would have resented a militia officer holding such a senior position’.13 
This rivalry did not lessen during the First World War. Writing to Brudenell White in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Stevenson, To Win the Battle, p. 13. 
12 For interwar and Second World War rivalry, see D. M. Horner, ‘Staff Corps versus Militia: The 
Australian Experience of World War II’, Defence Force Journal 26 (Jan/Feb 1981), pp. 13-26; M. 
Johnston, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 192; G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War 
(Melbourne, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 2009); K. James, The Hard Slog: Australians in the 
Bougainville Campaign, 1944-45 (Melbourne, VIC: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
13 C. Wray, Sir James Whiteside McCay: A Turbulent Life (Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 80-81. 
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September 1918, Chauvel remarked on ‘the intrigues going on in London’, blaming ‘the old ill 
feeling amongst the Victorian militia officers against the permanent forces… they want to get 
one of their own men into power’.14 
 Though a self-governing dominion, Australia’s defence policy and organisation were 
still part of the wider question of Imperial defence. This required the interoperability of British 
and dominion forces. In case of major conflict, it was expected that the Empire’s forces would 
combine to fight the common foe.15 Interoperability was promoted in a number of ways: 
through shared publications, education and training, and the attachment of British officers.16 
 The Imperial conferences, particularly those of 1909 and 1911, also played an important 
role in promoting interoperability.17 It was as a result of these conferences that British training 
manuals, including Combined Training, the Field Service Pocket Book (1906), and FSR were 
provided to the dominion forces. At the 1909 conference, Colonel Justin Foxton, the Australian 
representative, noted that the adoption of such manuals ‘seems to me almost to go without 
saying… the field service regulations and training manuals ought to be adopted if the principles 
proposed… are to work out satisfactorily’.18 This decision went some way to establishing 
uniformity, as well as ensuring dominion forces were up to date with the latest tactical and 
administrative methods.  
 Education and training were also brought into line. A number of places were set aside 
for dominion officers at the two Staff Colleges from 1905 onwards. Both Brudenell White and 
Thomas Blamey attended Staff College at Camberley and Quetta respectively. It is perhaps no 
surprise that they both went on to hold senior staff appointments during the war: Brudenell 
White served as MGGS Fifth Army, and Blamey as BGGS Australian Corps. On the outbreak !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 NLA, White Papers, MSS 5172 2.3/43, Chauvel to White, 9 September 1918. 
15 Connor, Anzac and Empire, p. 14; J. Bou, ‘Ambition and Adversity: Developing an Australian Military 
Force, 1901-1914’, Australian Army Journal 9 (1) (2012), p. 80. 
16 See B. D. Faraday, ‘Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-
1918’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 1997, for a fuller exposition of these 
attempts at interoperability. 
17 R. A. Preston, ‘The Military Structure of the Old Commonwealth’, International Journal 17 (2) (1962), 
pp. 98-121. 
18 TNA, CAB 18/12A, Imperial Conference: Proceedings Volume 1, 1909, p. 21. 
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of war in 1914, however, Australia could only call on thirteen Staff College graduates [psc], 
including four British officers on secondment.19 In addition to Brudenell White and Blamey, the 
seven other Australian psc officers also achieved noteworthy positions by the end of the war: 
Cecil Foott served as Chief Engineer, Australian Corps; Eric Harrison and John Lavarack 
served as GSO1s to the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions respectively; Edgar Reynolds was 
GSO for Aviation in the Australian Flying Corps throughout the war; Henry Macartney 
commanded the 3rd Brigade Australian Field Artillery, while Edmond Drake-Brockman 
commanded the 4th Australian Brigade. James O’Brien was invalided home in July 1915, whilst 
serving as second-in-command to the 8th Light Horse Regiment.20 
 The extension of Staff College training to the dominions allowed the adoption of 
uniform procedures across the Commonwealth. The common system of staff education and 
training influenced the dominions’ decision to adopt British promotion examinations for their 
regular officers. Australia adopted this system in 1909 with some amendments to reflect the 
different organisation and administration within the CMF.21 These overarching changes to the 
military education system were further enhanced by the establishment of the short-lived 
Commonwealth Military Journal in 1911, which published articles by British and Australian 
soldiers on aspects such as ‘infantry formations in the attack, modern musketry training, 
aviation, wireless telephony and night operations’.22 Australia also had access to the United 
Services Institutes, established on the British model, in Sydney and Melbourne, where officers 
were able to read and discuss current military publications and literature from overseas.23  
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19 Out of the thirteen officers, Cyril Brudenell White, Henry Macartney, Edgar Reynolds, Cecil Foot, and 
John Lavarack were Camberley graduates. Edmond Brockman, Eric Harrison, Thomas Blamey, and J. C. 
O’Brien were Quetta graduates, while John Gellibrand, Duncan Glasfurd, Charles Gwynne, and Francis 
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 Along with shared publications and training, the CMF also benefitted from the 
attachment of British regular officers. These attachments were notable on the directing staff of 
the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and included Colonel Charles Gwynn (Director of 
Military Art) and Colonel Ewen Sinclair-Maclagan (Director of Drill) – the latter going on to 
command the 4th Australian Division during the war. There were a number of other 
secondments to the Australian force, including Duncan Glasfurd who was appointed Director of 
Military Training in 1912 to oversee and inspect compulsory training under the cadet scheme; 
Henry Clogstoun, appointed as Director of Works in 1912 to help reorganise Australian military 
engineers; and Harold Mackworth, appointed as Director of Army Signals.24 
 As we have seen, attempts at interoperability between Britain and Australia had steadily 
gained impetus during the few years preceding the First World War. However, one of the most 
important military encounters involving the two nations occurred during the Boer War. Over 
16,000 Australians served, forming an integral part of the Imperial Army. For the most part, 
these Australian ‘volunteers’ served under British commanders, with some of the latter going on 
to play an important role in the AIF’s development and integration during the First World War. 
These commanders included Rawlinson; Hamilton; Birdwood; Allenby, who had commanded a 
squadron of New South Wales Lancers; and Plumer, who had commanded a mixed force of 
Australians, Canadians, and Rhodesians at Mafeking. In a 1916 letter to Sir George Pearce, 
Godley was delighted to ‘hear that the others [I ANZAC] have gone into General Plumer’s 
army, as he had so many Australians under him in South Africa, and knew them and liked them, 
and they knew and liked him’.25 Henry Gullett, the Australian official historian of the Sinai and 
Palestine campaign, remembered Allenby’s visit to an Australian unit in the desert where many 
of the men were drunk. The men struck matches on Allenby’s car and ‘almost leaned on him. 
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The tighter they were the closer they wished to get to him’. Allenby ‘took it well’, writing an 
‘appreciative note’ to the unit’s commander, Major-General Sir Granville Ryrie. 26 
 Although the Australians were under British command during the Boer War, some 
officers served in staff positions in British formations. The war also provided future AIF 
commanders and staff officers with the experience of operating within a larger British force.27 
Major-General William Bridges, the original commander of both the AIF and the 1st Australian 
Division, had served in the Boer War in a divisional staff appointment before going on to 
become the first commandant of Duntroon and Inspector-General of the army.28 Bridges’ war 
service brought him into contact with individuals such as Hamilton, whilst his staff 
appointments gave him credibility when dealing with British regular officers, particularly in 
Egypt. In the 1st Australian Division, veterans were well represented in senior staff positions, 
with twelve of the fifteen officers having served in South Africa. The heads of the division’s 
supporting units were all Boer War veterans except for the commander of the artillery.29 Other 
notable AIF officers with Boer War experience included Brudenell White, Chauvel, Legge, 
John Gellibrand, and William Glasgow – all of whom would go on to hold senior appointments 
in the AIF during the First World War.30 
 Not only did the Boer War give the Australians the opportunity of working within a 
British force, it also gave the British officers the opportunity to command Australian irregular 
forces in combat. In addition to this, Britain also benefitted from the reports of the Inspector-
General of Overseas Forces. These reports gave an insight into the state of the dominions’ 
forces. Despite greater alignment between Britain and her dominions, inspections of the 
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26 AWM, Papers of Henry Gullett, AWM40 69, Ts extracts from Gullett's original diaries and notebooks, 
‘General Murray’, n.d. 
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30 Brudenell White ended the war as MGGS Fifth Army; Chauvel as GOC Desert Mounted Corps, EEF; 
Legge as Inspector-General, Australian Military Forces; Gellibrand as GOC 3rd Australian Division; and 
Glasgow as GOC 1st Australian Division. 
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Australian forces in the years leading up to the outbreak of war did not make for pleasant 
reading. The 1912 and 1913 reports, by Major-General George Kirkpatrick, found that the 
forces were, by and large, as poorly trained and inefficient as they had been since federation.31 
Hamilton’s subsequent inspection of the Australian forces in April 1914, though less damning 
than Kirkpatrick’s, highlighted grave deficiencies in training and unit cohesion. The system in 
place was entirely suited to peacetime conditions, but unlikely to withstand the demands of war 
for more than a few weeks.32 Referring to the Australian forces in a pitched battle, Hamilton 
suggested they would need a 2:1 majority to overcome regular troops from overseas. This large 
margin was owing to the ‘comparative lack of discipline and cohesion’.33 Given the limited 
training of recruits – sixteen days per annum, of which only eight were to be spent in camp – it 
is unsurprising that such deficiencies existed.34 As we shall see in the next section, the British 
army had to employ a series of methods to compensate for these deficiencies and help integrate 
the newly formed AIF during the First World War. 
 
Before detailing some of the integration methods used by the army, it is necessary to outline the 
AIF’s command and control arrangements to show how it functioned within the British military 
during the war.35 The AIF was formed on 15 August 1914 under the command of Bridges, and 
initially constituted the 1st Australian Division (which Bridges also commanded) and the 1st 
Light Horse Brigade. As commander of the AIF, Bridges reported directly to Sir George Pearce 
in Melbourne. In a September 1914 Order of Council, Bridges was given powers to promote 
officers, to change and vary units, to transfer officers and men, and to hire and transfer civilian 
employees where necessary.36 This authority resulted in a number of clashes with senior 
generals, including Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood (GOC ANZAC) and General Sir !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Bou, ‘Ambition and Adversity’, p. 81. 
32 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 78. 
33 AWM, AWM1 20/5, ‘Report on Inspection of the Military Forces of Australia’, 24 April 1914, p. 45 
34 Ibid., p. 11. These sixteen days would be supported by six years of cadet training. 
35 For an in depth overview of the creation and administration of the AIF, see Faraday, ‘Higher 
Administration’, pp. 40-74. 
36 Faraday, ‘Higher Administration’, p. 43. 
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John Maxwell (GOC Egypt). As Bruce Faraday notes, ‘in some areas Bridges was subordinate 
to Birdwood, in most areas Birdwood was subordinate to Maxwell, but in other areas Bridges 
was supreme’.37 To simplify matters, Bridges insisted on working through Birdwood in all 
dealings with the base in Egypt. After Bridges’ untimely death at Gallipoli in May 1915, 
command of the AIF initially passed to an Australian, Colonel James Legge, before he was 
ousted in favour of Birdwood in September of the same year.38 As with Bridges, Birdwood also 
had dual command responsibilities, acting as GOC of both the AIF and I ANZAC. As we shall 
see later, this was a cause for consternation. Birdwood remained undisputed administrative head 
of the AIF in all theatres, including Egypt and Britain, until he was promoted to command the 
Fifth Army in 1918. 
 While the command and administration of the AIF remained stable after Birdwood’s 
appointment, the establishment of infrastructure for the AIF was required back in Britain. 
Although a base depot had been established in Egypt under Colonel Victor Sellheim in January 
1915, the Australian wounded from Gallipoli were often transferred back to Britain. This led to 
the creation of the Australian Administrative Headquarters in London in October 1915, under 
the command first of Colonel Sir Newton Moore and subsequently of the Australian 
businessman, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson. With the evacuation of Gallipoli in January 
1916 and the eventual move of Australian forces to the Western Front, Australian Headquarters 
was transferred to London in May 1916 where it remained for the rest of the war.  
 Although the tangled nature of the AIF’s command and administration proved to be 
problematic, it was, as its name suggests, conceived as part of the British Imperial effort.39 This 
required it to integrate into the British army. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the army 
developed a number of methods for this purpose. These included command appointments, 
attachments and mentoring, military publications, and training schools. Though there was some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Ibid.; AWM, Papers of C. E. W. Bean, AWM38 6 DRL/606 255/1, White to Bean, 8 May 1924. 
38 Birdwood was officially appointed GOC AIF in September 1916. The appointment was backdated to 
September 1915. 
39 AWM, Bean Papers, AWM38 6 DRL/606 255/1, White to Bean, 8 May 1924. 
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resistance to these methods and questions as to their efficacy, the AIF, on the whole, benefitted 
from its experience of these methods. 
 Although there was a leavening of officers conversant with the army’s processes, the 
AIF suffered from command inexperience, particularly at brigade level and above. Of the 1st 
Australian Division’s original cadre of 631 officers, only ninety-nine were serving or retired 
members of British or Australian regular forces, while 104 had previous war experience.40 This 
inexperience led to the widespread employment of British and Indian army officers. Birdwood 
was the most senior of these appointments. Though Bridges had overall command of the AIF, 
Birdwood was appointed as field commander of the ANZAC in November 1914. He identified 
his Boer War experience as one of the reasons for his selection: 
 
I have always felt that my close contact with these excellent fellows laid the 
foundation of my very happy relations with the Australian and New Zealand 
troops throughout the War of 1914-18. Indeed, it was because he realised how 
well we had got on together in South Africa that Lord Kitchener selected me to 
command the combined Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in 1914.41 
 
Birdwood, an Indian army officer, had served as Kitchener’s military secretary during the Boer 
War. It is likely that he owed his appointment as much to his ‘happy relations’ with the 
Australians as to Kitchener himself. Following the Boer War, Birdwood held the position of 
Assistant Adjutant-General, India in 1904 and QMG, India in 1912. However, as an Indian 
army officer, he sat outside the British military establishment. There was still a snobbish 
prejudice against Indian army officers.42 It is possible that this may have aided him in his 
command of the Australian forces. He, like them, sat outside the traditional establishment. 
 Though he held the rank of lieutenant-general, Birdwood was a tactical commander. He 
did not advise the Australian government on strategy, nor did he command a campaign. 
Birdwood’s corps undertook tactical missions directed by higher command. His skills were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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centred on man management. More of a leader than a commander, Birdwood relied to a great 
extent on his long-standing Australian chief of staff, Brudenell White, for the day to day 
running of the AIF. Owing to Brudenell White’s proficiency, Birdwood was prone to ‘always 
“buzzing around”, looking people up, perambulating all over the place, barely ever at 
headquarters and not really exercising command at all’.43 However, William Hughes, the 
Australian Prime Minister, deemed Birdwood to be ‘a man in every way competent, who knows 
the Australian soldier and who is respected and loved and admired by him’.44 Birdwood had a 
keen eye for talent and was quick to identify poor performance, but he was not a martinet. 
Monash, for example, was suitably impressed by Birdwood’s ‘wonderful grasp of the whole 
business of soldiering’. He went on to note how:  
 
I have been around with him for hours and heard him talking to privates, 
buglers, drivers, gunners, colonels, signallers and generals and every time he 
has left the man with a better knowledge of his business than he had before. He 
appeals to me most thoroughly, and I think the Australasian Army Corps is 
most fortunate that Kitchener chose Birdwood as their Corps Commander.45 
 
Brudenell White, who would have a long association with Birdwood both during and after the 
war, recalled Birdwood as a ‘young (49) vigorous fellow with charming quiet manners’ with a 
‘beautiful clear and honest nature – without any warps’.46 In Birdwood, the Australians had a 
much-needed leader - one with people skills and proven experience in senior administrative 
positions. 
 The AIF benefitted from Birdwood’s appointment, particularly in the early days of his 
tenure. As Monash recalled, ‘he possesses the complete confidence of the whole force… He has 
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kept the force free from intrigue, contented and immune from outside interference’. 47 
Birdwood’s appointment went some way to mitigating the factionalism between permanent and 
militia officers. As an Indian army officer, he was not subject to prejudices that would influence 
whether he believed a militia or regular officer to be most suitable for command. He was also 
always prepared to try an inferior Australian officer rather than a British officer who he knew to 
be more capable.48 His candid views on the suitability of AIF senior officers were an important 
aspect of his correspondence with Pearce, the Australian Defence Minister, and Ronald Munro 
Ferguson, the Australian Governor-General. He kept both men abreast of his views on particular 
individuals. Commenting on brigade appointments, for example, Birdwood wrote that 
commands had been given to ‘Elliott, Glasgow, Irving and Glasfurd. The first named I have 
only put in temporarily so far, as I have heard conflicting reports as to his stability’.49 Later in 
the war, Birdwood commented on the relative merits of Brudenell White and Chauvel, 
questioning whether the latter’s success in Egypt ‘is due to him’ as he lacked ‘great character or 
ability’.50  
 Birdwood’s eye for talent, his reputation, and leadership qualities offered legitimacy 
and unity to an organisation that was initially ill-equipped and poorly trained for war. More 
importantly though, his appointment streamlined the system of command for Australian soldiers 
fighting overseas. He was, after all, de facto head of the AIF in all theatres. At the War Office, 
Birdwood’s continuing control of the AIF was seen as self-serving, leading to growing ill-
feeling between Birdwood and a number of senior generals. 51  Though appreciating his 
generalship, Pollen, Hamilton’s military secretary, thought Birdwood like a cat: 
 
 [He] always wants stroking. A little douche of cold water frightens him away. 
Somehow these men who pin their hopes to the favour of various big men, are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more sensitive to a little wholesome criticism than they need to be.52 
 
In a letter to Robertson, Murray noted that Birdwood had ‘a distinct eye to his future... He wants 
to remain at the end of the war everything to Australia…’53 Allenby deemed Birdwood’s 
control, particularly over AIF troops in Palestine, as ‘an absurdity’. Robertson agreed with 
Allenby’s assessment, noting that Birdwood had ‘a way of communicating with the 
Government of Australia and getting them to put forward suggestions made by him’.54 
Birdwood was aware of the situation, noting in a letter to Munro Ferguson that ‘there is a great 
deal of jealousy against me at the War Office… also, they never look favourably upon the 
Indian Army officer’.55 Colonel Andrew Skeen, Birdwood’s former GSO1 and a pre-war 
instructor at Quetta, warned Brudenell White in early 1916 of ‘the jealousy against our little 
General… he is as unsuspicious of meanness as a child – it’s up to you to watch – and if you let 
them catch our little General in some trap, I’ll never forgive you’.56 
Birdwood’s push to retain command of the AIF beyond 1916 – and the Australian 
government’s ultimate support for this decision - blocked promotion opportunities for 
Australian officers.57 In the Canadian Corps, Byng had made way for a Canadian officer, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, in April 1917. In Palestine, Chauvel had been appointed 
to corps command in April 1917, yet Monash did not take over the Australian Corps until May 
1918 with Birdwood remaining head of the AIF until the Armistice. Although much admired by 
the men he commanded, Birdwood’s retention of command encroached on the culture and 
identity of the AIF. Following Monash’s appointment to command the Australian Corps, 
Chauvel, although ‘very glad’ that Birdwood retained command of the AIF, railed against the 
Australian government’s inconsistency: ‘they insist on having Australians commanded in the 
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field by Australian officers, but allow the administration to be run by a British officer!’58 
Command problems also manifested themselves at divisional level. As John Bentley 
argues, appointments to divisional command, particularly after the expansion of the AIF in early 
1916, were complex affairs.59 The AIF was still reliant on a handful of professional Australian 
officers supplemented by Imperial officers. For some Australian officers, such as Harold 
‘Pompey’ Elliott, this reliance on Imperial officers was a contentious issue. Commenting on 
Birdwood’s command, Elliott wrote that ‘he… has not handled Australians as long as I have, 
and has not studied them as I have done’.60 However, as Birdwood recalled in 1917, ‘Imperial 
officers have been employed with the AIF only when Australian officers were not available’, 
and that the ‘dearth of qualified Australian officers was due in the first instance to our being 
such a young force and naturally requiring experience’.61 The appointment of Imperial officers 
underscored the tension between Australia’s burgeoning national identity and the need for 
military efficiency. This was a line that Godley had to navigate carefully with his decision to 
appoint an Imperial officer as his divisional medical officer. Godley believed that it was ‘best to 
have an Imperial Officer to act temporarily, especially as our medical arrangements are 
naturally rather amateurish’.62 He felt that it would be useful to have a British regular officer to 
‘start them in the right way’, but would be more than happy to appoint an Australian or New 
Zealand officer providing they had ‘sufficient military knowledge and experience to carry on 
the job properly’.63 Although it was important for Australian commanders to learn on the job, it 
was just as vital that the AIF had experienced individuals to guide it during its early years. 
The high officer casualties sustained at Gallipoli, coupled with the AIF’s expansion, led 
to a dilution of experience. Though the reliance on Imperial officers lessened, there was still 
widespread inexperience at the higher levels of command. By March 1916, two Imperial 
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officers (Harold Walker and Herbert Cox) commanded the 1st and 4th Australian Divisions, 
whilst two Australians (Legge and McCay) commanded the 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions 
respectively. In addition, Chauvel had been appointed to command the Anzac Mounted 
Division. There was now an Australian majority at divisional command level, but this did little 
to quell the grumblings. The appointment of Cox to the command of the 4th Australian Division 
was particularly contentious and brought to the fore concerns around the favouring of Imperial 
over Australian officers. Pearce voiced his ‘general feeling of disappointment’ over Cox’s 
appointment, particularly given the experience of ‘Chauvel, Monash, White and Holmes’.64 
However, Birdwood defended his decision, arguing how ‘very much harder it must be to select 
Australian officers, when comparatively speaking few have had consistent and regular military 
training throughout their lives, simply because the number of your permanent officers in the 
higher ranks is naturally small’.65 Although desert training and operations at Gallipoli had given 
Australian officers experience of handling larger bodies of men, this did not instantly fit them 
for higher command. Monash, for example, had served as a brigade commander throughout the 
Gallipoli campaign, but his inexperience at that level was obvious, particularly during the 
August offensive.66 Pearce acceded to Birdwood’s opinion, suggesting confidence in the latter’s 
judgment, but insisted on being consulted on all AIF appointments above the rank of colonel.67 
However, with the command and staffing of the newly formed 3rd Australian Division, Pearce 
was much firmer, and attempted to prevent the appointment of any British officers to that 
division. Birdwood was astute enough to recommend Monash for command of the division, 
along with Harold Grimwade, another Australian, as his artillery commander, commenting that 
‘the experience they are gaining with troops in France will be of the very greatest value’.68  
The raising and training of the 3rd Australian Division marked a turning point in the 
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AIF’s integration into the British army. Its reliance on Imperial officers was markedly reduced, 
with Australian officers commanding all of its combat formations. Its three brigade 
commanders, for example, were pre-war militia officers who had seen service at Gallipoli. 
However, there was still a guiding hand in the guise of two regular Imperial officers: 
Lieutenant-Colonels George Jackson as GSO1, and Mynors Farmar as Assistant Adjutant 
Quartermaster-General [AAQMG]. Both had experience of serving with Australian formations: 
Jackson had served as GSO1 to the 2nd Australian Division, while Farmar – a pre-war graduate 
of the LSE’s administration course - had worked with Australian troops during his time as BM 
to the 86th Brigade. Sellheim and Brudenell White, both pre-war associates of Farmar, had 
recommended him for the position of AAQMG, with Birdwood agreeing to this appointment 
‘after inquiries, which resulted in information concerning work in Gallipoli’.69 These two 
seasoned officers remained with the division for over a year.70 Upon leaving the 3rd Australian 
Division, their positions were filled by Australian officers: Robert Jackson was appointed 
AAQMG in September 1917, while Carl Jess took over as GSO1 in January 1918. 
The departure of both Jackson and Farmar was political in nature, marking the 
beginnings of ‘Australianisation’. From as early as May 1917, the Australian government was 
agitating for the replacement of ‘Imperial officers holding high AIF appointments’.71 The policy 
was finally agreed in July 1917, with a telegram from Munro Ferguson to Walter Long, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, requesting the ‘employment of Australian officers on the 
staffs’.72 Birdwood received a letter five days later demanding that: 
 
 … under your command Australians be constituted in purely Australian 
formations as far as possible and with Australian officers for commands and 
staffs. I have ascertained… the names of over 90 officers… employed under 
you who are not Australian, and while appreciating thoroughly the assistance 
given by the British army, I consider that units under your command should !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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now be able to provide Australian officers for these positions. I shall be glad if 
you will prepare a list of Imperial officers whom you can now replace…73 
 
One of these ninety officers was Farmar. Writing to his wife, he confirmed that ‘the politicians 
in Australia are clamouring for the displacement of all British officers with Australian troops, 
saying that they stand in the way for promotion for Australians. They look upon a Staff Officer 
as a sort of carpet knight, an ornamental position which their political friends will ably 
occupy’.74 Monash, who had developed a close friendship with Farmar, was ‘enraged at the 
thought’, while Farmar was ‘heart broken to leave the division’.75 Along with his personal 
attachment to the formation, he remained concerned over the lingering problems of experience 
and factionalism with the AIF: ‘There are so very few Australians who have the military 
education or experience: and also, sad to say, few who are above chicanery for advancement or 
advancement for their friends’.76 
 By the war’s end, the AIF was primarily commanded and staffed by Australians as a 
result of ‘Australianisation’. However, they had learned their trade with the advice and guidance 
of Imperial commanders and staff officers. In May 1918, Monash was finally appointed 
commander of the Australian Corps, with Blamey as his chief of staff. At divisional level, of the 
seven formations, four were commanded by Australians, two by Imperial officers, and one by a 
New Zealander; while at brigade level, pre-war Australian militia officers dominated both the 
infantry and mounted commands. 77  Although the use of Imperial commanders was not 
universally popular amongst Australian troops or with the Australian government, there were 
obvious instances where a successful working relationship developed between the two groups; 
Monash and Farmar’s relationship provides a good example of this, while Charles Rosenthal 
called in on his former divisional commander, Cox, when the latter was appointed to the India 
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Office in early 1917.78 This relationship was not limited to the AIF either. Canadian and 
Imperial officers found relations to be both cordial and professional. They understood the 
seriousness of the business in which they were engaged and simply got on with it.79 Although 
the use of Imperial officers caused friction, particularly in the political arena, it remained a key 
learning mechanism for the AIF’s integration.  
 In addition to command appointments, the army also used mentoring and attachments to 
great effect when integrating new formations. As discussed previously, this was not exclusive to 
the First World War. The War Office had seconded regular officers to Australia before the war, 
not only to help train and reorganise formations, but also to ensure that the most up to date 
methods were disseminated. These same principles determined the use of mentoring and 
attachments during the First World War. As well as leavening the AIF’s command structure 
with much needed experience, Imperial officers also became instructors, trainers, and staff 
officers, thus providing the AIF with a firm grounding in the elementary aspects of soldiering.  
According to Bean, the ‘Australian and New Zealand officers had to rely almost 
entirely on themselves’.80 This was untrue. Through its higher commanders – men such as 
Birdwood and Godley – the AIF could access a number of experts who helped streamline the 
integration process. For example, Godley, during initial desert training, expressed concern over 
the ‘weak and inexperienced’ staff and poor musketry training in Chauvel’s Light Horse 
Brigade. In order to alleviate this inadequacy, Godley secured an Indian army officer to act as a 
musketry instructor; he also did the same for Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade.81  
These personal appointments were supplemented by the wider Imperial ‘mentoring’ 
system. Building on the greater interoperability between Empire forces, the War Office attached 
a number of qualified staff officers and commanders – 214 in total - to the Canadian Corps to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales [ML], Papers of General Sir C. Rosenthal, 
MLMSS 2739, Diary, 17 June 1917. 
79 D. Delaney, ‘Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
1914–1918’, Journal of Military History 77 (2013), pp. 951-952. 
80 Bean, Official History, I, p. 139. 
81 AWM, Godley Papers, 3DRL/2233, Godley to Pearce, 30 March 1915. 
! 234 
‘command certain components and complete the connections of the staff nervous system’. This 
scheme enabled the Canadians to develop their own officers to eventually take over those 
functions.82 This development was aided by the institution of an army-wide staff learner 
scheme, forming part of the army’s wartime process for staff training in response to the closure 
of Camberley and Quetta. Staff training went through a number of incarnations from the ad hoc, 
formation-led instruction courses in 1915, to the formal junior and senior staff schools at Hesdin 
and Cambridge University from late 1916.83 
The CEF and the AIF benefitted from the personal interactions of the ‘learner’ system 
and the structured learning environment of the staff schools. Walter MacCallum was just one of 
many Australians who went through the junior staff school system. His wartime career 
demonstrates how talent was identified and selected for training and advancement to higher 
staff positions. Commissioned in the AIF on 5 May 1915, MacCallum saw action at Gallipoli in 
the 20th Battalion. Identified as future staff material by his battalion commander, MacCallum 
was attached as an aide-de-camp to the 2nd Australian Division in November 1915 before being 
appointed GSO3 to that same division in October 1916. As a result of his ‘energy and initiative’ 
during the advance to Bapaume in February 1917, he received the Military Cross. Deemed 
suitable for further training, MacCallum went to the junior staff school in July 1917 where the 
commandant remarked on his ‘force of character and distinct ability’. In September 1917, he 
became BM to the 5th Australian Brigade. By November 1918, he was a GSO2 in the 2nd 
Australian Division having been awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Mentioned in 
Despatches three times.84  
Although the staff courses encouraged professionalism, they were only able to train a 
small number of future officers. The AIF cohort for the course in December 1917, for example, 
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totaled just one officer for the senior course and five for the junior course.85 It was, therefore, 
vital to have an informal learning system that ran alongside these formal courses.86 For the 
army, this ‘on the job’ learning was just as important as the schools themselves. Even with the 
move to a more professional staff training regime in 1918, the importance of attachment and 
mentoring was still evident. The revised regime highlighted the need for ‘a reserve of qualified 
staff officers for appointment as Brigade Majors’. This reserve was to be met through the 
attachment of GSO3s and Staff Captains ‘as understudies to the Brigade Major for a period of 
one month’.87 The strength of the army’s ‘mentoring’ system can be partly attributed to the 
dynamic relationship between the mentor and the mentee. It was a relationship that not only 
allowed for the transfer of job-related knowledge, but also equipped the mentee with the tools to 
navigate the politics of a complex institution.88 The fact that the army moved towards a 
formalised ‘mentoring’ system showed that, as an organisation, it recognised the benefits of 
heuristic learning as a way of transferring knowledge between professionals and novices. In the 
case of the AIF, this is evident in the relationship between Farmar and Robert Jackson in the 3rd 
Australian Division. Jackson, as Deputy AAQMG, understudied Farmar for a year before taking 
over the latter’s position in September 1917. For the most part, this system was successful. As 
one Canadian staff officer recalled, there was a ‘wonderful group of staff officers around us, the 
pick of the British army. They were absolutely superb… and they taught us very much’.89 
Despite the ‘Australianisation’ policy, British staff officers were still used to mentor 
Australian commanders late on in the war. This was most obvious in Chauvel’s case. Allenby 
had appointed Chauvel to command the Desert Mounted Corps much to the disappointment of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chetwode.90 As Stephen Badsey notes, placing Chauvel - an Australian - in command of a 
mixed corps of eleven horsed brigades, five of them yeomanry, four Australian, one New 
Zealander, and one Indian, was unique in the war.91 However, both Allenby and Lynden-Bell 
had reservations about Chauvel’s ability. Lynden-Bell believed that Chauvel would ‘do all right 
in command’, but that he needed ‘a first-class cavalry soldier as BGGS’.92 Allenby concurred 
with Lynden-Bell’s assessment, suggesting that Chauvel’s ‘higher military training’ was the 
weak point and that, although he had the capacity for command, he would ‘be improved by 
having a trained and experienced cavalryman as BGGS’.93 Murray had already noted Chauvel’s 
weaknesses in the ‘higher strategical and tactical handling of cavalry’ in late 1916.94 Chauvel 
himself was conscious of his own shortcomings, particularly where his military education was 
concerned. Unburdening himself to his wife, he confessed to: 
 
… walking on pretty thin ice with all these people, and have been very lucky to 
have been able to hold my own… Sometimes, at the conferences at GHQ, when 
I look around the room and realise that I am absolutely the only one who is not 
in the British regular army and cannot put psc after my name, I do get a bit of a 
funk on lest I should be caught out in a want of knowledge on some technical 
point.95 
 
Chauvel’s concerns mirrored Farmar’s observations on the military education of AIF senior 
commanders, suggesting that ‘Australianisation’ was not the most suitable policy.  
Prior to his appointment to the Desert Mounted Corps, Chauvel’s two chief staff 
officers were British regulars: Vivian Fergusson, a Royal Artillery officer, and Edward Trew, a 
Royal Marine. Allenby deemed this inappropriate for the staffing of the Desert Mounted Corps, 
insisting that Chauvel should have ‘the most up to date cavalry staff officer’ as his BGGS.96 As 
a result, Howard-Vyse was brought over from France to replace Fergusson. Both Chauvel and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 NLA, White Papers, MSS 5172 2.3/40, Chauvel to White, 15 August 1917. 
91 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p. 286. 
92 TNA, WO 106/718, Correspondence between General Staff, War Office and Egypt, Lynden-Bell to 
Maurice, 18 July 1917. 
93 Ibid., Allenby to Robertson, 19 July 1917. 
94 LHCMA, Godley Papers, 3/193, Murray to Godley, 14 December 1916. 
95 AWM, Chauvel Papers, PR00535 3/2, Chauvel to wife, 14 February 1918. 
96 AWM, Chauvel Papers, PR00535 4/10, Chauvel to wife, 7 August 1917. 
! 237 
Chetwode were disappointed at this decision. 97 Chetwode went so far as to write to both 
Lynden-Bell and the Assistant Military Secretary to voice his displeasure. For Chetwode, the 
‘case of Colonel Fergusson is to my mind such a flagrant injustice that at the risk of offending 
Sir Edmund [Allenby] I must ask you to put up to him my final appeal. It never entered my head 
for a moment that when I advised a Cavalry BGGS for the Cavalry Corps that Fergusson would 
be turned down’.98  
Although new to the Palestine theatre, Howard-Vyse’s appointment was designed to 
support Chauvel as he moved from command of the Desert Column to a corps. As a psc officer 
with former service on both Allenby and Chetwode’s staffs in France, Howard-Vyse was well 
qualified for the job. Cyril Falls recalled how Chauvel ‘might need some coaching in the early 
days of his big command’, but ‘British commanders and staffs were inclined to be too 
patronising in this respect, to the annoyance of Australians and Canadians’.99 While this may 
have been the case at first, the relationship between Chauvel and Howard-Vyse was ultimately 
productive. Chauvel soon believed him to be ‘turning out very well indeed and is an extremely 
nice fellow’.100 There was regret on Chauvel’s part at Howard-Vyse’s eventual departure to 
command the 10th Cavalry Brigade in July 1918. Incidentally, Howard-Vyse’s replacement as 
BGGS was another Imperial officer – Brigadier-General Charles Godwin. Godwin was also psc 
with a wealth of experience in staff appointments. As his ‘most dashing Brigadier’, and 
someone ‘whom I like very much’, Chauvel welcomed Godwin’s appointment.101 
Throughout his service in the First World War, Chauvel’s chief staff officers were 
Imperial officers. This is unsurprising given his command of a multi-national corps. His 
correspondence – often candid in nature – does not betray any feelings of wounded national 
pride at not having an Australian chief of staff. In fact, Chauvel developed close relationships 
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with his staff and other senior Imperial officers, notably Lynden-Bell: ‘the only real friend I had 
left at GHQ’.102 Arguably, Chauvel’s background as a permanent officer, and his experience as 
Australian representative to the Imperial General Staff, served him well in his dealings with his 
Imperial colleagues. However, the AIF in Palestine, much like the EEF, was not afforded the 
same attention nor priority as its counterpart in France. As part of his mandate as commander of 
the AIF, Birdwood exchanged and transferred personnel within or between units of the force.103 
In a letter to Pearce, Birdwood noted that this authority ‘enables me to call upon light horse 
officers, if necessary, to fill staff appointments with the rest of the force… I have just done this 
in getting an officer over from Egypt for a vacancy caused by the formation of the staff of the 
3rd Division’.104 As the larger force in the principal theatre, the AIF in France was able to call 
on talented officers in Egypt, thus limiting Chauvel’s opportunity to secure a chief of staff such 
as Brudenell White, Jess, or Blamey. 
 Like command appointments, attachments and mentoring provided the AIF with 
handrails whilst it learned its trade. The use of heuristic learning methods was widespread 
throughout the army. Although Imperial officers were seconded to Australia pre-war, the 
decision to formalise and expand these methods was a response to the increasing civilian make-
up of the army, particularly from 1915 onwards. However, for these approaches to work, it was 
important that the Imperial officers – essentially ‘outsiders’ to the AIF’s culture and ethos – 
were temperamentally suited to their roles as instructors or mentors. As Birdwood noted in June 
1916, Imperial officers must ‘possess very much the velvet glove’. If handled right, the men 
‘will do anything to fall in with one’s wishes’, but if handled wrong, they ‘will do nothing’.105 
Although they gave the AIF access to officers who had ‘complete command of the mechanisms 
and staff procedures’ of the British army, attachments were not always welcome. Writing to 
Munro Ferguson in May 1917, Long hoped that ‘it is not the wish of your Government that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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none but Australian officers should serve on staffs of Australian formations as they regard the 
staff generally as an Imperial organisation in which officers of Dominion and British Forces 
shall be considered interchangeable’.106 The Australian government declined this interchange. 
One of the reasons given for the government’s decision was ‘the different systems of discipline, 
training, and administration governing the British army and the AIF’.107 There were indeed 
differences in discipline and administration between the two forces. However, where training 
was concerned, this assertion was patently untrue. 
 As we have seen, the importance of command appointments and mentoring cannot be 
understated. However, the army also used ‘people-to-documents’ methods of learning, such as 
publications, which, in turn, informed training school syllabi. Although the Australian forces 
had access to British publications before the war, it is debatable how familiar the Australian 
officer would have been with these documents. As Bridges dryly commented, FSR was about as 
useful to most Australian militia officers as ‘the cuneiform inscription on a Babylonian 
brick’.108 This correlates with Bean’s view that Australians were not ‘a material to be treated 
according to pure British drill-book methods’.109 However, for the AIF to integrate and become 
a working part of the army, they needed to familiarise themselves with these publications. 
 According to Bean, initial training ‘was simply the old British Army training. Little 
advice came from the Western Front’.110 This was far from the actual case. One of Birdwood’s 
first actions as field commander was to request ‘copies of any instructional pamphlets you [the 
War Office] may have on points of training… on experience gained up to date in the war’.111 He 
subsequently followed this up with an urgent request for:  
 
… Notes from the Front vols one and two 1500 copies of each. He [Birdwood] 
considers they would be invaluable and wants sufficient for issue to each officer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of his command. If more are available they could with advantage be distributed 
to NCOs also. He would also like three hundred copies each of Lecture by 
[Brigadier-General R. A. K.] Montgomery, Notes on Artillery in the Present 
War, and Notes on the Use of Plane Tables with Artillery, for use of artillery 
officers and higher commanders.112 
 
On 2 April 1915, the 4th Australian Brigade received Notes on Artillery in the Present War, 
suggesting that the men of the AIF were made aware of the latest developments and were most 
likely trained in them too.113 This ‘experience gained in France’, along with the fundamentals of 
warfare, were also disseminated in the form of lectures. Skeen, for example, gave lectures on 
the ‘laws of war’ to Australian brigades, while Monash recalled a lecture by an Imperial staff 
officer on grenade training that referred to rifle grenade tactics then used in France.114  
Along with recent publications, Birdwood also procured specimen maps from France, 
copies of the latest BEF Standing Orders for corps, division, and brigade, as well as FSR and all 
manner of War Manuals.115 The appointment of Imperial officers proved particularly useful 
here. They already had a working knowledge of these central publications, providing strong 
foundations upon which the AIF could base its future training and development. One of 
Godley’s divisional conferences in January 1915 drew attention to the fact that ‘officers on the 
continent do not read Field Service Regulations Part II sufficiently’. If the men were short of 
rations or equipment then it would be ‘the fault of senior officers in not having read their Field 
Service Regulations Pt II which tell you how to obtain everything, and deal with any 
administrative difficulty’.116 The same conference also highlighted the need for every officer 
and senior NCO to read the ‘various Notes and Pamphlets from the Front’. It is unsurprising 
that, in a letter to his wife, Monash admitted that ‘what is keeping me so busy is in getting to 
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learn the ropes’.117  
Although the extent to which these publications were read and assimilated is unknown, 
it is clear that the army expected the AIF to base its training around these manuals to promote 
greater uniformity. The Australians took these publications seriously. In February 1916, the 
training of machine gun companies in the MEF was ‘to be carried out on a common system in 
order to standardise knowledge’, with reference to the latest publications from France.118 
Divisional conferences in 1916 often referred to existing publications, such as SS109 and 
numerous translated publications from the French army.119 Furthermore, Brudenell White’s 
personal papers contain a wealth of official SS pamphlets alongside Army and formation 
specific publications, including the Fifth Army’s ‘Memorandum on Trench to Trench Attack by 
a Battalion Commander’ and the 1st Australian Division’s ‘Artillery in Trench Warfare’.120 A 
memo in Monash’s papers warned of the dangers of ‘reading FSR I unintelligently’ and 
included a list of references from FSR and Infantry Training relating to infantry in open 
warfare. More importantly, the memo highlighted the need to ‘read and try to apply’ the 
principles within these manuals and suggested that, if the meaning was obscure, officers should 
‘ask for instances to be given by application of theory’.121 Bentley argues that cultural, political, 
and institutional separation from Britain provided dominion forces with a degree of flexibility 
not afforded to Imperial forces. He suggests that lack of philosophical rigidity provided the AIF 
with a high level of learning flexibility, allowing lessons to be analysed and very quickly 
disseminated and applied.122 However, the very nature of the British army’s publications, along 
with its pragmatic attitude towards learning, encouraged a certain degree of flexibility in the 
tactical implementation of these publications. This pragmatism was by no means unique to the 
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dominion forces. In the EEF, for example, variations on implementation were actively collated 
and placed on record. The commandant of the senior officers’ school at Heliopolis was 
instructed to ‘inform General Headquarters on any points… commonly practiced in units which 
differ from official manuals or pamphlets’.123 As no two tactical situations were likely to be the 
same, EEF GHQ argued that it was ‘better not to emphasise unduly one particular case’ as it 
might ‘increase the difficulties officers have in applying principles to the tactical situation 
confronting them’.124 The AIF was required to follow British guidance for the purposes of 
uniformity and interoperability, but units – both in the AIF and the wider army – had the 
autonomy to experiment with tactics, techniques, and procedures.  
 As the AIF gained experience, it took advantage of this autonomy. In a memo to 
Brudenell White in February 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Ross (Commandant, I ANZAC 
School) questioned whether they were ‘right in sticking to the 1914 book as to the advanced 
guard and infantry methods and formations? Should we not practice on the basis of a larger 
infraction on the enemy’s front, the close support of mounted troops, by means of armed motor 
cars, busses, etc?’125 Ross’ suggestion challenged guidance emanating from the top of the army, 
which recommended that ‘the pre-war manuals remain in force’, and that ‘it is the duty of 
Commanders to see that the principles laid down in the manuals are adhered to’.126 However, 
Ross believed in the need for uniformity, noting that ‘the efficient carrying out in practice of all 
the latest methods, memorandum, experience from recent fighting, employment of weapons etc, 
should be on absolutely clear cut lines. In practice today this is not so’. For Ross, variety of 
method should only be allowed in ‘very local conditions’.127 There was a need for standardised 
knowledge, but not to the point of being doctrinaire. 
 The military publications produced throughout the war formed the basis of the army’s 
various courses and schools of instruction across its operational theatres. The publication of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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SS152 finally placed these schools on an even footing. Prior to that, the school system 
developed on an ad hoc basis. During the AIF’s initial desert training in early 1915, the system 
was in its infancy, leading to a greater reliance on individual commanders for the training of 
units. The inexperience of the newly raised Australian formations required them to learn the 
basics of soldiering from scratch. They were also required to adopt the new British company 
organisation.128 This meant that small unit training, particularly at platoon and company level, 
had to be extended before progressive and formation training could take place. The monotony 
of basic training was a source of frustration for the individual soldier thirsting for front line 
action. As one NCO observed, ‘the men are fed up of it all and will not improve much more in 
fact I consider they are going backwards now they have been disheartened, constant promises 
and nothing coming of any of them’.129 
The extension of company training meant that battalion and brigade training did not 
commence until February 1915.130 These larger exercises were overseen and umpired by senior 
commanders. Unfortunately, they were not always successful. Brudenell White admitted to 
‘feeling depressed’ as a result of a poor divisional manoeuvre, while the night attack exercise of 
the 2nd Australian Brigade in March 1915 was ‘not good’.131 Comments on the Australian and 
New Zealand Division’s operations also highlighted significant deficiencies, mostly 
fundamental in nature, including the inadvisability of laying down ‘hard and fast rules’, 
indifference around communications, and the ‘injudicious’ distribution of troops. 132  To 
compound matters further, some formations completed progressive training quicker than others 
resulting in a lack of uniformity between formations. Monash recalled how ‘we [4th Australian 
Brigade] have already taken part in three large Divisional Field operations with every man out 
and spread out over miles of country - while in the case of those who left Australia with 
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Bridges, they have not, so far, although they have been in Egypt ten weeks, had a single day’s 
Brigade training, much less Divisional training’.133 In fact, Bridges’ 1st Australian Division 
never got to the stage of divisional manoeuvres. The usefulness of these large scale manoeuvres 
was debatable given the nature of terrain and the type of warfare experienced at Gallipoli.134 
The only tangible benefit of the desert training lay in the establishment of a tactical foundation 
upon which the units could build. However, this training could not make up for the lack of 
experience, particularly at the junior levels of command, nor could it rectify weaknesses in staff 
work. 
During the AIF’s operations at Gallipoli, there were developments in Egypt that aimed 
to improve the training of AIF reinforcements and future drafts. These improvements can be 
largely attributed to the work of a British regular officer, Major-General James Spens, 
commanding Cairo Military District. As Robert Stevenson argues, it was Spens’ work that laid 
the foundations for the Australian and New Zealand Training Centre at Tel-el-Kebir. Although 
Spens was outside Australian jurisdiction, reporting to Sir John Maxwell, he established a 
system whereby each of the AIF’s brigades at the front were represented by a battalion at the 
depot.135 These battalions were designed to provide replacement personnel. Staffed by British 
regular officers, and despite taking time to bed in, these battalions produced good results from 
September 1915 onwards. 
Following the evacuation from Gallipoli, AIF troops reorganised into four divisions.136 
To facilitate the training of reinforcements for these divisions, the Training Centre at Tel-el-
Kebir came under GHQ control and was placed under the command of Major-General Steuart 
Hare, a British regular, in April 1916. Hare was supported by a number of regular officers as 
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instructors, including Lieutenant-Colonel George Cape, formerly GSO1 to the 53rd Division.137 
Hare’s remit was to ‘take in hand the thorough and systematic training of all troops’, but he was 
encouraged to correspond with Australian and New Zealand Headquarters on matters he 
considered necessary.138 The situation he found at Tel-el-Kebir was far from satisfactory. Not 
only were there concerns around the discipline of Australian troops, but there were also issues 
as to the nature of authority. For the purposes of command and training, it was recommended 
that all of the AIF’s training units come under Hare’s command, while Colonel Reginald 
Spencer-Browne, the centre’s commandant, should only have responsibility for the 
administration of the units.139 It was also recommended that training at the centre should be 
confined to company exercises.140 Hare was unconvinced by the arrangement, recalling that 
‘Spencer-Brown is quite pleasant about it, but as I am responsible to GHQ for the training of all 
troops in the camp, and he is under me and yet is responsible to Gen[eral] Sellheim, the position 
is an impossible one’.141 For Hare, the reason the system eventually worked was due to Spencer-
Browne’s willingness to subjugate his authority. If Spencer-Browne departed and 
a ‘cantankerous and pigheaded man took his place’, then the system would have been 
unworkable.142 For the Australian government, however, this represented a direct infringement 
on the AIF’s autonomy, particularly when concerns were raised over Spencer-Browne’s 
suitability. In a letter to Pearce, Godley acknowledged that the centre was on a ‘better footing’, 
but Spencer-Browne’s ‘limitations do not admit of his satisfactorily training and administering 
such a large body of men. What is really wanted is a good, live, young, active, energetic Major-
General. Possibly this may be supplied by the War Office in England’.143 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Along with the reorganisation of the Training Centre, the AIF had access to a range of 
formal training classes, which ran under the auspices of the Imperial School of Instruction at 
Zeitoun. Besides courses for training officers and NCOs, it also ran machine-gun, Lewis gun, 
signal and telephone, artillery, Stokes gun, and bombing classes.144 To ensure equal training 
opportunities, the Imperial School was brought under the control of GOC Egypt with 50 per 
cent of vacancies allotted to the ANZAC.145 Bringing the school under GOC Egypt increased 
the potential for uniformity of training across formations still in Egypt. These higher level 
courses, which focused on the training of instructors and specialists, were designed to 
supplement divisional schools and individual training at unit level. The latter warranted 
particular attention given the dilution of experience after Gallipoli and the considerable 
expansion of the AIF. In an attempt to mitigate this, the ANZAC staff issued a series of circular 
memoranda to provide guidance on the most valuable types of training. These memoranda 
advocated ‘section, platoon, company and specialist training’, but ‘too much close order drill 
must be avoided’.146 Lectures and hints were aimed at young or recently promoted officers to 
ensure that their training kept the men interested. As one pamphlet outlined, ‘owing to the 
limited military experience of many of the company and platoon commanders, it has been 
noticed that some of them soon get to the end of their ideas regarding training and then devise 
exercises which are of little value’.147 
 Both British and Australian higher commands raised concerns around the efficacy of 
the training. In a letter to Colonel Wigram, Birdwood confessed he did not ‘truthfully feel that 
any of them [4th and 5th Australian Divisions] are thoroughly trained divisions, and they are not 
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equal in this respect to the two I took with me to the Peninsula last April’.148 The British high 
command was far from charitable in its own assessment. In a private letter to Robertson in 
March 1916, Murray saw the Australians’ ‘lack of discipline and the inefficiency of their 
officers’, as well as their ‘enormous conceit in themselves’ as considerable handicaps.149 This 
evaluation was formalised in his report on the efficiency of the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. 
Murray deemed the officers ‘poor in military knowledge, and herein lies the chief trouble both 
as regards infantry and artillery. With good regular officers who know how to train and 
command them, the infantry would soon be turned into a magnificent fighting force’.150 
However, no regular officers were available to command the new Australian formations and, 
even if there had been, such a move would mean negotiating a political minefield. Sir John 
Maxwell was inclined towards leniency in his assessment. He suggested that the shortage of 
trained officers was due to the high casualties at Gallipoli, as well as there being ‘no smart 
regular battalion to set a standard by’. For Maxwell, ‘a Territorial Division in the making’ was 
not conducive to the learning of discipline or soldiering.151 Birdwood, fully aware of the 
limitations within the AIF’s command structure, informed Pearce that he hoped ‘to send all our 
young officers… to regular training schools either in England or France, before taking up their 
duties with the regiments. This will be a tremendous boon to us, and will ensure regiments [are] 
getting men who are, at all events, tolerably trained in the many details of company officers’ 
work’.152 This was a clear acknowledgement of the AIF’s dependence on the British army’s 
training infrastructure and training methods. 
 Upon its eventual arrival in France, the AIF made considerable use of British training 
schools, particularly for the training of company commanders, platoon sergeants, and various 
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specialists.153 Unlike their dominance in Egypt, the I and II ANZAC were now just two out of 
eighteen corps in the BEF. More than ever, they had to adhere to the British way of working. 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Peck, for example, was the first Australian officer to attend Bonham-
Carter’s senior staff school at Hesdin. Bonham-Carter recalled that, when he first arrived, Peck 
was ‘like a nervous foal bucking and blowing through his nostrils in his anxiety and fear that he 
would be treated with lack of friendliness or courtesy by a lot of stiff regular staff officers’.154 
However, Peck ‘found himself among the friendliest and most generous minded lot of men he 
had ever met. He wanted to apologise for his former ideas and ignorance, and that no Australian 
would be allowed to run down the “Imperial” Army in his presence’.155 
 Through the use of military publications and the training school system, the British 
promoted uniformity of method across its organisation. The AIF benefitted from these two 
formal methods of learning during its own integration process. In the main, the AIF was 
required to conform to the British way of working, particularly in the opening phases of the war. 
However, enough flexibility existed within this formal system to allow for innovation, 
individuality, and even divergence at the tactical level. Indeed, as each commander trained his 
own formation, the possibility for divergence and individuality was increased. Nevertheless, this 
training was carried out within the formal parameters laid down in pamphlets such as SS152. 
The various AIF training schools were modelled on SS152’s template. For the AIF to function 
as a working part of the larger British army, this shared template was vital. Although Bentley 
argues that ‘the spirit of criticism and independence’ allowed for greater innovation and 
creativity in the AIF’s tactical thinking, it is important to recognise that the AIF’s learning 
process was intertwined with that of the entire army.156 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 AWM, AWM4 1/44/8, 2nd Australian Division GS War Diary, 29 March 1916; AWM, AWM4 
1/48/3, 4th Australian Division GS War Diary, 20 June 1916; AWM, AWM25 881/11, Schools. Training 
Instructions and Organisation. GHQ Recommendations, BGGS I ANZAC to MGGS Second Army, 7 
September 1916. The I ANZAC School did not open until 11 November 1916. 
154 CAC, Bonham-Carter Papers, BCHT 9/2, Autobiography, n.d., p. 26. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Bentley, ‘Champion of Anzac’, p. 300. 
! 249 
Before considering the AIF’s efforts to self-integrate, it is worth summarising briefly how its 
integration process evolved over time. From its initial establishment to its blooding at Gallipoli, 
the AIF was subject to a fairly prescriptive process. Imperial officers were prevalent at all levels 
of command, and also played a role as specialist instructors. Memos abounded, gently 
reminding AIF officers to consult FSR or one of the many SS pamphlets published during the 
war. This oversight was to be expected whilst the AIF learned the fundamentals of war. 
Although Gallipoli provided it with combat experience, the expansion and reorganisation of the 
AIF led to a dilution of experience. This resulted in Imperial officers remaining in command 
positions. As the force gained in experience, the relative prescription of the process decreased. 
For the purposes of interoperability, the AIF was still expected to utilise existing publications 
and training infrastructure. However, its growing experience, particularly from May 1916 
onwards, resulted in greater autonomy and a lighter touch from its Imperial overseers. Boosted 
later by the policy of ‘Australianisation’, it was this growing experience that gave the AIF the 
opportunity and, arguably, the confidence to self-integrate. 
 The beginnings of self-integration were clear following the AIF’s arrival on the 
Western Front. It sought to benefit from the rapid and organised transmission of experience and 
information from long serving, often British, formations through the process of attachment. This 
was a common practice and one familiar to the Australians who were used to instruct incoming 
Kitchener army divisions at Gallipoli.157 These attachments were often arranged by individual 
commanders as a way of self-integrating. Attachments allowed for knowledge sharing through 
heuristic learning, whilst also offering a practical way of integrating formations into a new 
expeditionary force.158 In March 1916, for example, officers and men from each battery in the 
1st Australian Division were attached to the 9th Division’s artillery for instruction, while in 
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April of the same year, five officers and twenty ORs were attached to the 28th Brigade.159 The 
AIF divisions that arrived on the Western Front in June 1916, such as the 4th Division, took 
advantage of the experience already gained by the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions. Charles 
Rosenthal, then temporary commander of the 4th Australian Division, actively liaised with the 
divisional and artillery headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, as well as the New Zealand 
Division, regarding the ‘attachment of officers and men for instruction’.160 
 Unlike its fellow divisions, the 3rd Australian Division received far more systematic 
training, with full use made of the British army’s manuals and wider training infrastructure. It 
also showcased a number of self-integration methods. Not only did Monash have two Imperial 
staff officers to support him, he also had access to the existing schools system as well as his 
own experience of fighting on the Western Front. Monash was preoccupied with practicality: 
the AIF had ‘20 months experience of war [and] there will not be a minute wasted in teaching 
things the men will afterwards have to unlearn. My 6 weeks in France will be a powerful help to 
me in this respect’.161 Having witnessed firsthand the benefit of the school system, he took full 
advantage of it, sending his officers and NCOs to Army schools and courses – both in Britain 
and France - to be trained as instructors.162 In one of his first conferences as commander, 
Monash outlined his attitude towards training and instruction, noting the importance of getting 
‘instructors away to courses and carry[ing] on instruction of others concurrently’, while 
pressing for the ‘higher training of officers at divisional school in subjects such as 
reconnaissance, order and message writing…’163 He was also desirous for ‘experienced officers’ 
from France, in order to benefit from their ‘better understanding of requirements’.164 Using the I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ANZAC’s circular and training memoranda as a template, the 3rd Australian Division issued its 
own versions, offering guidance on aspects such as bayonet training and general points on how 
to be an effective platoon commander.165 
In keeping with the army’s approach, heuristic learning through the establishment of 
‘The Bustard’ trench system at Lark Hill on Salisbury Plain supplemented these institutional 
methods. The 3rd Australian Division dug ‘The Bustard’ between August and September 1916 
for the purpose of familiarising troops with trench conditions, including experience of live-fire 
training. Monash aimed for a system where brigades could ‘go to live for several days at a 
stretch and then carry out a complete relief’.166 This system would be used to simulate assaults, 
practice reliefs, and consolidate positions. Drawing on his own experience, Monash was keen to 
add realism and atmosphere wherever possible, hoping to involve the artillery and RFC during 
exercises. 167  The decision to establish this working trench system demonstrated greater 
autonomy and training sophistication within the AIF, and provided a good example of its self-
integration into the British army. 
 Although Monash was given a free hand in the training of his command, he was still 
subject to quality control through a series of inspections by British regular officers. These 
officers included Generals Sir Henry Sclater (GOC Southern Command), Sir John French (CinC 
Home Forces), and Sir Francis Howard (Inspector of Infantry). In a letter to his wife, Monash 
complained that his division was ‘being inspected to death, and it does disturb the training 
so’.168 However, the inspections were necessary in order to identify areas for improvement. In 
August 1916, Howard’s inspection drew attention to the ‘elementary stage’ of bayonet training 
in the 3rd Australian Division owing to ‘the different systems obtaining in Australia and with 
us’. Howard went on to suggest the value of despatching British instructors to Australia in order 
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to ‘guide it in the right lines’.169 For the most part, Howard’s inspection was favourable, and 
concluded with the remark that ‘the Division promises so well that if left intact and supplied 
with rifles it should be ready to go out fully trained in the class of warfare now obtaining by the 
3rd week in October at the latest’.170 Howard’s prediction was not far off the mark; the 3rd 
Australian Division arrived on the Western Front in November 1916.171 
 
Although there was suitable flexibility in the British army’s methods, the process of integrating 
formations into a well-established organisation was fraught with tension for both newcomer and 
long-standing member. As this section will show, the process was far from perfect, particularly 
as it involved a certain degree of unlearning and confrontation of conflicting values and 
expectations. To become a part of the army’s organisational culture, the AIF had to learn the 
army’s way of doing things. New members had to interact with existing members of the 
organisation in order to learn what was expected of them, and what they could or could not do. 
The army’s use of both formal and heuristic methods to integrate the AIF and other newcomer 
formations shows a sophisticated understanding of its learning requirements. The fact that the 
AIF was considered a corps d’élite by the end of the war is in no small part due to the army’s 
integration methods.  
 For long serving members of the army, there was an element of doubt around the AIF’s 
ability and wariness over its distinct sense of self. For some, this sense of self was seen as 
‘conceit’.172 Prior to the AIF’s arrival on the Western Front, there were concerns over its ability 
to fit in with the British way of doing things despite its combat experience and its desert 
training. Questions around its discipline were most notable. Lynden-Bell, for example, 
remarked that ‘The Australians frankly terrify me. Their want of discipline is something awful’, 
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while Cowans teased Godley over the latter’s ‘obstreperous Australians’, commenting that ‘they 
are rather a handful’.173 Officers in the AIF realised that the development and maintenance of 
discipline was a vital aspect of their self-integration. Training memos prior to the AIF’s 
despatch to France emphasised the importance of discipline, noting that: 
 
Improvement in training must be accompanied by improvement in discipline. 
To be a soldier a man must realise the necessity of loyally observing orders both 
on and off parade. The chief outwards signs of the spirit of discipline are 
keenness of interest in work, in training or on duty, smartness of movement at 
all times, pride in one’s personal appearance, cheerful recognition of authority 
on all occasions.174 
 
 The AIF’s arrival on the Western Front was met with concerns around the force’s 
combat effectiveness. However, this was not just limited to the AIF. As we have seen, it was a 
widely held prejudice against formations that had experienced combat in subsidiary theatres. 
Commenting on the 29th Division, for example, Rawlinson wrote how it wanted ‘a bit of 
smartening up’, and that the division has ‘an idea that the only heavy fighting that has been 
done has been in Gallipoli’.175  Similar comments were levelled at the AIF, Lynden-Bell 
remarking that, ‘after all the laudatory accounts of their doings as soldiers which 
have appeared in the press for the past year or so, it is very difficult to convince them that 
for purposes of fighting in France they know practically nothing’.176 Surprisingly, even senior 
officers were not spared criticism, Murray observing that, although Brudenell White was ‘a very 
able man’, he ‘must be made to understand that in France his work on the General Staff will be 
so exacting as to utterly prohibit his continuing to run the Australian Forces generally both in 
France and Egypt’.177 There was a tendency within the AIF to contrast its previous experiences 
with those found on the Western Front. In a letter to his wife, Monash wrote that ‘It hasn’t taken 
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us many hours to tumble into the regular routine of trench life - but oh dear! compared with 
Anzac, the people here don’t know what war is’ before going on to declare that ‘war in France 
is simply child’s play to what it was in Gallipoli’.178 Birdwood expressed similar sentiments, 
pointing out to Pearce that the AIF’s experience at Pozières was ‘not looked upon… as such a 
great feat as the CinC and others here regard it, for it certainly does not compare with the attack 
on Lone Pine in actual hand to hand and determined fighting’.179  
 This initial prejudice lessened as the AIF proved itself on the Western Front, but there 
were still instances later in the war where its capabilities and bearing were criticised, notably in 
Palestine. In July 1917, Lynden-Bell wrote to the War Office commenting that ‘I only wish we 
could get some really good Brigadiers from France for the Australian brigades, but of course for 
political reasons it is quite impossible to get rid of our present Australian brigadiers. They are 
all good brave fellows, but lack knowledge of combined cavalry action’.180 In February 1918, 
Chauvel, already conscious of his own limitations, also raised concerns around perceptions of 
the AIF in Egypt: 
 
There is no doubt that we Australians are decidedly unpopular, here as 
elsewhere, but I am afraid we have our manners entirely to blame. I am always 
trying to impress upon our people that they are making themselves intensely 
disliked by their discourtesy and that they are being made to pay for it… It is 
certainly being brought home to the Anzacs that they are no longer the only 
pebbles on the beach and I don’t know that it will do them any harm!181 
 
Although the raw material was generally good, there were still concerns around the knowledge 
and aptitude of the AIF’s commanders, particularly in the Light Horse. Both Chauvel and 
Howard-Vyse acknowledged these concerns in their joint call for a Desert Mounted Corps 
‘School for Young Officers’.182 Based on SS152’s guidance, this school instructed ‘lately 
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commissioned officers… in their duties as officers, and in the tactics of troop leading’.183 It 
aimed to supplement instruction provided at GHQ schools at Zeitoun, as well as that found in 
divisional schools and courses of instruction. After receiving GHQ authorisation, the school 
opened on 18 February 1918. Its establishment not only highlights the army’s flexibility, but 
also serves as yet another example of AIF units utilising army infrastructure to ensure the 
continued and efficient training of their officers. Despite these intentions, as well as the 
infrastructure and expertise at the AIF’s disposal, the constraints of time and the demands of 
war remained major challenges. In the face of these challenges, the AIF did not simply maintain 
its success in integrating; it built on this success to become a corps d’élite. 
 
The decision to expose the AIF to both formal and heuristic methods is evidence of the army’s 
sophisticated understanding of learning and knowledge sharing. These formal methods, refined 
through the integration of British territorial and Kitchener army formations, encouraged 
uniformity between operational theatres and formations themselves irrespective of their 
nationality. The use of heuristic methods shows that the AIF was not treated purely ‘according 
to British drill-book methods’.184 These informal methods were often the most effective way of 
integrating new contingents.185 In this respect, the army showed itself to be sensitive to the 
political, cultural, and social mores of this particular national contingent.  
 By mid-1916, the AIF’s troops and commanders had proven themselves in combat and 
had enough experience to operate without the oversight of Imperial commanders and mentors. 
The overwhelming majority of Australian officers at division and brigade level suggests that the 
army’s methods had succeeded where they mattered most – at the operational and tactical level. 
This, coupled with the inherent flexibility of the army’s methods, allowed the AIF to self-
integrate. Operating within the existing infrastructure, AIF formations arranged their own 
attachment schemes, along with more practical methods, such as the development of ‘The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Bustard’ system. For the purposes of interoperability, uniformity of training and method was 
desired. However, this did not prevent low level innovation. It was here that the character and 
individuality of formations shone through. Rather than adopting a doctrinaire attitude, the army 
had to be sensitive to the various new sub-cultures that now existed within its organisation.  
 The army recognised that it needed to invest in a series of methods that would provide a 
holistic integration process for newcomers. It could not favour formal over informal methods. 
Its desire to develop these mutually supportive methods demonstrates that the army had a 
greater awareness of the importance of learning than previously thought. It also reveals a 
preference for autonomy and initiative that continued to support its pre-war ethos. The success 
of these methods is evident. As one general remarked, ‘it is not possible to turn civilians into 
trained commanders in a few months - the wonder is that they have picked up so much and done 
as well as they have!’186 
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CONCLUSION'!
The course of the campaign in this theatre followed closely the course of events in the 
main Western theatre. Thus, the first period, the defence of the Canal, corresponded to 
the first check of the enemy’s onrush in France and Belgium; the period of the advance 
through the Sinai desert, to the general development of the Allied strength… the 1917 
advance, to the period of increased Allied pressure which exhausted the enemy’s 
reserves; while the last advance coincided with the final Allied counter-offensive.1 
 
General Sir Edmund Allenby 
 
I would like to emphasise how to study history. The real value is not a remembrance of 
dates or number or details, but first and foremost the study of human nature. For 
successful war depends on a knowledge of human nature and how to handle it.2  
 
General Sir John Shea 
 
When the guns fell silent on 11 November 1918, the British army had fought across the fields of 
France and Flanders, the deserts of Mesopotamia and the Sinai, the mountains of Italy and 
Salonika, the craggy cliffs of Gallipoli, and the jungles of East Africa. It had expanded from a 
small, professional force into a mass, multi-national citizen army. It had fought not only with 
fists and bludgeons, but also with brains and rapiers. In short, at war’s end, it was a military 
both experienced and transformed. This final chapter will summarise the findings of this study 
and consider its implications for three questions: the effectiveness of the army at learning and 
adaptation; the relationship between learning and innovation within military institutions; and the 
nature of large organisations when faced with change. 
 This study has demonstrated that learning within the army was more complex than 
hitherto thought. The army proved to be effective and institutionally capable of learning and 
adapting both on and beyond the Western Front. This effectiveness was contingent on a number 
of different factors, which broadly align with the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the 
study. The army’s ethos enhanced its ability to learn and adapt. It also influenced its approach to 
learning. While it developed a series of formal methods, the army also tolerated and encouraged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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informal methods. This diversity underpinned its flexibility, which enabled it to integrate 
civilians, combat formations, and national contingents. Through a combination of its ethos and 
flexibility, the army promoted a culture of innovation across its theatres where individuals were 
given the opportunity to influence institutional behaviour. 
Fundamental to the army’s learning effectiveness was the influence of its pre-war ethos. 
This proved an important and enduring framework throughout and, as David French has shown, 
beyond the First World War. Though the army expanded and changed almost beyond 
recognition, its ethos survived. Its enduring nature was, in part, due to wider social and cultural 
aspects. It was shaped by, and representative of, the values of civil society. In some respects, 
civilians who joined the army already had a latent understanding of this ethos. Its survival was 
also ensured through implicit and explicit means. The regular army still dominated the highest 
levels of command. Commanders-in-Chief and senior generals were imbued with this ethos and, 
through their personal command styles, were able to impress it on to lower levels of command. 
Attachments and mentoring schemes offered another implicit way of instilling this ethos, as 
seen with the integration of territorial, Kitchener army, and AIF formations. Publications and 
training schools promoted this ethos explicitly. Pre-war manuals such as Infantry Training and 
FSR were used throughout the war, and, where possible, regular army instructors were sought to 
run training schools across the various expeditionary forces. 
 This ethos provided the army with flexibility, enabling it to recalibrate its approach to 
learning quickly in response to its increasingly civilian composition. This study, therefore, 
refutes Murray’s assertion that ‘the bureaucratic framework and the culture of the pre-war 
period ensured that learning took an inordinate amount of time’.3 The army realised early on in 
the war that principles and pragmatism were adequate for those who had military experience, 
but for newcomers they were not enough. The army, therefore, embarked on a far more 
systematic approach to knowledge capture and dissemination. This also extended to the 
subsidiary theatres. Though knowledge was disseminated in a standardised format, it remained !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for each force to decide whether to ignore or adapt this. The various expeditionary forces and, 
indeed, the corps and divisions with them were not unitary. They each had their own 
idiosyncrasies and ways of operating. The army was, therefore, a culture of sub-cultures. 
However, these sub-cultures and idiosyncrasies were still consonant with the values and norms 
of the army’s wider ethos. 
This ethos also determined the army’s approach to learning. The relationship between 
learning and ethos was one of reciprocal interdependence. In this respect, the study supports 
Foley and Catignani’s respective research into the impact of culture on learning. However, it 
also provides a point of departure from Foley’s assertion that the army prioritised informal 
methods. Evidence suggests that the army’s approach to learning was necessarily complex with 
both informal and formal methods utilised in equal measure. These two kinds of avenue ran 
alongside one another. In the opening months of the war, the army pursued an initially ad hoc 
approach, but it was not long before it recognised the need for a central knowledge repository. 
The deluge of publications and training schools across all theatres suggests a heavy-handed, 
interventionist approach. These publications and schools remained in force throughout the war, 
but that is not to say that informal methods were any less important or any less prevalent. As in 
other large organisations and indeed with the modern army today, individuals turned to each 
other, gathering knowledge unofficially. This was aided by certain connections between 
individuals, whether through shared military service, attendance at the same public school, or 
through other social circumstances. 
 Although the formal-informal split is useful, this study has shown the inadequacy of 
such an over-simplistic model. Such a split masks the complexity of organisational learning. It 
is perhaps more accurate to posit the army’s approach to learning in terms of systematic and 
incidental efforts. Allenby’s appointment to command the EEF, for example, had a systematic 
effect. His impact on the force was highly personal, but his appointment was ultimately 
determined by the organisation. The casual interactions between former colleagues, or between 
members of neighbouring divisions were incidental in nature. This was a strength, in that it 
! 260 
could aid rapid adaptation, but also a weakness, potentially leading to the loss of knowledge. 
Though encouraging and attempting to draw on these incidental exchanges, the army was not 
able to capture all informal knowledge. Within some branches, such as mining, there was a 
higher level of success in this respect. The development of Mining Notes provided a systematic 
way of codifying incidental exchanges, capturing low level experiences, and disseminating 
them both vertically and horizontally. Rather than solely focusing on the top-down distribution 
of SS pamphlets, this study’s examination of other methods, such as Mining Notes and 
incidental exchanges, has extended Foley’s concept of horizontal learning to accommodate the 
British army.  
The army’s varying approaches to learning speaks to additional organisational tensions: 
ad hocism versus standardisation, principles versus prescription, and diversity versus 
uniformity. The publication of SS152, for example, typified these tensions with its simultaneous 
call for uniformity and diversity of method; while the army’s vacillation between ad hoc and 
systematic approaches to personnel selection provides another example. These tensions were far 
from ‘unproblematically compatible’.4 They were ever-present. The army attempted to deal with 
these tensions by encouraging formations and individuals to innovate within institutional 
parameters. Unsurprisingly, this led to considerable diversity of method even within the more 
systematic approaches, such as training schools and publications. Expeditionary forces often 
amended recommended syllabi in response to differing tactical and geographical circumstances, 
while formations interpreted and adapted publications to reflect their local situations. 
 This flexible approach was not stumbled upon by accident, nor was it limited to a 
particular expeditionary force. It was a deliberate policy. Although institutional methods 
existed, territorial and Kitchener army formations, as well as national contingents, practiced 
self-integration in the form of horizontal learning. Even with the ‘Indianisation’ policy, for 
example, EEF GHQ was averse to laying down ‘any uniform standard’. Corps and divisions 
were empowered to develop their own methods for integrating Indian units into their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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establishments. Similarly, the appointment of civilian experts, with or without military rank and 
uniform, was contingent on the situation in each force. A ‘one size fits all’ approach across all 
theatres would have been both ineffective and a positive danger. 
The army had to be responsive, sensitive, and flexible to the needs of its forces. This 
responsiveness was particularly important for organisational learning. At the beginning of this 
study, organisational learning was defined as ‘the process of improving actions through better 
knowledge and understanding’.5 Broadly speaking, the army learned in two ways: first, through 
the learning of its members, and secondly, through integrating new members with new 
knowledge. By doing this, the army promoted a culture of innovation that went beyond the 
individual efforts of men such as Maxse and Geddes. These two individuals were merely 
examples of, rather than exceptions to, the rule. The army showed a willingness to interact with, 
and reach out for, the advice of those with recognised expertise whether they were civilians or 
soldiers. As a result, individuals were given the opportunity to influence institutional behaviour. 
However, this culture of innovation was greater than the individual’s independent relationship 
with the organisation. Rather, it was the interdependence of individuals that proved key. For 
change to take place, a network of individuals was required. In this respect, this study supports 
and builds on Goya’s analyses of innovation. Although an individual often came up with an 
innovative idea, it was for higher command to embrace a role that involved selecting, 
supporting, and spreading these ideas. There were a number of individuals – sponsors, 
facilitators, and entrepreneurs - who sat between the innovator and the higher command to 
smooth over organisational resistance. This network of individuals ensured that a culture of 
innovation pervaded the entire institution. 
 Civilian initiatives were a key part of this culture. The army was not an insular 
organisation, nor was it averse to change or new knowledge. It could not afford such an attitude 
when fighting a war against a rival military-industrial system. Chemical warfare, military 
mining, and inland water transport all resulted from the army’s decision to listen to ‘outsiders’. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The employment of civilian experts to head up transport missions and the implementation of 
efficiency measures, routine in the business world, provide additional examples of this outward-
facing attitude. The army embraced such measures, willingly incorporating the language of 
business and efficiency into its day to day processes. These measures permeated throughout the 
army, both on and beyond the Western Front; from the card index of the Department of 
Organisation, to the ‘science of statistics’ in the Transportation Directorate, to the EEF’s ledger-
based accounting system. 
 The army’s record was not spotless, however. Snobbery, intolerance, and ‘Blimpish 
pockets’ were inevitable. The reactionary attitude of men such as Stuart-Wortley, Clayton, and 
Sir Ronald Maxwell was used by contemporaries such as Lloyd George as a stick with which to 
beat the seemingly conservative army. Yet these attitudes were far from the norm, far less 
widespread, and far from unique to the military. Indeed, for large businesses like Brunner 
Mond, Armstrong Whitworth, and Krupp, the war was far from ‘plain sailing’, leading to 
significant, often unwanted, adjustment and upheaval. Certain departments or products were 
mothballed, machinery was constantly readjusted, labour diluted, while new manufacturing 
technologies and products were demanded and devoured by the military-industrial machine.6 
The war required both militaries and businesses to change. However, this was not easy. Change 
required individuals to modify their beliefs, look beyond the boundaries of their communities, 
and break with long-standing routines. Change is often perceived as threatening, particularly for 
those who feel that their job might be at risk. The army was aware of such threats. However, 
rather than idly sitting by, higher command helped prepare for change. It levered the army’s 
ethos, focusing on cohesion, communication, and collaboration, whilst also encouraging 
innovators to find their own ways of making change more palatable. 
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 In summary, through a combination of its pre-war ethos and increased fluidity in 
wartime, the army displayed organisational and cultural flexibility, allowing for high levels of 
learning and adaptation. This was not limited to a single formation, branch, or expeditionary 
force. It was an institutional undertaking. Unsurprisingly, this process was necessarily complex 
and far from even. The methods used to realise this were not always precise, nor were they 
always effective. However, with its preference for practical solutions, the army was prepared to 
look beyond its boundaries, considering non-traditional methods, as it sought to reckon with the 
challenges of modern war. 
 
Learning, and the change that accompanies it, is a complex process. By examining the army 
institutionally, this study has revealed the extent to which its learning process was influenced by 
other institutions and agencies that sat outside the immediate military organisation. This speaks 
to the intricacy of a process that has, for the most part, been previously understood in a rather 
inward-looking, insular context. By thinking about learning as a collaborative process, it is 
possible to understand the links between certain individuals and institutions that enabled this 
process to function. This study provides a point of departure for our understanding of the army’s 
learning process beyond the usual focus on tactical development. By focusing on the process 
rather than the outcome, it has highlighted the importance of factors such as organisational 
culture, human agency, as well as institutional and individual resistance. These factors, 
particularly those relating to human nature, have often been neglected in analyses of the army’s 
learning process, which has encouraged a view of increasing competence. The reality, as this 
study has shown, was much more complex and fraught. Part of this tension was not so much to 
do with the resistance of elites, but the sheer amount of knowledge generated. While it is 
tempting to anthropomorphise the army, assigning it learning qualities, its essence and ability to 
learn is embodied in its individuals, rather than its formal processes. While the study has 
enhanced our understanding of learning in the British army of the First World War, it also has 
implications for our broader understanding of military innovation. It has shown that the links 
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between theatres and formations are worth exploring to understand how learning and adaptation 
are practiced institutionally. It has also shown that a vectored view of innovation is too 
simplistic. While Kollars’ ‘tolerance of creativity’ has proved to apply to the British army, the 
evidence suggests that the army also encouraged creativity. By moving away from front line 
units, it is clear that a considered, pragmatic approach to adaptation took place across the 
military institution. Indeed, as this study has shown, such fluidity was not limited to those 
militaries fighting in modern, counterinsurgency operations. Even in an unlimited, total war, the 
British army displayed fluid tendencies. While by no means a ‘flat’ organisation, it was willing 
to listen to dissenters, promote self-reliance, and subvert the chain of command where 
necessary. 
Although this study has considered how the army learned in wartime, its findings also 
have implications for our understanding of how large organisations negotiate and respond to 
change. The army experienced some of the same challenges and barriers faced by all 
organisations, notably resistance to change, ‘Not Invented Here’ syndrome, and the need to 
integrate newcomers. Though the army was unique in its function and role, the difficulties it 
faced in terms of learning and adaptation were far from unique. Before and during the First 
World War, parallels were drawn between the army and business. In 1907, Mackinder had 
called for the army administrator to be transformed into a ‘soldier businessman’, while Cowans 
was likened to a ‘Managing Director’, Haig a ‘master sales manager’, and the whole army an 
‘amazing business institution’.7 
In some respects, the British army of the First World War was similar to a multinational 
corporation, with its home base at Whitehall and subsidiary branches across the world. The 
army experienced similar concerns to those that confronted such corporations, namely the 
reluctance to adopt a ‘one size fits all’ policy, the importance of promoting a shared culture, and 
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the problem of geographical dispersion.8 With its pre-war experience of fighting across the 
globe, the army refined or developed a number of ways to overcome these concerns. The use of 
liaison officers, secondments, and attachments allowed for subsidiary theatres to benefit from 
innovations taking place on the Western Front. Less tangible, however, was the importance of 
its ethos or ‘corporate culture’. This encouraged an entrepreneurial attitude and a non-parochial 
mindset, mitigating the potential liabilities associated with bureaucracy and stagnation. 
Corporate culture determines how an organisation responds to change. For the army of the First 
World War, it determined how it fought, how it identified lessons, how it innovated, and, 
ultimately, how it put knowledge in power. !
 !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 L. M. Lucas, ‘The Role of Culture on Knowledge Transfer: The Case of the Multinational Corporation’, 
The Learning Organization 13 (3) (2006), pp. 271-272. 
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